Case law

Northwestern National Insurance v. Fishback

130 Wash. 490 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 7, 1924

without due process; and that the right to contract for one’s services in a lawful calling is a right guaranteed by the constitution; and that, under the constitution, every individual is entitled to all privileges and immunities … times receive fair and equitable treatment; it is merely an interference with what has always been one of the ordinary businesses engaged in by whoever saw fit to do so; it prescribes no mental or moral qualifications, establishes

Herron v. Tribune Publishing Co.

108 Wash. 2d 162 · Washington Supreme Court · May 7, 1987

The reason ... for granting absolute immunity is not free speech or public welfare alone. . . . … Regardless of the reasonableness of Herron's actions, the odd posture of the petition was clearly a matter of important public interest.

Potter v. Washington State Patrol

166 P.3d 684 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 30, 2007

The State argues that Savage is inapplicable as a qualified immunity case. It suggests that to rely on Savage would erode a distinction between privileges and immunities. … Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.1984) (stating that privileges involve justifiable motives, while an immunity permits no inquiry into motives)). ¶ 13 The suggested distinction between privileges and immunities is not undermined by

Kalmas v. Wagner

133 Wash. 2d 210 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 25, 1997

Because we find that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the under color of law requirement for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , or qualified immunity. … any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance v. Wiscomb

95 Wash. 2d 373 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1980

Clearly, as the Court of Appeals concluded, *377 one spouse may sue the other for negligence after Freehe . … The established methods of detecting and discouraging fraud can be applied to intrafamily claims without the effect of denying coverage to bona fide claimants. Borst v. Borst, supra .

State ex rel. State Reclamation Board v. Clausen

110 Wash. 525 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 30, 1920

"What was clearly a public use a century ago, may, because of changed conditions, have ceased to be such today. … Some contention is made that 'the law is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal privileges and immunities guaranty of our constitution, because it contemplates, in the disposition of the lands, the giving of preference

Washington State Grange v. Locke

153 Wash. 2d 475 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 20, 2005

Therefore, he vetoed the sections establishing the top two primary, leaving the Montana primary system in its place. … established precedent to this case, we must first look to the common and ordinary meaning of “AN ACT Relating to a qualifying primary” by referring to a dictionary definition of the title’s terms.

Ruff v. County of King

125 Wash. 2d 697 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 19, 1995

The striping along the roadway was clearly visible. The speed limit was clearly posted. … Notwithstanding, Ruff argues that his experts *705 establish the need for a guardrail at the accident site, thus creating an issue of fact as to King County’s negligence.

Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc.

128 Wash. 2d 745 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 7, 1996

The construction industry in particular would suffer, for it is in this industry that we see most clearly the importance of the precise allocation of risk as secured by contract. … We hold Moen’s settlement with Hotchkiss did not conclusively establish that Moen’s payment was for its sole negligence. 3.

Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District

102 Wash. 2d 395 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 30, 1984

They claimed they were immune from prosecution under Const, art. 1, § 19. The court responded by setting forth those activities not protected by the provision. … The right of all constitutionally qualified citizens to vote is fundamental to our representative form of government.

State v. Unga

165 Wash. 2d 95 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 26, 2008

Ed. 2d 169 (1996), adhered to on remand, 124 F.3d 205 (7th Cir. 1997)). ¶45 Some tactics exert the clearly prohibited external or positive pressure, such as the truncheon to the head. See, e.g., Brown v. … Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 132 , 942 P.2d 263 (1997) (establishing the “totality of the circumstances” and stating, “[t]he court must determine whether there is a causal relationship between the promise and the confession”

State v. Hobble

126 Wash. 2d 283 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 13, 1995

The prosecutor refused to grant Appellant immunity for the use of an alias, and Appellant argued that in the absence of a grant of immunity sufficient to cover such testimony, he was entitled to assert a privilege against … Unless the answer to a question would obviously and clearly incriminate the witness, the witness "must establish a factual predicate from which the court can, by use of 'reasonable judicial imagination’ (aided by suggestions

King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board

138 Wash. 2d 161 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1999

The County further argued that the UGA provisions in the CPPs were not internally inconsistent and clearly mandated that the Bear Creek area be designated a UGA. … It held that CPPs may be directive and that King County’s CPPs clearly mandated that the Bear Creek area be designated urban.

State v. Sieyes

168 Wash. 2d 276 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 18, 2010

Ed. 2d 741 (1980)). *293 ¶29 Two textual exceptions qualify the scope of the right to keep and bear arms in the Washington Constitution. … For the purposes of this case, it is enough that the state constitutional right to bear arms is clearly an individual one. III.

State ex rel. Weyant v. City of Seattle

127 Wash. 681 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 2, 1924

Weyant, who could not qualify under that provision. Any other facts which are pertinent will be mentioned as we proceed. … Clearly, in order *688 to justify the removal of Weyant, the commission must find that his qualifications no more than equal those of Messrs. Bean and Crell.

In re the Marriage of Katare

175 Wash. 2d 23 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 16, 2012

According to Brajesh, these cases establish that abduction must be likely before his visitation time may be limited. … While Berry’s formal education was not related to child abduction, an expert may be qualified by experience alone. ER 702.

San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax

160 Wash. 2d 141 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 26, 2007

According to well established law of this court, such an enjoined party is entitled to attorney fees. See also CR 65(c). ¶58 We held in Ino Ino, Inc. v. … No. 94-1558, at 9 (1976)), superseded by statute as to judicial immunity as stated in Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F. Supp. 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)).

State v. Peterson

498 P.3d 937 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 18, 2021

RCW 69.50.410(6) (“Any person . . . who voluntarily applies . . . shall be immune from prosecution.”). … While on their faces, there is some tension between the statutes, when read in its historical context, RCW 69.50.410(3)(a) establishes a mandatory minimum sentence that works in tandem with the sentencing schema established

Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home

Washington Supreme Court · May 12, 2016

The court reasoned, "'A grant of immunity from liability clearly implies that civil liability can exist in the first place."' Beggs, 171 Wn.2d at 78 (quoting Jane Doe v. … Giving a patient morphine without a prescription would qualify as physical abuse by use of a chemical restraint.

State v. Carothers

84 Wash. 2d 256 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 15, 1974

The evidence concerning the condition of the bodies and the premises established beyond any doubt that such crimes had been committed. The only question was whether the petitioner was guilty of them. … The petitioner’s proposed instruction would have qualified the word “accomplice” with the phrase “or one who claims to be an accomplice.”