Case law

Alton v. PHILLIPS CO. v. STATE

65 Wash. 2d 199 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 5, 1964

The purpose of the constitutional provisions, as stated in Huse , is clearly to strike down such legislation. The reasoning in Sirrine v. State, 132 S. C. 241, 128 S. E. 172 (1925), is particularly applicable. … individuals without violating the special privileges and immunities provision of our state constitution.

Seattle-First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co.

91 Wash. 2d 230 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 28, 1978

This, of course, is conduct "immunized" by our statute and not cognizable by the judiciary. … The concept of "successive" tort-feasors applies when none of the multiple tort-feasors could have caused the whole harm suffered and where the harm caused is clearly divisible. See Smith v.

Halverson v. Skagit County

139 Wash. 2d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 9, 1999

to cause such *7 flooding under the common enemy doctrine; and (3) it was immune from liability under RCW 86.12.037. 12 The trial judge excluded the County’s immunity defense and its prescriptive easement and common enemy … Moreover, if a hybrid of eminent domain and tort were recognized, this court would be required to recognize the County’s statutory immunity under RCW 86.12.037. 13 Such immunity is inapplicable only when the alleged violation

Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co.

85 Wash. 503 · Washington Supreme Court · May 18, 1915

We have been cited to no authority, and have been able to find none, which would carry the rule of qualified privilege to the extent here asserted. *514 II. … It does not clearly appear whether this represented one-half of the sale price or the whole sale price.

McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr.

Washington Supreme Court · Dec 27, 2012

As part of our reasoning in Hunter, we also noted that "[t]he unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity in the 1963 act thus clearly -6- McDevitt v. Harborview Med. … As a result, there were no facts in Waples to address the issue of whether article II, section 26, and the legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity, permitted the legislature to establish conditions precedent before

Kittitas Cnty., Corp. v. Sky Allphin, Abc Holdings, Inc.

190 Wash. 2d 691 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 16, 2017

As a result, they qualify as work product under Civil Rule (CR) 26(b)(4). A. … Decisions to this effect confuse the work-product immunity with the attorney-client privilege....

Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe

Washington Supreme Court · Feb 16, 2017

County of Yakima, Anderson, and Smale establish the principle that our superior courts have subject matter jurisdiction over in rem proceedings in certain situations where claims of sovereign immunity are … (dissenting)-It is well established that "tribal sovereign immunity comprehensively protects recognized American Indian tribes from suit absent explicit and 'unequivocal' waiver or abrogation." Wright v.

Gerrard v. Craig

122 Wash. 2d 288 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 9, 1993

which to base a determination of the percentage of total fault attributable to each entity which caused the claimant's damages.[ 11 ] After considering whether an injury resulting from a chain collision automobile accident qualifies … First, that causation is difficult to separate in every case of indivisible injury; and consequently, predicating assignment of fault on establishing causation will create uncertainty for courts and litigants in indivisible

Haslund v. City of Seattle

86 Wash. 2d 607 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 25, 1976

The objection did not specify the court’s failure to instruct on the established elements of the underlying tort theories. … Until a plaintiff suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of negligence, he cannot establish a cause of action.

Billings v. State

27 Wash. 288 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 14, 1902

In other words, the state has retained all its legal rights as a defendant in an action, and has waived nothing but its former immunity from suits. … And the same doctrine is clearly announced by the supreme court of Alabama in State v. Hill, supra, and is recognized as established law in the other cases above cited.

Vet Voice Found. v. Hobbs

4 Wash. 3d 383 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 6, 2025

Voters must establish that they are eligible to vote when they register. RCW 29A.08.010. … PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES Under our state constitution’s privileges and immunities clause, “[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or

State v. Brown

31 Wash. 2d 475 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 20, 1948

Such a ruling would be tantamount to granting him permanent immunity. We find no merit in the second assignment of error. … The record shows them to be amply qualified experts as to the matters about which they testified.

B. F. Goodrich Co. v. State

38 Wash. 2d 663 · Washington Supreme Court · May 15, 1951

Appellant, a New York corporation qualified to do business in the state of Washington, is a manufacturer and wholesaler of various products. … as this was entitled to such immunity.

J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC

184 Wash. 2d 95 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 3, 2015

But subsection 230(c)(1) does not protect the ISP from liability for other causes of action. ¶20 The context of subsection 230(c)(1) also compels the conclusion that it does not establish an immunity. … As discussed in more detail below, this provision clearly shows that Congress contemplated defenses for good faith actions *108 that do not rely on an ISP’s status as a publisher or speaker.

Wright v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corp.

159 Wash. 2d 108 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 7, 2006

economic development of tribal resources to be separated from other governmental functions of the Tribes and placed within the responsibility of persons or entities different from the Council,” id. at 350, it nonetheless clearly … For any business enterprise established with the express purpose of promoting tribal economic development, the extension of immunity arguably furthers “federal policies intended to promote Indian tribal autonomy.”

Lewis v. City of Medina

87 Wash. 2d 19 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 15, 1976

We will, however, state briefly a number of other reasons which support the action of the board and clearly demonstrate such action was not arbitrary and capricious, nor was it contrary to law. … The relevant provision contains the words “would have qualified as a building site.” The subject property would not have qualified under King County standards which required a minimum of 6,000 square feet.

Commercial Electric Light & Power Co. v. Judson

57 L.R.A. 78 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 6, 1899

Immunity from taxation is not one of them. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 186 (5 Sup. Ct. 813) ; Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 Ill. 557 ( 25 N. E. 660 ) ; Spring Valley Waterworks v. … Anderson, supra, that it is a settled principle that franchises are subject to taxation, and it is a firmly established rule in this state that all property not specifically exempt by law is subject to taxation.

Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. Schaaf

1 Wash. 2d 210 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 4, 1939

The appellant, Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Oregon, and qualified to do business in this state. … The next question is whether the appellant has been denied any privileges or immunities which others may enjoy; and, in this connection, it invokes § 12 of Art.

State Ex Rel. Blankenship v. Gaines

136 Wash. 610 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1925

Seattle, supra, holding that there is no difference in meaning between ‘■three-fifths of the voters” and “three-fifths of the qualified voters,” because the word “qualified” adds nothing, since every voter is a qualified … The repetition of the word “registered,” in describing the voters concerned in disincorp oration proceedings throughout the disineorporation statutes, clearly shows the intention of the legislature.

Hanson v. Hutt

83 Wash. 2d 195 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 17, 1974

Both cases are clearly distinguishable, since neither involves the constitutionality of a statute. … many of these women were justifiably disqualified because they voluntarily quit work, or because they were unable to work, or because they were not seeking work, or for any other reasons for which a claimant may not be qualified