Case law

Thomas v. French

99 Wash. 2d 95 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 3, 1983

The contract itself required the school to qualify students for the state cosmetology examination. … The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's eviden-tiary ruling and found the letter admissible on two alternative grounds: At the time it was admitted, the letter was clearly relevant to defendant's cross claim (later

Jacobs v. Brock

66 Wash. 2d 878 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 23, 1965

The guidelines for making this determination are well established in this state: [3, 4] In Johnson v. … She was therefore qualified to testify as an expert witness in regard to such services. In view of the remand, our consideration of the remaining issues raised is unnecessary.

In Re the Estate of Bergau

103 Wash. 2d 431 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 10, 1985

To implement this goal, RCW 84.34.060 provides that the assessor shall consider only current use of qualified property in determining true and fair value. … It was clearly and expressly stated in the will: assessed fair market value. As the majority concedes, the term "assessed fair market value" has only one possible interpretation: fair market value.

State v. Valdobinos

122 Wash. 2d 270 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 9, 1993

He emphasized, "And I think my client clearly is willing to waive his speedy trial right. He has the right to hire counsel of his own choosing." … Count 3: Intent To Deliver While Garibay argues that each of the charges against him were flawed, one of the charges is clearly sufficient.

Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist.

946 P.2d 768 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 13, 1997

The present case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the above cited cases. … However, the Christiansons cannot possibly qualify for the waiver under the second "useful life" criterion.

Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Hogan

22 Wash. 2d 27 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 8, 1944

Gazzam, who is the president and owner of all except qualifying shares of stock in appellant corporation, admitted that he had often seen respondent’s buildings, and that he never made any claim to respondent that appellant … As we stated, according to the line of ordinary high tide, as established by Mr.

Landmark Development, Inc. v. City of Roy

138 Wash. 2d 561 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 22, 1999

We concluded this approach which would have allowed the city to recover more than the actual cost of the system clearly exceeded the city’s statutory authority. … Ed. 2d 487 (1985) (state may not favor established residents over new residents based on view that it may “take care of ‘its own’ ”).

Budget Rent a Car Corp. v. STATE, DOL

31 P.3d 1174 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 4, 2001

For an agency policy to qualify as a "rule" under the APA, two elements are required by statute: "Rule" means any agency order, directive, or regulation of general applicability (a) the violation of which subjects a person … Clearly this is not the case. At most, the statutory phrase "total... fleet" is ambiguous in this context. An ambiguity arises when a term is fairly susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Schelinski v.

State v. Pang

940 P.2d 1293 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 31, 1997

Thus, rather than furthering the ends of justice, the majority rewards Pang's calculated flight and ensures that neither nation's will is done by immunizing Pang from any liability for the deaths he may have caused. … (Criminal Law Code, Article 250 with qualifying clauses from Article 258—Arson followed by death).

Hamburger Apparel Co. v. Werner

17 Wash. 2d 310 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 25, 1943

Appellant contends that it may also establish some rights under the proviso to that section, above quoted. … As the defendant appeared in the action, full relief was granted to the plaintiff, but the court clearly stated the correct rule as to allegations necessary to state a cause of action. In 7 Cal.

Seattle Times Co. v. Serko

243 P.3d 919 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 18, 2010

¶ 18 In order to prevail in a challenge to the production of records under the PRA, a party must establish a specific exemption that bars production of the requested records. … Moreover, a party opposing the production of public records must establish that production would "clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and

State v. Minor

174 P.3d 1162 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 17, 2008

Former RCW 9.41.040(1)(a) (2003). [4] Residential burglary qualifies as a "[c]rime of violence," which is included within the definition of a "[s]erious offense" for purposes of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm … without prejudice and is not an issue on appeal. [6] In his petition for review, Minor challenged the manifest injustice disposition, arguing it was not supported by the record and that the length of the disposition was clearly

Denny v. Sayward

10 Wash. 422 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 28, 1894

Authorities have been cited to establish the doctrine that one not served with process in an action is not bound by a judgment rendered therein ; but they are none of them in point, under the circumstances of this case. … Harrington as individuals, or as members of the partnership of Crawford & Harrington ; but it does not so clearly appear that the defendant was injured by any questions growing out of this variance, if variance it was, as

Spokane Valley Land & Water Co. v. Arthur D. Jones & Co.

53 Wash. 37 · Washington Supreme Court · May 1, 1909

The appellant reserved exceptions, and clearly stated its view, in objections which it interposed during the trial of the case. The error, if any, is therefore sufficiently reserved. LaRault v. … It follows that no just estimate of his damages could be arrived at without taking that right into account as a substantial and permanent right qualifying the amount he ought to recover.” In Tyler v.

Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth.

Washington Supreme Court · May 9, 2013

Harborview Med Ctr., 94 Wn.2d 559, 567-68, 618 P.2d 76 (1980) (burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure to establish exemption is clearly unnecessary). … SHA's total failure to establish reasonable and effective policies and procedures to govern disclosure of public records was in violation of the PRA, see RCW 42.56.040, .070, clearly contributed to SHA's failure to adequately

Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O.M. Scott & Sons

120 Wash. 2d 712 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 11, 1993

We first note that defendant does not contend that the witness was not qualified as an expert. Defendant does not contend that the testimony was not that kind that would assist the trier of fact. ER 702. … Two items of testimony clearly support this fact. First, the owner testified: "If our sod is in good shape, everything is right, we'll get our 40,000 feet."

Alaska v. Baker

64 Wash. 2d 207 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 9, 1964

The following sections are clearly and plainly regulatory enactments, and being severable, should be severed: §§ 43.10.160; 43.10.170; 43.10.200; 43.70.020(d); 43.70.070(a) (b); and 43.70.100. … In addition, RCW 4.16.100, supra, established a 2-year limitation against such actions brought in the courts of this state.

In Re the Proceedings for the Discipline of Thacker

35 Wash. 2d 605 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 3, 1950

We assume that the only purpose of that paragraph is to establish jurisdiction and the venue of the hearing. … We are entirely satisfied that Mr. *618 Taylor’s answers established his total lack of bias or prejudice.

City of Tacoma v. Horton

62 Wash. 2d 211 · Washington Supreme Court · May 29, 1963

You're going to have to qualify it, and you're going to have to get some reason why it is admissible. Q. (by Mr. Chapin) Lieutenant, do you know where Sgt. Mathis is at this time? A. … The law respecting the waiver of immunity to search was recently summarized by United States District Judge Ben C. Dawkins, Jr., in United States v. Kidd, 153 F.

ABBEY ROAD GROUP v. City of Bonney Lake

218 P.3d 180 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 8, 2009

The majority rule provides that development is not immune from subsequently adopted regulations until a building permit has been obtained and substantial development has occurred in reliance on the permit. … To establish this fairness and certainty in the development *188 process, Abbey Road urges this court to establish a uniform vesting point "for every land use permit application regardless of the permit's name or what it