Case law

State Ex Rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co.

64 Wash. 2d 375 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 30, 1964

Certificate No. 1 for 250 shares of stock was issued to Engman, certificate No. 2 for 249 shares to Eng-man’s wife, and certificate No. 3 for one qualifying share to Sam Hayes. … Coast was not a party to any illegal contract and its equitable claim has been established.

State v. Depaz

165 Wash. 2d 842 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 2, 2009

Court rules establish the procedures for replacing a juror who has been excused during jury deliberations. See CrR 6.5. … The transcript clearly indicates that she voluntarily admitted to talking to her husband about the case.

Olson v. Chapman

4 Wash. 2d 522 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 11, 1940

We are unable to find from the record evidence sufficient to establish that respondents repaid the amounts expended for taxes. It is contended by respondents, however, that the note and mortgage given by J. L. … the payment of those taxes by their co-owners, to escape the burden of repayment by the giving of a worthless mortgage, or by failure of the payor of the taxes to use bookkeeping methods which would have disclosed more clearly

State v. Waller

197 Wash. 2d 218 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 25, 2021

Waller (Anthony Thomas), No. 98326-7 uncontroverted record establishe[d] the court did not amend the judgment and sentence,” and then concluded that the trial court had not vacated the judgment. Id. … RAP 2.2(b) sets out an exclusive list of orders from which the State may appeal and limits even that list with the qualifier, “only if the appeal will not place the defendant in double jeopardy.”

Gruen v. State Tax Commission

35 Wash. 2d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 5, 1949

If a reasonable doubt appears, it should be resolved in favor of the validity of the law, the presumption being “that the statute in question is constitutional,” and the burden rests upon the attacking party to clearly establish … I, § 12, of the Washington state constitution, which reads: “Special Privileges and Immunities Prohibited.

State v. Sturtevant

76 Wash. 158 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 25, 1913

or shall be established.” … In the absence of any qualifying statute, and as between parties asserting private rights, this definition would ordinarily be accepted.

State v. Woods

143 Wash. 2d 561 · Washington Supreme Court · May 24, 2001

He asserts that death-qualified juries are significantly “more likely to vote for guilt” than nondeath qualified juries. Id. … Because his jury was “death qualified,” he argues, he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of his guilt.

Manufactured Housing Communities v. State

13 P.3d 183 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 9, 2000

Rather, we have recognized the criteria to establish a taking are "`quite different'" from that required to establish a due process violation. … Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v.

Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co.

120 Wash. 2d 246 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 25, 1992

The "not reasonably safe" standard was established by the definition of a manufacturer's duty to which no exception was taken. … The statute also evidences legislative intent that certain entities' share of fault not be at all recoverable by a plaintiff; for example, the proportionate shares of immune parties.

Berge v. Gorton

88 Wash. 2d 756 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 7, 1977

This complaint fails to allege facts establishing a claim based upon either a theory of abuse of discretion or a clearly incorrect decision on the part of the Attorney General. … I at no time indicated to the court, as you know, that this office had any intention of seeking to recover money dispersed to qualified students under the tuition supplement program the previous year, at a time when the statute

Scott v. Trans-System, Inc.

64 P.3d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 13, 2003

The primary reason for establishing Northwest was to provide TSI and its subsidiaries with a pool of trained drivers for use in their trucking business. … Dissolution should not be granted as a matter of right, since the provision allowing judicial dissolution is "`clearly couched in language of permission.'" Id. at 951 , 632 P.2d 512 (quoting Jackson v.

Antio, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue

3 Wash. 3d 882 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 24, 2024

This claim satisfied our previously established common 3 See also Detillier v. Kenner Reg’l Med. … And to create that test for qualifying “investment income,” we relied heavily on John H. Sellen Construction Co. v.

State v. Reid

144 Wash. 2d 621 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 6, 2001

to make application to the secretary, (2) the detainee has a right to directly petition the court, (3) the detainee has a right to an adversarial hearing, (4) if indigent, the detainee has a right to have an appointed, qualified … Conditional release, rather than final release, is clearly contemplated by the statute, and does not offend due process. The trial court and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

Turpen v. Johnson

26 Wash. 2d 716 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1946

At the trial, no effort was made by either Clark county or the defendants Johnson to establish the statute of limitations as a defense. … his treatise on the Law of Real Property in Conveyancing, says: « < “'pkg requisite of an adequate description is that the land shall be identified with reasonable certainty, but the degree of certainty required is always qualified

Cowan v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad

55 Wash. 2d 615 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 11, 1960

The party producing the witness must show he is qualified. Tully v. Mahoning Express Co. (1954), 161 Ohio St. 457 , 119 N. E. (2d) 831, 45 A. L. R. (2d) 1144. … Even if erroneous, it was not prejudicial, because the basic facts of the plaintiff’s case were established by other testimony without the opinion of Kusian as to the concentration of the gas.

Public Utility District No. 1 v. Department of Ecology

146 Wash. 2d 778 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 18, 2002

As explained, in order to determine whether a change application may be granted under RCW 90.03.380, Ecology must tentatively quantify the right in order to determine whether the right qualifies for a change. … Okanogan Wilderness League is clearly distinguishable, as the water right holder there offered a single, invalid reason for nonuse of the water right at issue. R.D.

Vec v. State Public Disclosure Com'n

166 P.3d 1174 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 13, 2007

However, Bare does not establish binding precedent here. … However, VEC fails to justify how it qualifies as a "political organization" but not a "political committee."

Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Department of Ecology

119 Wash. 2d 761 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 1, 1992

Ecology has authority to categorically exempt certain actions from the EIS requirement, but major actions do not qualify for such exemptions. RCW 43.21C.110. 4. … There must be sufficient evidence to establish the claim.

State v. Flores

186 P.3d 1038 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2008

Thus, unless an aggravating factor is established solely by the jury verdict or the defendant's stipulation, it cannot be used to support an exceptional sentence. ¶ 57 It is well established that the "clearly too lenient" … The jury's findings alone qualified the offenses as a "major VUCSA" under former RCW 9.94A.535(2)(e).

Knipe v. Austin

13 Wash. 189 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 9, 1895

Beside, even the dictum of that case has been substantially qualified by what was said in the case of Hays v. Merchants Bank of Port Townsend, decided March 5, 1896, by the learned judge who wrote it. … The statute cited in the majority opinion shows clearly that whatever the nature of the title of the purchaser, *197 he is entitled to the possession of the property unless the same he in the possession of a tenant holding