Case law

Sterling Realty Co. v. City of Bellevue

68 Wash. 2d 760 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 16, 1966

Several preliminary and underlying propositions have been established by our cases and statutes, however. … This statute clearly governs noncontinuous improvements only. It furnishes no support for the city’s argument in the present case, which concerns dividing a continuous improvement into units.

City of Yakima v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters

117 Wash. 2d 655 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 7, 1991

Since 1980, PERC's hearing examiners and its board have consistently interpreted the proviso to mean that a civil service commission must be similar in scope, structure and authority to qualify a city for exemption from bargaining … The state personnel board members are appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate. 36 Persons so appointed shall have clearly demonstrated an interest and belief in the merit principle, shall not hold

State v. Post

118 Wash. 2d 596 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 10, 1992

When compared to the cases in which coercion was found, the alleged compulsion here is too conditional and not sufficiently immediate to qualify as coercive. … excessive or clearly too lenient.

State v. K.L.B.

Washington Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2014

Police officers certainly qualify as public servants under the statute. … Clearly, the legislature did not adopt this statute with the intent that ejusdem generis apply.

City of Seattle v. Fuller

177 Wash. 2d 263 · Washington Supreme Court · May 2, 2013

Similarly, RCW 35.20.250 establishes “concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court and district court...” on the part of the municipal court. … Id. at 269-71. ¶40 Of course there is such language — when the legislature amended these two statutes by changing “the court” to “the superior court,” the legislature clearly inserted language discriminating between defendants

Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos

92 Wash. 2d 939 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1979

regulations for conservation purposes, and that allocation as contemplated by the District Court's order would constitute a violation of equal protection and provide Indian fishermen with unconstitutional special privileges and immunities … The United States Supreme Court has clearly ruled, however, that the Indian treaties of the 1850's reserve to the signatory tribes a right to fish that nontreaty fishermen do not enjoy. 443 U.S. at 681 , 99 S.

American Star Insurance v. Grice

121 Wash. 2d 869 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 29, 1993

Since the extrinsic evidence does not clearly indicate that coverage is excluded, we construe the ambiguity in favor of the insureds and reverse the summary judgment in favor of the insurers. … The insurers argue that this new "absolute" pollution exclusion (as contrasted with the older "qualified" pollution exclusions construed in United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, *877 Inc., 34 Wn.

State v. 119 Vote No! Committee

957 P.2d 691 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1998

Yet nowhere does the majority opinion reveal the holding of New York Times , which is "a public official cannot recover for defamation unless he or she establishes the defendant made the defamatory statement with actual malice … The Oregon standard is a very difficult one to establish, but still provides that factually false statements may be actionable.

Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist.

423 P.3d 197 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 9, 2018

Lukashevich was qualified under the WIAA standards. … But that does not immunize the school district from all tort liability. Instead, the school district remains liable for harm caused by direct breaches of its own duties.

McSorley v. Hill

2 Wash. 638 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 1, 1891

There was only one way by which Catheriúe T. could have become entitled to 320 acres under the donation act, and that was to have married some qualified donation applicant prior to December 1, 1851. This she did not do. … The main question in controversy in that case was, as to whether the land in controversy was brought under the operation of the town-site act by the organic law of August 14, 1848, establishing the territorial government

True's Oil Co. v. Keeney

76 Wash. 2d 130 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 5, 1969

Defendant Davis, was aware that there were no corporate bank accounts established for the corporation, nor corporate minutes nor corporate account ledgers, nor written agreements between the corporation and any grower or … RCW 23.01.080 clearly and unambiguously imposed a duty upon the officers and directors of an infant corporation, and created a .liability in the event of a breach of that *139 duty.

Burns v. City of Seattle

164 P.3d 475 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 2, 2007

In contrast, it is well established that the operation of an electric utility is a proprietary activity. … In Algona, we concluded that the doctrine of governmental immunity from taxation barred the city of Algona from levying a tax on King County's solid waste facility.

Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.

Washington Supreme Court · Jul 14, 2016

The Department ofLabor and Industries initially found that Kovacs qualified for benefits, which he began to receive. … Read in isolation, it does not clearly establish whether the statute oflimitations begins to run on the day of the injury or the next day.

Chandrruangphen v. City Of Sammamish

Washington Supreme Court · Feb 12, 2026

In her view, if the City’s e-mail does not qualify as “mail” 37 Wanthida Chandrruangphen v. … An e-mailed written decision, sent only to an applicant’s attorney, does not qualify as a “publicly available” decision.

Locals 302 & 612 of the International Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Construction Industry Retirement Trust ex rel. F5 Networks, Inc. v. McAdam

166 Wash. 2d 229 · Washington Supreme Court · May 21, 2009

The legislature clearly contemplated that there would be times demand would not be made and did not, as they could, require dismissal. … It also specifically found that “[b]ackdating options qualifies as one of those ‘rare cases [in which] a transaction may be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a substantial

Grammer v. Skagit Valley Lumber Co.

162 Wash. 677 · Washington Supreme Court · May 19, 1931

But this contract clearly evidences that the real function plaintiff was required to perform under the contract was to procure a purchaser. He had no other duty to perform. … Cas. 1914C 1239, we said: “By an unbroken line of decisions we have held that, to meet this statute, the writing evidencing the agreement must be so complete in itself as to make a resort to parol evidence to establish any

State v. Faford

910 P.2d 447 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 1, 1996

Nowhere does the statute imply a radio interception demands a second conveyance to qualify as a transmission. … Having determined the method of interception falls under the act, the question remains whether the form of communication qualified as "private." See RCW 9.73.030(1)(a).

Christie v. the Port of Olympia

27 Wash. 2d 534 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 8, 1947

If, as the *542 evidence amply establishes, it was necessary for the Port of Olympia to pay wages equal to those paid by the members of the association in order to get qualified longshoremen during the period from 1934 to … Clearly, such power was, in *547 the language of Dillon, quoted in the opinion, “essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.”

State Ex Rel. Carter v. Superior Court

18 Wash. 2d 130 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 8, 1943

The relator, Carter, is the duly elected and qualified treasurer of King county. He was charged, tried, and convicted on eight counts for violations of § 1 of chapter 72 of the Laws of 1941, p. 187 (Rem. … That could have been ac *136 complished more readily and clearly by omitting the section entirely. It is true that notice connotes something different from summons in our practice.

State Ex Rel. American Automobile Insurance v. Fishback

154 Wash. 297 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 12, 1929

$2,768,660.35; that, since entering the state of Washington, it has expended large sums of money in building up its business and good will within the state, has paid losses within the state in excess of $1,000,000, has established … Such a situation would clearly violate both the letter and the spirit of the constitutional provision already quoted. *303 We think our earlier eases distinguished in the Fibreboard case are controlling here.