Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
3,545 results
1.68s
97 Wash. 2d 191 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 18, 1982
We conclude that the ordinance action by the Council in the instant case is clearly a policy decision which will effect *197 a permanent change in the method of recording votes in Pierce County. … The Blakeslee case dealt with a bill appropriating money for a public highway, and the bill discussed in Helm appropriated funds for salaries established by the Governor.
Cited 17 timesPublishedGwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford
193 Wash. 451 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 9, 1938
. *464 I do not pursue this subject further because, in the first place, it is vain to labor overmuch in attempting to establish the obvious; and second, the question has been settled by authority binding upon this court. … The rationale of the majority opinion is, therefore, clearly unsound. I think the result is, also.
Cited 5 timesPublishedFreedom Foundation v. Gregoire
Washington Supreme Court · Oct 17, 2013
Only those communications made to inform policy choices qualify for the privilege. … Without clearly articulated guidance, there is the potential for inconsistent and overly broad application of the privilege.
Cited 0 timesPublishedRetired Public Employees Council v. Charles
148 Wash. 2d 602 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 30, 2003
This letter contained several qualifiers to which the executive director alerted appellant organizations. … The statutory provisions are clearly referenced in section 906(7).
Cited 73 timesPublishedState Ex Rel. Carroll v. Munro
52 Wash. 2d 522 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 30, 1958
XI, § 6, to appoint a qualified person to fill a vacancy on the board. There is no cessation of county government. … In both of those cases, all of the offices of county commissioners were vacant, and there was clearly nothing that could be done under Art.
Cited 5 timesPublished10 Wash. 586 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 12, 1895
Said the court, referring to the statute: "This statute contemplates and clearly gives the right to-proceed against either executor or administrator, for a conveyance in pursuance of the contract of the deceased. … The tender being an affirmative proposition to be established by the plaintiffs, we think, under the testimony, presuming the witnesses to *609 be equally credible, that they failed to establish the tender on the points disputed
Cited 12 timesPublished20 Wash. 2d 76 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 14, 1944
The only question for consideration in the proceeding to have the will established in probate is as to its validity. … Anything going to the validity of the will as of that date is clearly a proper subject to be raised by a contest of the probate.
Cited 6 timesPublished184 Wash. 2d 548 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 22, 2015
Consequently, the State has failed to establish that Mayer’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. A. … The “at any time” statement thus did not immunize Dennison’s warnings against the defects created by his later responses to Mayer’s questions. *562 C.
Cited 34 timesPublishedBremerton Creamery & Produce Co. v. Elliott
184 Wash. 80 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 10, 1935
Marshall having qualified as executor, the administration of the estate proceeded in an orderly manner. T. O. … It was initiated by such an agreement and established by a consent decree entered pursuant thereto.
Cited 15 timesPublished20 Wash. 629 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 3, 1899
In the first place, I am of the opinion that the words “after charges have been preferred,” occurring at the end of the section, refer to and qualify the first, as well as the second, part of the provision, and were intended … When a municipal officer claims to exercise a particular statutory power, he must not only be able to show clearly that he possesses such power, but that he has a clear right to exercise it under the existing circumstances
Cited 22 timesPublishedWashington Supreme Court · Sep 11, 2025
As noted above, “[i]n order to qualify as the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes, the two offenses must be the same both in law and in fact.” Id. at 815. … Yet, it is well established that the State may choose to “clearly distinguish between the acts” supporting the charges during closing arguments. State v. Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d 808, 825, 318 P.3d 257 (2014).
Cited 0 timesPublishedPort of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Board
151 Wash. 2d 568 · Washington Supreme Court · May 14, 2004
“Metals criteria may be adjusted on a site-specific basis when data are made available to the department clearly demonstrating the effective use of the water effects ratio approach established by the USEPA [United States … ACC and CASE argued that the Vacca Farm site was not sufficiently degraded to qualify for restoration.
Cited 228 timesPublishedKitsap County Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Kitsap County
167 Wash. 2d 428 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 29, 2009
In addition, the award clearly states that LaFrance “is not entitled to back pay per se, but may keep any Unemployment Insurance benefits for which he is monetarily eligible.” CP at 83. … The arbitrator found that the County had shown that (1) LaFrance was given warning, (2) the rules were reasonable, (3) the County made an effort to establish whether the violations had occurred, (4) the County’s investigation
Cited 24 timesPublished160 Wash. 295 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 9, 1931
Surely that witness was qualified to pass on Fau-cett ’s capacity to make a will. … As far as I am concerned I understood him clearly and I put the question to him clearly. It is not a matter in which I could be mistaken about the conversation. Q. Now, Mr.
Cited 1 timesPublishedWashington Supreme Court · Sep 19, 2013
The State also contends that each element of the medical necessity defense is addressed by the Act and establishes inconsistencies between the two. … While some of these elements are indeed similar to the common law defense, they are not identical and are not clearly inconsistent.
Cited 0 timesPublishedIn re the Personal Restraint of King
146 Wash. 2d 658 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 3, 2002
The Department cannot save its policy by qualifying an unambiguous mandate. “Courts should assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.” Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 105 , 26 P.3d 257 (2001). … In 1995, as now, RCW 70.48.210 allowed cities and counties to establish farms, camps, work release programs, and special detention facilities, and permitted cities and counties to establish earned early release programs based
Cited 12 timesPublishedRuiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chemical Corp.
141 Wash. 2d 493 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 24, 2000
Under this approach, not all products that cannot be made safer would qualify as “unavoidably unsafe” products entitled to comment k’s protection. … The defendant manufacturer sought “immunity from liability resulting from its decision to use a more flammable propellant than one that was a suspected teratogen and ozone-depleter.” Id. at 980.
Cited 29 timesPublishedCity of Bellevue v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1604
119 Wash. 2d 373 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1992
This power shall not be affected or impaired by any means of adjustment, mediation or conciliation in labor disputes that have been or may hereafter be established by law. RCW 41.56.160. … However, the statute expressly qualifies this exclusion from the duty to bargain in good faith with the language "unless otherwise provided in" RCW 41.56. RCW 41.56.030(4).
Cited 38 timesPublishedState Ex Rel. Forks Shingle Co. v. Martin
196 Wash. 494 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 24, 1938
. § 6504-31], describes the state lands which are set aside and established as “state sustained yield forest No. 1.” … “The natural and appropriate office of the proviso being to restrain or qualify some preceding matter, it should be confined to what precedes it unless it clearly appears to have been intended to apply to some other matter
Cited 2 timesPublishedLuv v. W. Coast Servicing, Inc.
Washington Supreme Court · Oct 9, 2025
However, the lower courts failed to follow Union Bank’s holding explaining what qualified as a change in law. … An appellate court may reconsider only those decisions that were clearly erroneous and that would work a manifest injustice to one party if the clearly erroneous decision were not set aside, and no corresponding injustice
Cited 0 timesPublished
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