Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Detention of Petersen v. State

    42 P.3d 952 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 21, 2002

    In its order it did not restate that the burden to establish probable cause rested on Thorell. Instead, it concluded "the state has established the absence of probable cause to believe that Mr. … Thorell In Thorell's case the trial court clearly erred when, in its 1999 order, it stated the burden of proof at the probable cause hearing rested on Thorell.

    Cited 107 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Lawler v. Grant

    178 Wash. 61 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1934

    The two appointees qualified in February, since which time they have served as such judges. On April 3,1934, they filed in the superior court for King county joint applications for a writ of mandamus to compel George A. … Clearly, in our opinion, it would be available for the new judges, just as it is already, because it is a fund for that purpose.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Horton v. Board of Education of Methodist Protestant Church

    32 Wash. 2d 99 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 16, 1948

    In due course, all of the trustees duly qualified and acted as such, but all of them, excepting plaintiff, are deceased, and plaintiff is now the duly appointed, qualified, and acting sole surviving trustee under the will … In the last-cited case, the general rules relative, to the cy pres doctrine, with which we are here in accord, are set out very clearly and at some length.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • In RE McNEAR v. Rhay

    65 Wash. 2d 530 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 28, 1965

    Such proof must be made by clear and positive evidence, and it must be established that there was no coercion actual or implied. … It would not and could not support a general exploratory search or seizure. 1 Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities, Ch.

    Abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d 641 (1994)Cited 67 timesPublished
  • State v. Kronich

    160 Wash. 2d 893 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 12, 2007

    In other words, assuming there was an error, it clearly had “practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.” Stein, 144 Wn.2d at 240 . … of the Court of Appeals upholding Kronich’s conviction for third degree DWLS. *905 Conclusion ¶22 Kronich’s claim that the trial court violated his rights under the confrontation clause by admitting a DOL certification qualifies

    Overruled on other grounds by State v. Jasper, 174 Wash. 2d 96 (2012)Cited 51 timesPublished
  • In re the Personal Restraint of Davis

    152 Wash. 2d 647 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 4, 2004

    Olsen were retained as qualified experts and both testified during the penalty phase of the trial. 235 On May 29, 1997, Dr. … mental health experts, and adequately prepare for the penalty phase by retaining qualified mental health experts. 259 We noted that while failure to perform any one of these actions would not establish ineffective assistance

    Cited 677 timesPublished
  • Tegman v. Accident & Medical Investigations

    75 P.3d 497 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 28, 2003

    Nor are the negligent defendants jointly and severally liable under RCW 4.22.030 for any such damages because their liability clearly is determined under RCW 4.22.070. … Some state legislatures have established such a system.

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Seattle Endeavors, Inc. v. Mastro

    123 Wash. 2d 339 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 24, 1994

    We therefore hold that the inadvertent infringement of a weak mark is not sufficient to qualify as a public interest for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the Consumer Protection Act. … Because no cognizable public interest is established where the mark is weak and the infringement inadvertent, *351 the plaintiff has failed to establish all five elements of the Act.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Vangemert v. McCalmon

    68 Wash. 2d 618 · Washington Supreme Court · May 19, 1966

    The instruction that the jury could consider the loss of earnings was clearly proper. … The trial court deeming him not to be qualified, refused to admit his testimony.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • State Ex. Rel. Wash. Nav. Co. v. Pierce County

    184 Wash. 414 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 14, 1935

    Rankin are the duly elected, qualified and acting members of the board of county commissioners of Pierce county, Washington, and that S. … Clifford Davis is the duly elected, qualified and acting county auditor of Pierce county, Washington, and that Paul Newman is the duly elected, qualified and acting county treasurer of Pierce county, Washington. “ (3) That

    Modified by State Ex Rel. Washington Navigation Co. v. Pierce County, 187 Wash. 695 (1936)Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Cerrillo v. Esparza

    158 Wash. 2d 194 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 31, 2006

    However, the structure of the statute clearly signals a disjunctive reading. RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) is divided into three subsections enumerated (i), (ii), and (iii), and separated by semicolons and the word “or.” … As a result, the trial court did not consider whether the truckers failed to qualify for the exemption for other reasons.

    Cited 158 timesPublished
  • City of Sumner v. Walsh

    148 Wash. 2d 490 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 23, 2003

    Nor is it necessary for the City to establish that its ordinance completely solves the problems it was enacted to address. … A juvenile may move about freely at night accompanied by a parent or qualified adult.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System

    99 Wash. 2d 772 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 15, 1983

    We hold that an agreement to purchase project capability does not qualify as a purchase of electricity. … Under the provisions, the participants clearly could construct, acquire and operate generating facilities.

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • State v. Portee

    25 Wash. 2d 246 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 21, 1946

    The presumption of law, granting its minor premise, establishes a certainty. … We think it unnecessary to cite or discuss those decisions, since our own decisions are clearly to the same effect.

    Cited 52 timesPublished
  • Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc.

    175 Wash. 2d 83 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 16, 2012

    of legal procedures established in those same statutes. … court-martial qualified as a prior conviction for purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW.

    Cited 195 timesPublished
  • Cerrillo v. Esparza

    142 P.3d 155 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 31, 2006

    By phrasing the statute in such a way, the legislature has provided that all employees of a service and retail establishment can be paid under the RSE." Id. at 884-85, 64 P.3d 10 (citation omitted). … However, the structure of the statute clearly signals a disjunctive reading. RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) is divided into three subsections enumerated (i), (ii), and (iii), and separated by semicolons and the word "or."

    Cited 157 timesPublished
  • Rublee v. Carrier Corp.

    428 P.3d 1207 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 1, 2018

    After limited discovery, Pfizer moved for summary judgment on the ground that Rublee could not establish apparent manufacturer liability. … However, where the real manufacturer or packer is clearly and accurately identified on the label or other markings on the goods, and it is also clearly stated that another who is also named has nothing to do with the goods

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center

    81 Wash. 2d 12 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 20, 1972

    What proof is necessary to establish a duty to inform? … We perceive the general rule to be—except in extraordinary circumstances where the duty to disclose is so clearly manifest that reasonable minds could not in reason differ on the question—that the standards of the medical

    Cited 69 timesPublished
  • State v. Powers

    149 Wash. 509 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 5, 1928

    The facts necessary to a determination of the points involved are: Both appellants run soft drink parlors, confectionery and pool room establishments in Se *510 attle. … The words ‘every other liquor or liquid containing intoxicating properties’ qualify nothing else, but describe and add another class to the things the sale and manufacture of which are prohibited.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Flanigan v. Department of Labor & Industries

    123 Wash. 2d 418 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 3, 1994

    RCW 51.24.060(1)(e). [6] *437 Clearly then, reimbursement is based on the amount rather than the nature of the recovery. … Clearly, the court is not referring to the nature of the recovery or the nature of the damages.

    Cited 86 timesPublished

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