Case law

Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc.

Washington Supreme Court · May 19, 2016

Any subordinates must be "qualified and competent," and franchisees are responsible for training the subordinates. CP at 328. … And such employees shall be duly qualified and licensed to drive and over the age of 25 years."' Id. (quoting lease).

Wash. Educ. Ass'n v. Dep't of Ret. Sys.

Washington Supreme Court · Aug 14, 2014

For the employees to prevail,, therefore, they must establish that "there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution." Larson v. … The first prong of the Carlstrom analysis asks whether gain sharing became part of the parties' employment contract, which it clearly did.

Quon v. Furuya Co.

81 Wash. 526 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 17, 1914

This is the established rule in this state. Iverson v. McDonnell, 36 Wash. 73 , 78 Pac. 202 ; Lowsit v. Seattle Lumber Co., 38 Wash. 290 , 80 Pac. 431 ; Stratton v. … In pursuing this course, the appellant was acting entirely within its rights, but it thereby waived the immunity from inquiry as to its liability insur *532 anee.

Cary v. Allstate Ins. Co.

922 P.2d 1335 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 26, 1996

"The term `public policy,'... embraces all acts or contracts which tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense … However, compensation made to qualifying persons under the statute in no way depends on this reimbursement.

J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark

64 Wash. 2d 470 · Washington Supreme Court · May 14, 1964

It seems to have been overlooked in this matter that Stark’s right to purchase the combine was established by the option contained in the 1958 lease agreement. … Although each of the items of identity may, in itself, be but a link in a chain to join the two corporations, the final connection is established by the duty owed.

Rumbolz v. Public Utility District No. 1

22 Wash. 2d 724 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 9, 1945

We call attention to this to indicate that the merits have been thoroughly considered, because that may not seem clearly apparent from this opinion. … The first five sections provide for the establishment of public utility districts by popular vote. Section 6 (Rem. Rev. Stat, § 11610 [P.

State v. Saintcalle

Washington Supreme Court · Aug 1, 2013

Swain did little to curb racial discrimination, establishing a "crippling burden of proof" and leaving peremptories "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 10 No. 86257 … We are not a group of qualified statisticians.

State v. Saintcalle

Washington Supreme Court · Aug 1, 2013

Swain did little to curb racial discrimination, establishing a "crippling burden of proof" and leaving peremptories "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 10 No. 86257 … We are not a group of qualified statisticians.

Ritterhoff v. Puget Sound National Bank

37 Wash. 76 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 16, 1905

It does not clearly appear from the complaint that the note has matured, although possibly its maturity may be inferred by reason of demand for payment having been made. … In defining the jurisdiction of courts of equity, it is a well established principle that equity will not relieve when there is a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB

233 P.3d 861 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 24, 2010

Under CR 12(b)(6) a plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted if it is possible that facts could be established to support the allegations in the complaint. See Halvorson *863 v. … Further, the federal regulation clearly indicates that even laws of general applicability have the potential to have a more than incidental impact on lending practices.

In re Pers. Restraint of Phelps

190 Wash. 2d 155 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 22, 2018

Perpetrator profile testimony clearly carries with it the implied opinion that the defendant is the sort of person who would engage in the alleged act, and therefore did it in this case too. … App. at 837 , 866 P.2d 655 (holding that an expert was qualified to testify about the grooming process); State v.

State Ex Rel. Dunbar v. American University

140 Wash. 625 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 25, 1926

received a full sanipractic license without examination under such rule as aforesaid, and a large number of other diplomates, although not entitled to a diploma according to the curriculum of the school and although not qualified … drugless healing in the state of Washington. ’ ’ While it is true that, in many respects, the evidence on which the findings were made is in conflict with that introduced on behalf of appellant, still we are satisfied that it clearly

Bulman v. Safeway, Inc.

27 P.3d 1172 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 2, 2001

He only ambiguously qualified those admissions in the following exchange: Q. So Mr. Bulman, it wasn't until November 20th, 1995 that you were aware of the remedy articulated in this policy; isn't that correct? A. … It degrades Bulman's credibility, characterizing his statements as "gratuitous" and "ambiguously qualified." Majority at 1177, 1178.

Page v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America

12 Wash. 2d 101 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 2, 1942

To keep him occupied, respondent established a twenty dollar petty cash fund from which he would pay small household bills and the weekly premiums on the policies in question. … That the husband as statutory agent for the community has complete power to buy or sell community personalty and make its contracts is a well-established rule in this state.

Post v. Maryland Casualty Co.

2 Wash. 2d 21 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1939

Morrison owned all the stock except that held by directors as qualifying shares. Morrison Investment Company was organized February 16, 1933. … All stock in that company, except qualifying shares held by directors, stood in the name of Morrison & Company, Inc.

Weaver v. Evans

80 Wash. 2d 461 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 6, 1972

This system embraced the annuity concept as well as a pension benefit upon qualified retirement. … Rather, the majority, in the name of "vested right," establishes a prior claim to state funds, immune from the exercise by the legislature and the executive of their constitutional and statutory duties.

Michigan Millers Mutual Fire Insurance v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co.

32 Wash. 2d 256 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1948

Error is assigned: (1) in holding the evidence sufficient to establish that the damage to warehouse and peas was caused by the burning of grass and brush by the defendants; (2) in holding the evidence sufficient to establish … “Where two persons would otherwise be liable for a harm, one of them is not relieved from liability by the fact that the other has an absolute privilege to act or an immunity from liability to the person harmed.”

Seattle School District No. 1 v. State

90 Wash. 2d 476 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 28, 1978

The state was, under the same document (Const, art. 2, § 26), made immune from the suit without its consent, and the immunity to the legislature to this date has not been removed. 26 Separation of Powers For still another … I would venture to say that the legislature is as immune from suit as this court, in the performance of its constitutional duties, is immune from legislative investigation — and that, of course, means totally immune.

Neitzel v. Spokane International Railway Co.

65 Wash. 100 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 14, 1911

This language clearly indicates that such a title only, not a fee simple, but a qualified fee or an easement, shall be vested as may be necessary for the contemplated corporate purpose; and such corporate purpose, under art … It therefore took such qualified title or interest only as it needed for its corporate purposes constituting a public use.

Draper MacHine Works, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources

117 Wash. 2d 306 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 5, 1991

They were dealing solely with .010, which clearly does not allow any private use of public waterways other than for navigation. … To qualify under the statutes as tidelands, the property must underlie tidally influenced water. RCW 79.90.030, .035.