Case law

Tacoma Railway & Power Co. v. City of Tacoma

79 Wash. 508 · Washington Supreme Court · May 7, 1914

C. 77 § 83]) : “To lay out, establish, open, ... or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, . . . and to regulate and control the use thereof, and to vacate the same, and to authorize or prohibit the use of electricity … The authority to declare the forfeiture is so clearly expressed as to remove the question from the sphere of debate.

Schibel v. Eymann

Washington Supreme Court · Aug 3, 2017

Under traditional collateral estoppel analysis, as applied to the facts in this case, the answer is clearly no. … And the answer to that question is clearly no. 11 Schibel et ex. v. Eymann et al.

Wroten v. Robbins

103 Wash. 393 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 19, 1918

These are matters with which the trial court, by reason of his knowledge of the extent and nature of the services, was peculiarly qualified to deal, and we find nothing in the record which warrants us in disturbing his judgment … Hickey, 94 Wash. 370 , 162 Pac. 564 , and which is as follows: “Any agreement or' stipulation which clearly shows that it is the intention of the parties that the right to a lien shall be waived is sufficient to accomplish

Pacific Northwest Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim

158 Wash. 2d 342 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 12, 2006

PNSPA’s complaint clearly states that gun collectors, dealers, and buyers were invited to “sell, trade and buy” the firearms. 5 CP at 80. … The dissent fails to explain how a sale qualifies as an exhibition.

Martin v. Aleinikoff

63 Wash. 2d 842 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 20, 1964

The legislature clearly states that its purpose in passing the statute was to prohibit "discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed." … Thus, only the final and conjunctive adverbial clause logically, and in keeping with the primary purpose of the act, modifies or qualifies the preceding disjunctive infinitive clauses.

State v. Haislip

77 Wash. 2d 838 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 9, 1970

On its face it has everything required in order to qualify as a “written instrument” within the meaning of the forgery statute. … each other and consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, but also must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis or theory which would establish, or tend to establish, his innocence.

Erickson & Associates, Inc. v. McLerran

123 Wash. 2d 864 · Washington Supreme Court · May 19, 1994

During the review of Erickson’s MUP application, DCLU determined part of Erickson’s project was located on slopes steep enough to qualify as a "critical area” under the new ordinance. … The determinative issue was whether a verbatim record of proceedings was required to establish an adequate record for review.

Yamauchi v. Department of Employment Security

96 Wash. 2d 773 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 14, 1982

Therefore, good cause was established for termination of the wife's employment. … Our legislature has clearly determined that a marital status exemption where one party is required to follow a spouse should exist.

Washington National Bank v. Smith

15 Wash. 160 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 13, 1896

The policies of insurance under these circumstances would have been for the sole benefit of the mortgagors, excepting in so far as they were qualified- by the statements indorsed thereon that the loss, if any, should be payable … Even if the claim of the appellant that it was in fact intended both by the insurance companies and *167 by herself that the insurance should be" for her exclusive benefit was clearly established, it would not thereby be

Dickinson v. Edwards

105 Wash. 2d 457 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 27, 1986

Where there "is no statutory sanction for the absolute rule of immunity" and the reasons for granting immunity are wanting, "[t]he true role of the legislature ... is to restrict liability if it chooses to do so ..." … However, these guidelines are so vague and disorganized that no employer or commercial establishment can accurately determine what actions qualify as "reasonable".

In re the Personal Restraint of Ecklund

139 Wash. 2d 166 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 7, 1999

While a record demonstrating two instances when parole, was revoked clearly provides some basis for a finding of lack of rehabilitation, Ecklund’s case is clearly distinguishable, for there is no such clear indication in … However in Cashaw we specifically stated, The Board’s administrative regulations qualify as “laws of the State of Washington” as that term is used in RAP 16.4(c)(2), (6).

State v. Ferguson

15 P.3d 1271 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 8, 2001

A sentence is considered clearly excessive only if the trial court abused its discretion in establishing the length of the sentence. [88] There is an abuse of discretion when, under the circumstances, no reasonable person … Oxborrow, 106 Wash.2d 525, 531 , 723 P.2d 1123 (1986) ("[F]or action to be clearly excessive, it must be shown to be clearly unreasonable, i.e., exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, or an action that no

State v. Boulet

5 Wash. 2d 654 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 16, 1940

The challenge that the venue was not established is without merit. … Substantial evidence on behalf of the state clearly established appellant’s guilt.

State ex rel. Tacoma School District No. 10 v. Clausen

126 Wash. 90 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 14, 1923

Clausen is the duly elected, qualified and acting auditor; and that the duly elected, qualified and acting school board of relator, acting-as such, at a meeting duly and regularly held on March 14, 1923, pursuant to notice … given, duly and regularly adopted a resolution by which it was determined to borrow money and issue negotiable serial bonds of the school district in the sum of $2,400,000, for the purpose of establishing an intermediate

In Re Detention of West

256 P.3d 302 · Washington Supreme Court · May 5, 2011

This immunity for opinion work product is nearly absolute. Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198, 211-12 , 787 P.2d 30 (1990). 2. … But this immunity is not absolute.

State v. Towessnute

89 Wash. 478 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 4, 1916

The .old locations were his before the treaties; by that convention he admitted the white man, but the white man got only what the Indian clearly conceded. … The first decision establishes a repeal of an Indian treaty even by implication rather than that a state be crippled in its police power.

In Re O'brien's Estate

13 Wash. 2d 581 · Washington Supreme Court · May 18, 1942

Some courts have gone so far as to hold that the administrator of an estate, who has been appointed and has qualified and assumed the duties of his office, cannot contest a will of his decedent presented for probate subsequent … It is a clearly defined statutory rule, judicially administered. In each case, the executor is allowed the amount which the probate court finds, and adjudges to be, the reasonable value of his services.

State v. Carr

160 Wash. 83 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 30, 1930

Clearly, the instruction was in accordance with appellant’s theory of the case, and the element of knowledge and consent on the part of the employee of the paper company as a condition precedent was rightly made a part of … Craddick, 61 Wash. 425 , 112 Pac. 491 , this court said: “A thief will not be accorded immunity by the law by simply returning the stolen property when he finds that his crime has been discovered.”

Tanner Electric Cooperative v. Puget Sound Power & Light

128 Wash. 2d 656 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 23, 1996

state and federal cases, the majority observes WUTC theoretically could regulate some aspects of Puget’s conduct and years ago did approve the 1966 service area agreement (under RCW 54.48), and concludes that is enough to establish … Clearly, the WUTC’s approval in 1974 of the 1966 agreement did not constitute approval of these actions and is far from sufficient to shelter Puget from the obligations and liability imposed under the Act.

Brower v. Johnson

56 Wash. 2d 321 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 9, 1960

Concededly, we have announced a rule somewhat qualifying the view expressed by the Montana court, holding that an independent agreement for the distribution of the profits of an illegal business, made after the basic agreement … We have no hesitancy in holding that, if the appellant’s testimony respecting the pinball machine operation engaged in by the Grays Harbor Amusement Company is true, then the business of that partnership is clearly illegal