Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,190 results
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Huber v. Texas Woman's University
504 F. Supp. 2d 198 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 17, 2007
Thus, Huber cannot establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination based upon having to teach platform courses. … Huber avers teaching platform courses takes away from the time he can devote to his specialization. 3 .Subsequently, on June 30, 2006, the Court determined that Huber’s state discrimination claim was barred by sovereign immunity
Cited 1 timesPublishedIn Re the Arbitration Between Trans Chemical Ltd. & China National MacHiney Import & Export Corp.
978 F. Supp. 266 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 7, 1997
Most state-owned industrial enterprises were established in 1949 or soon thereafter. CNMC was established in 1950. … The FSIA uses it to determine whether an "agency" of the state may potentially qualify for foreign sovereign immunity itself under the FSIA.
Cited 78 timesPublishedYates v. Spring Independent School District
District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 31, 2023
Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 985 (Sth Cir. 2015) (to establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination a plaintiff must show “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position at issue, … immunity.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Texas · Apr 23, 2024
When qualified immunity is a defense, a plaintiff must establish that the defense is inapplicable. See King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016). … Finally, the Court finds that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this matter, under the circumstances. Handorf, 821 F.3d at 653.
Cited 0 timesUnknown999 F. Supp. 938 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 31, 1998
Clearly, Defendant did not agree to drill for the Government simply because the Government receives some monetary benefit as a byproduct of the activity. 3 Moreover, although it is clear that the use of patented inventions … Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (when, as here, proof goes beyond the pleadings, party bringing case has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction without the benefit of having allegations contained in complaint
Cited 6 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Texas · Oct 17, 2024
by judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and/or official immunity. … But no one is closing the Harris County courthouse doors to the public during bond hearings—that would clearly be unconstitutional.
Cited 0 timesUnknownJiles v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.
313 F. Supp. 3d 822 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 13, 2018
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Jiles "must prove (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job; [and] (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment action on account of his disability … He thus cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. e.
Cited 8 timesPublishedWest v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation District
836 F. Supp. 1331 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 3, 1993
Clearly, Plaintiffs speech was not a matter of public concern. … Thus, any statements regarding his job performance-were qualified.
Cited 2 timesPublishedU.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Jefferson
314 F. Supp. 3d 768 · District Court, S.D. Texas · May 21, 2018
In Peacock , however, the Supreme Court recognized that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 qualifies under § 1443(1) as a law providing specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. 86 S.Ct. at 1811. … Defendants Fail to Establish Diversity Jurisdiction Plaintiff argues that this action should be remanded because defendants are unable to establish diversity jurisdiction as the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00
Cited 4 timesPublishedStewart v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.
998 F. Supp. 746 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 19, 1998
Although Plaintiff argues otherwise, the “continuing violation” exception clearly does not apply in this case. … Similarly, to establish a prima ■ facie case under Title VII based on alleged differential treatment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she belongs to a protected group, i.e., she is female; (2) that she was qualified
Cited 11 timesPublishedSuttles v. United States Postal Service
927 F. Supp. 990 · District Court, S.D. Texas · May 15, 1996
The defendants, however, contend that Suttles has failed to establish a prima facie case, arguing that he is not a disabled person as defined by the Act and he has not shown that he is an “otherwise qualified individual.” … The Fifth Circuit has established a two-prong test to determine whether an individual is “otherwise qualified” under the Rehabilitation Act. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393 (citing Chiari, 920 F.2d at 315 ).
Cited 12 timesPublishedVietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
518 F. Supp. 993 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 15, 1981
The testimony elicited at trial clearly established that the defendants had knowledge of the wrongs conspired to be done, and neglected to aid in preventing the commission of these wrongs. … The evidence adduced at the hearing clearly established that the defendants acted intentionally to impede and prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their lawful occupation.
Cited 54 timesPublished9 F. Supp. 2d 745 · District Court, S.D. Texas · May 6, 1998
To qualify as an eligible voter in District H under the Texas Election Code, an individual must be a resident of that district. Texas Election Code § 11.001(2). … Claim of Legislative Immunity. — During discovery in this ease, Council Member Martha Wong filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena [Doc. # 45] invoking her legislative immunity.
Cited 7 timesPublished341 F. Supp. 1117 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 12, 1971
However, Public Nat’l Bank, Wilentz, and Collins clearly represent extensions beyond the state-wide requirement. … It does not appear that any city, other than the city originally qualifying under each statute, has ever subsequently qualified under any of these statutes.
Cited 2 timesPublished330 F. Supp. 781 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 27, 1971
In deciding the question of intervention, the Court assumes that Miller qualifies as the first informer of the alleged violation, Shipman v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.Va.1970). … Neither does it establish the right to an informer’s fee.
Cited 2 timesPublished918 F. Supp. 2d 619 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 16, 2013
In an earlier ruling, this court granted the employees’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity. (Docket Entry No. 97). … Background The factual background in this case was largely explained in this court’s earlier opinion on qualified immunity. (See Docket Entry No. 97).
Cited 0 timesPublished105 B.R. 368 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 28, 1989
that a lay advocate was immune from similar sanctions for the same conduct. 15. … Youngs stated that “she does qualify as a paralegal and is entitled to recover her time at the rate of $90.00 per hour.” In the lengthy Declaratory Statement of Barbara S.
Cited 13 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 13, 2023
Fifth, Plaintiff appears to argue that qualified immunity does not apply because the duty to provide respite care from the heat is “clearly established.” D.E. 100, p. 4. … While he states this proposition with respect to all of the Defendants, the only ones to whom the Magistrate Judge applied qualified immunity were Defendants Sanchez and Johnson. See D.E. 97, pp. 25-27.
Cited 0 timesUnknownHoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.
846 F. Supp. 542 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 8, 1994
Even if Defendants’ resin choice did-mot literally infringe the ’806 patent, the Court cannot envision circumstances which would more clearly qualify for the protection of Graver: the Defendants’ process performs the identical … As .discussed above, the evidence at trial clearly established that the Defendants deliberately based their infringing process on the ideas embodied in the ’806 patent.
Cited 11 timesPublishedDoe v. First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc.
81 F.R.D. 562 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Oct 24, 1978
Defendants cannot immunize hiring policies from class action attack by creating an appearance of divided responsibility. … The joinder of all these claimants would clearly be impractical. Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1970).
Cited 5 timesPublished
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