Case law

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  • National Union Fire Insurance v. Puget Plastics Corp.

    450 F. Supp. 2d 682 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 6, 2006

    Clearly, Cowan falls into the Maupin line because it involves an intentional tort, which by its very nature is “intentionally harmful” as described in Grapevine. … (C) A “knowing” violation of the DTPA would not qualify as an accident if the actor intended the harm and/or should have reasonably anticipated the harm.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Garcia v. Peterson

    319 F. Supp. 3d 863 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 20, 2018

    The court noted that to hold otherwise "would produce an unjust asymmetry, allowing a party (here, [TPD] ) to enjoy the full benefits of access to a state's courts qua plaintiff, while nonetheless retaining immunity from … The plaintiffs argue that MidCap ignores the factual allegations that clearly state a claim under the FLSA. Dkt. 47 at 41.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Stacey G., Etc. v. Pasadena Independent Sch. Dist.

    547 F. Supp. 61 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 19, 1982

    Finally, the program established three annual goals. Record at 1162. … School Dist., supra, at 874 n.5 (“Mainstreaming is clearly a predominant thesis underlying the [Act].

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Spinoso v. PHH Mortgage Corporation

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 17, 2020

    Plaintiffs allege that Ocwen informed Spinoso that she would qualify for a loan modification, but the bankruptcy court had to approve it. Id. at 6-7. … establish a causal link between a violation of the TDCPA and any alleged injury.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Powell v. City of Houston

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 6, 2025

    The Claims for Unlawful Search and Seizure and Excessive Force The Powells clearly state that they are suing Chief Diaz only in his official capacity. (Docket Entry No. 2, p. 1). … “Although recognized as a harsh grant of immunity, [§ 101.106] serves the purpose of protecting government employees from individual liability for acts or omissions where a claim based upon the same facts is made against

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Martinez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 14, 2024

    “In considering these four prerequisites, the court must remember that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion … years without making any mortgage payments by filing at least 6 bankruptcies and continuously applies for loan modification agreements that are optional on the part of the mortgagee and for which he is unable to qualify

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Sahara Health Care, Inc. v. Azar

    349 F. Supp. 3d 555 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 1, 2018

    Clearly, Plaintiff's request fatally matches requests denied by district courts and subsequently *563 affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. 57 The Court finds amendment unwarranted here. … Clearly, the courts that have addressed the issue support this Court's finding that Plaintiff has no protected property interest in the reimbursements.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Knox v. Astrue

    660 F. Supp. 2d 790 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 29, 2009

    The ALJ found that, even if Knox did not have a substance abuse problem, his other impairments would qualify as “severe.” (Tr. at 28). … Clearly, the ALJ should have sought additional information from Dr. Farag regarding the basis for his opinion. If the ALJ believed that Dr.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Stewart v. City of Arcola

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 3, 2024

    Although Stewart does not need to meet the heightened evidentiary burden reserved for the summary judgment stage, she does need to plausibly allege facts that tend to establish that the City is liable for the alleged conduct … Taken as true, this qualifies as protected activity under Title VII. Furthermore, her termination is clearly an adverse employment action.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • SIS, LLC v. Orion Group Holdings, Inc.

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Dec 12, 2023

    It is not the duty of the Court to search the record for evidence that might establish an issue of material fact. Jd. IIE. Discussion The SaaS agreement is governed by Georgia law. … Nevertheless, SIS clearly disagrees about what is required to adequately calculate SIS’s savings resulting from Orion’s alleged breach.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Carlson

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 2, 2020

    CSS asserts that Carlson’s evidence of partiality is remote, uncertain, or speculative and fails to show clearly evident bias. Id. … Stodghill has never worked in the securities industry and has never been qualified to be an expert before. Id. at 798.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Thunderhorse v. Collier

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 28, 2025

    Act (PLRA) to dismiss the complaint at any time if it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Patel v. Garland

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 26, 2025

    The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id. at 286. B. … “[T]he word ‘may’ clearly connotes discretion.” Bouarfa, 604 U.S. at 13 (quotation omitted).

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd.

    942 F. Supp. 1513 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 6, 1996

    Thus, the claims clearly were not meritless or in bad faith when originally filed. … Clearly not all restaurant designs are inherently distinctive merely because there, are unlimited designs available.

    Cited 66 timesPublished
  • Barnett v. Kijakazi

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 27, 2023

    The ALJ issued a decision denying Barnett’s request for benefits, concluding that he did not qualify as disabled. R.12-24. … Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Barnett does not qualify as disabled. A.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Cook v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 15, 2025

    These elements cannot be established through common proof for all putative class members. … Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (class must be "adequately defined and clearly ascertainable").

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance National Indemnity Insurance

    202 F.R.D. 484 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 8, 2001

    the applicable state laws, to use filed rating plan factors when charging for Option V coverage; (2) assemble a grid of required filed rating-plan factors or verify that same are contained in the “RQS” computer program 3 (qualified … There is clearly no such concession by Wall Street in this case. In fact, Wall Street questions whether'an undercharge counterclaim will be asserted; to date, none has been filed.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Igwe v. Menil Foundation, Inc.

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 30, 2020

    It argues that Igwe fails to establish the third and fourth. Dkt 41 at 10, 12. … He points to no specific evidence establishing causation in his response.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Symetra Life Insurance v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd.

    657 F. Supp. 2d 795 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 28, 2009

    A “qualified order” is defined as: a final order, judgment, or decree which (A) finds that the transfer ... … Direct Standing Because NASP has standing to sue on behalf of its members, it need not establish direct standing. Nevertheless, NASP has also asserted facts that establish its standing to sue in its own right.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Hotze v. Hollins

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 2, 2020

    The Court finds, after reviewing the record, the briefing, and considering the arguments of counsel, that the tents used for drive-thru voting qualify as “movable structures” for purposes of the Election Code. … Further, they are not inside, they are clearly outside.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown

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