Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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2,190 results

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  • Sanborn-Alder v. Cigna Group Insurance

    771 F. Supp. 2d 713 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 15, 2011

    Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940 , the Supreme Court, applying the Twombly plausibility standard to a Bivens claim of unconstitutional discrimination and a defense of qualified immunity for government official, observed that two … Thus LINA’s evidence is irrelevant to the legal standard established in this Circuit. C.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Stone v. Unocal Termination Allowance Plan

    542 F. Supp. 2d 605 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 14, 2008

    Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 , 109 S.Ct. 948 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) (finding these standards consistent with established principles of trust law); see also Vercher v. … However, by inserting commas within the provision, the Plans clearly indicate that such reductions in employee eligibility for or amount of benefits must be incorporated within Article 16 or change of control provisions.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Sambula v. Barnhart

    285 F. Supp. 2d 815 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Apr 29, 2002

    Academically, no learning disability was established or Attention-Deficit/Hyperaetivity Disorder was diagnosed. (R.180). Dr. … The administrative hearing transcript clearly reflects that Guity and his mother, Maria Sambula, were not present at the hearing.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins

    452 F. Supp. 861 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 20, 1978

    Baumel, a qualified consultant natural gas engineer, with extensive experience in the evaluation of “market value” of natural gas. … This argument was clearly inconsistent with Vela .

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Boone v. Saul

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 29, 2023

    Boone has not identified facts that would fall within the incredibly exacting standard for establishing bias or partiality. 4. … This functionality capacity clearly states that I am disabled.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • City of Galveston v. United States

    257 F. Supp. 243 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 11, 1966

    It did not purpose to go outside traditional guidelines or to establish new precedents designed to advance the equalization of all ports. … However, there is more to natural advantage and location than geographic mileage differences, and shorter mileage to one port does not automatically give immunity from' rate equalization.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Mitchell v. City of Houston

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 30, 2022

    They contend that Mitchell failed to establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation, bystander liability, or Monell liability. Acevedo, Finner, and Edwards also assert qualified immunity. … This alone precludes its application to the claims brought by Mitchell against the individual Defendants, as the law in that regard isn’t clearly established for the purpose of qualified

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Sambula v. Central Gulf Steamship Co.

    268 F. Supp. 1 · District Court, S.D. Texas · May 2, 1967

    Brandon’s opinion, a general practitioner is not qualified to treat an injury of this nature. Dr. … The most that he established was that the incident was a possible cause of the aggravation.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Baker Hughes Inc. v. United States

    313 F. Supp. 3d 804 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 18, 2018

    The Treasury regulations clearly state that a contribution to capital cannot be considered a debt for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 166 . 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-1 (c) (1983). … Instead, the operative agreement stated clearly and succinctly that it was "free financial aid" and would not be paid back to BJ Parent or to Samotlor. (Dkt. 44-15).

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Penrod v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON

    824 F. Supp. 2d 754 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 15, 2011

    The statutory language clearly applies to loan servicers, not owners. 72 Plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefing makes no mention of RESPA and has abandoned the claim. 73 Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed even to allege that … Response, at 7 (arguing that BONY has failed to produce a Wholesale Price Sheet for the week of May 1, 2007, and Plaintiffs’ credit report, which would "establish the best rate for which Plaintiffs originally qualified without

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Flowers v. Collier

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 28, 2025

    □ waived its immunity. … or Congress has clearly abrogated it.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Gate Guard Services L.P. v. Perez

    14 F. Supp. 3d 825 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Apr 7, 2014

    Sedwick is an officer and shareholder of RSS, he “clearly ... has personal interest in its continued financial success.” (Dkt. No. 148 at 5-6.) As such, Mr. … Limited Availability of Qualified Attorneys The Supreme Court has explained that “the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved” refers to attorneys having “some distinctive knowledge or specialized

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Bowen v. Wohl Shoe Company

    389 F. Supp. 572 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 20, 1975

    To this Court, plaintiff’s employment was clearly terminated by defendant for her operation of the Conroe store. … The alleged attempt of Foley Bros, and defendant together to force plaintiff to relinquish the Conroe store also potentially qualifies. See note 4, supra.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Texas Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of Galveston

    944 F. Supp. 562 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Oct 31, 1996

    Plaintiffs request leave to “amend their pleadings to clearly state the authority by which the organization addresses their complaints” in the case. … To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, that such injury is traceable to the conduct of the defendant, and that such injury is redressable by

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In Re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. &" ERISA" Lit.

    310 F. Supp. 2d 819 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 29, 2004

    to establish a scheme of STDs, but it has- not done so. … Clearly discovery and submission of evidence are essential before such a determination can be made. III.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • In Re Starns

    52 B.R. 405 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 19, 1985

    Consequently, the Debtor concludes, Tract 2 qualifies as a business homestead. … One court has observed: Clearly the purpose of the time limits under ...

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Range v. United States

    256 B.R. 868 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 20, 2000

    On its face, the Ranges’ complaint does not establish that the primary issue was the discharge of penalties. … Consequently, the Court need not address whether the Ranges also qualify as a “party” within the meaning of section 7430.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Federal Deposit Insurance v. Brown

    812 F. Supp. 722 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Dec 10, 1992

    Also, notwithstanding its age, the business judgment rule still furthers the public policy of encouraging citizens to serve as corporate directors by immunizing them from acts and omissions that in hindsight proved to be … FDIC argues that Wheat establishes that the business judgment rule does not preclude an action for negligence against disinterested directors in the present case.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Hayward v. Harris County Jail

    District Court, S.D. Texas · May 21, 2024

    May 29, 2009) (“As a division within the Harris County Sheriff’s Department, the Harris County Jail does not qualify as an entity with capacity under the rules because it cannot sue or be sued.”). … These allegations, even if true, do not establish a constitutional violation. See McClure v. Foster, 465 F.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Mahoney v. Ernst & Young LLP

    487 F. Supp. 2d 780 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 21, 2006

    In contrast, when considering the magistrate judge’s orders addressing nondisposi-tive matters, the district court may modify or set aside portions of the orders only if they are “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” … The letter clearly opposed Defendant’s actions that allegedly violated Plaintiffs FMLA rights, including her right to reinstatement. 159 Therefore, the letter qualifies as protected activity. See E.E.O.C. v.

    Cited 4 timesPublished

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