Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,255 results
3.12s
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 18, 1999
Section 82.002(a) clearly states that only loss caused by the seller's negligence will defeat a duty to indemnify. See id. § 82.002(a). … The exception is clearly intended to make a loss caused by the seller's negligence a part of the products liability action.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 9, 2010
A witness may be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify as an expert. See Tex. R. Evid. 702. … Venable was qualified as an expert witness on the issue of causation, and the jury obviously found him more credible than Meyer.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSue Hoover v. Diana Cook Seinera
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 12, 1994
Unless Hoover has shown on appeal that she established every element of usury in the trial court, we cannot agree that she conclusively established her counterclaim for usury. … To rely on a qualified refusal, the person in possession must disclose the qualification to the owner; she must communicate the reason for the qualified refusal distinctly. Morey v. Page , 802 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. App.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 23, 1997
Sneed stated clearly and unequivocally that he never requested or directed a police officer to arrest Smith. In response, Smith points to the deposition testimony of Zamutt, the Wal-Mart pharmacist who detained Smith. … or neglect of a child in bad faith or with a malicious purpose is not immune from liability.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 22, 2010
geared toward automating 7-Eleven’s retail stores, not data-processing services; and (5) 7-Eleven’s claims are barred by the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies, ripeness, sovereign immunity … According to the State, the “purpose” requirement of section 151.006 is not met because “7-Eleven’s actual use of the Software clearly evidences a purchase for its own use, as opposed to a transfer of Software to a third
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 14, 2003
Under all the circumstances, Beauregard was not qualified to testify. Rule 803(4) clearly requires the statements by the declarant be made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. … As the rule itself requires, the proponent of the testimony must establish (1) that the scientific, technical, or other special knowledge will aid the trier of fact, and (2) that the expert witness is qualified to testify
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 22, 2008
And clearly the answer is yes." At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court overruled the plea. The Commission appealed the district court's order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. … TLG urges that it "established its qualifications in accordance with the Rule [311.51], thereby vesting its right to use the Rule to obtain an interim license." However, the mootness question here is much more narrow.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 22, 2010
Canmax store software was geared toward automating 7-Eleven's retail stores, not data-processing services; and (5) 7-Eleven's claims are barred by the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies, ripeness, sovereign immunity … According to the State, the "purpose" requirement of section 151.006 is not met because "7-Eleven's actual use of the Software clearly evidences a purchase for its own use, as opposed to a transfer of Software to a third
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 2, 2008
Where the challenged expenditures have already been made, taxpayers even more clearly lack standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent those expenditures. … --Austin 2007, pet. filed) (finding that "clearly erroneous" exception to law-of-the-case doctrine applied).
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 22, 2008
And clearly the answer is yes.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court overruled the plea. The Commission appealed the district court’s order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. … TLG urges that it “established its qualifications in accordance with the Rule [311.51], thereby vesting its right to use the Rule to obtain an interim license.” However, the mootness question here is much more narrow.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 2, 2008
Where the challenged expenditures have already been made, taxpayers even more clearly lack standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent those expenditures. … —Austin 2007, pet. filed) (finding that “clearly erroneous” exception to law-of- the-case doctrine applied).
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 17, 2015
of whom works in Minnesota, and who have established voluntary private pension plans, qualified under § 401 of Moreover, the retroactive state-imposed vesting … The Code clearly includes meaning is clearly required.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 11, 2014
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing an actor’s guilt, and an actor’s guilt can be established with circumstantial evidence alone. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 359. … Finally, appellant notes that Tambunga received immunity even though he did not testify.
Cited 0 timesPublishedHeather Lauren Richards v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 9, 2015
Washington, the United States Supreme Court established the federal constitutional standard for determining whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance. Strickland v. … Clearly, Ms. Chavira’s testimony shows that Ms. Lardieri is a masochist, who was also the main aggressor in the attack against Ms.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSoo Jin H. Rademacher v. Franz Louis Rademacher
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 16, 2026
She stated that she was also under the care of a neurologist who was “reviewing [her] memory loss;” that she had a hormone disorder and immunity disorder due to having her thyroid, uterus, and ovaries removed; and that … The court found that the MSA was signed by the parties and their attorneys, that it was clearly labeled as a mediated settlement agreement, and that it contained a statement in boldface capital letters that it was not subject
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 19, 2011
To establish a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief under the UDJA, a party must plead the existence of an “underlying controversy” within the scope of section 37.004 of the civil practice and remedies … “An act is ministerial when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed by the official with sufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion.” Anderson v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 3, 2007
Prior to Smith, disparate-treatment claims were clearly actionable under the ADEA, see Hazen Paper Co. v. … If it meets the quality standards established by the U.S.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 17, 2007
The standard allows the state in a timely manner to extricate itself from litigation if it is truly immune. … Plaintiffs' claims are clearly not so limited. They challenge expenditures claimed to be unlawful because they are being made pursuant to allegedly unconstitutional or unlawful appropriations.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 15, 1992
voters of the city at a regular or special election to be held within ninety (90) days after the date of the certification to the council; or (c) At such election submit to a vote of the qualified voters of the city said … In those cases, the charter provisions and the facts clearly established that the public official had no discretion to exercise. See e.g.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Dearing
150 S.W.3d 452 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 5, 2004
The statute clearly hinges the running of the limitations period on the date of the “unlawful employment action.” See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.202. … Subsection (a), which establishes disparate-impact claims, glaringly omits employment practices based on age discrimination.
Cited 51 timesPublished
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