Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,255 results
0.70s
John Klotz Stokes, M.D. v. David Delarosa
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 4, 2009
Meyer is not qualified to give opinions regarding the standard of care. We review a trial court's determination that an expert is qualified under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Broders v. … Meyer was qualified to render those opinions. Dr.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 6, 2000
The intention to confer a direct benefit to a third party must be fully and clearly spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be denied. See id. … Consequently, a presumption exists that parties contracted for themselves unless it "clearly appears" that they intended a third party to benefit from the contract. See Smith , 525 S.W.2d at 503-04 .
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 16, 2007
We reject GM’s challenge to Finding of Fact 168, which states, “GM failed to establish its burden of proof to show that Mr. Elliott is not qualified by his business experience to be a Pontiac/Buick/GMC dealer.” … Respondent, General Motors Corporation, failed to establish that the prospective transferee, Charles E. Elliott, was not qualified, in violation of Code §§ 2301.359 and 2301.360. .... 5.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 12, 2008
The parties agree that purchases of the cable itself qualify for the sale-for-resale sales tax exemption. … Fabrication HWC also argues that the evidence establishes that its operations amount to fabrication, which, like processing, is included in the manufacturing exemption.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 16, 2007
We reject GM's challenge to Finding of Fact 168, which states, "GM failed to establish its burden of proof to show that Mr. Elliott is not qualified by his business experience to be a Pontiac/Buick/GMC dealer." … Respondent, General Motors Corporation, failed to establish that the prospective transferee, Charles E. Elliott, was not qualified, in violation of Code §§ 2301.359 and 2301.360. . . . . 5.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 12, 2008
The parties agree that purchases of the cable itself qualify for the sale-for-resale sales tax exemption. … Fabrication HWC also argues that the evidence establishes that its operations amount to fabrication, which, like processing, is included in the manufacturing exemption.
Cited 0 timesPublished127 S.W.3d 852 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 29, 2004
The OAG filed a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the ripeness of the controversy and asserting sovereign immunity. … Last, appellants argue that there is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the UDJA.
Cited 76 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 21, 2021
The general rule is that “a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly,” and the statutory language waiving immunity must be clear and unambiguous. … DISCUSSION The OAG asserts that appellees did not state a viable claim under the Act because they did not establish that they fit within the Act’s “narrow immunity waiver.”
Cited 0 timesPublished945 S.W.2d 895 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 19, 1997
DISCUSSION In its first point of error, Apple contends appellees lacked standing to bring suit under the DTPA because they do not qualify as “consumers” under the act. … If there is no evidence to support the fact finder’s answer, the entire record must then be examined to see if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690 .
Cited 72 timesPublishedCombs v. TEXAS ENTERTAINMENT ASS'N, INC.
287 S.W.3d 852 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 5, 2009
For example, Steven White, a program specialist in the Comptroller's tax policy division, testified that if a play involving nudity was held at a bar or other establishment that serves alcohol, the owner of the establishment … Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex.2007) ("Absent an express waiver of its sovereign immunity, the State is generally immune from suit.").
Cited 0 timesPublishedJose A. Perez v. Texas Medical Board and Mari Robinson, JD, in Her Official Capacity
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 18, 2015
It is well-settled law that the state, as a governmental entity, “generally enjoys immunity from suit and liability unless immunity has been clearly waived by legislative enactment or constitutional provision.” … It is well established law that the UDJA “is not a general waiver of sovereign immunity. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011).
Cited 0 timesPublishedTjfa, L.P. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc.
368 S.W.3d 727 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 4, 2012
This Court has previously explained what qualifies as a statutory prerequisite to suit. See Scott v. Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist., 266 S.W.3d 531, 535, 537 (Tex.App. … -Dallas 1988, no writ) (stating that jurisdiction of court to hear case is established when petition is filed alleging subject matter over which court has jurisdiction).
Cited 22 timesPublishedINOVA Diagnostics, Inc. v. Strayhorn
166 S.W.3d 394 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 26, 2005
property is not immune from taxation by reason of Public Law 86-272. … This sustained activity is clearly encompassed by the bright-line rule equating physical presence in the state to a substantial nexus.
Cited 15 timesPublishedSarah Horton v. City of Smithville, Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 25, 2008
Horton, by virtue of bringing this suit, clearly considers herself to be a person aggrieved by the presence of the Waystation Opry on the Helmcamps’ property. … Horton has also failed to establish that the city council lacks the authority to grant the particular relief she seeks. See id.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSarah Horton v. City of Smithville, Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 25, 2008
Horton, by virtue of bringing this suit, clearly considers herself to be a person aggrieved by the presence of the Waystation Opry on the Helmcamps' property. … Horton has also failed to establish that the city council lacks the authority to grant the particular relief she seeks. See id .
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 27, 2015
“The state generally enjoys immunity from suit and liability unless immunity has been clearly and unambiguously waived by legislative 7 enactment or constitutional provision.” … Accordingly, any ambiguity in a statute must be interpreted to retain immunity. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003). The plaintiff bears the burden to establish jurisdiction.
Cited 0 timesPublishedHarris County Hospital District v. Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 13, 2015
The Hospital District submits that these allegations are clearly sufficient to invoke the provisions of Section 15.003 of the Utilities Code. … With regard to the question of immunity, this Court has held that the State has consented to suits for judicial review of the Commission’s final orders. Lopez v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 13, 2015
Judge Charles Ramsay does not qualify as a retired judge but as a former judge. … immunity.]
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 28, 1991
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY Because the Department is an entity of the State, within the doctrine of governmental immunity, Ms. Petty was obliged to establish legislative consent to suit, see Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. … The Department argues that the "question allows a finding of negligence based on the use of the enumerated property by any one of several hundred employees during a fifteen-year period without clearly establishing proximate
Cited 0 timesPublished228 S.W.3d 354 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2007
The standard allows the state in a timely manner to extricate itself from litigation if it is truly immune. … Plaintiffs’ claims are clearly not so limited. They challenge expenditures claimed to be unlawful because they are being made pursuant to allegedly unconstitutional or unlawful appropriations.
Cited 147 timesPublished
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