Case law

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  • Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas/Raytheon E-Systems, Inc. v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc./Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 30, 2003

    The claimant has the burden of clearly showing that it is entitled to the exemption. North Alamo Water Supply, 804 S.W.2d at 899. … Passage of title qualifies as a sale under Texas law. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. ' 151.005(1).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Victor Walls v. Travis County and Travis County Sheriff's Department

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 8, 1998

    Although the petition attached to the citation clearly named Travis County as the defendant, the answer was filed on behalf of Terry Keel as sheriff. … Travis County then filed an answer that was clearly on behalf of "Travis County" as an entity.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Rylander v. Associated Technics Co., Inc.

    987 S.W.2d 947 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 29, 1999

    On appeal, the Comptroller raises two issues addressing whether asbestos-abatement services qualify as taxable services under the Tax Code. … The legislature clearly intended to exempt this activity from taxation. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.0048 (a)(3)(A) (West Supp.1999).

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Rosendo Morales v. Texas Department of Insurance-Division of Workers' Compensation, and Commissioner Ryan Brannan, in His Official Capacity

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2015

    Section 410.255 does not even provide a right to judicial review, let alone clearly and unambiguously waive the State Appellees’ immunity. … This argument neither establishes a need to “bind” the State Appellees through UDJA action nor establishes an actual immunity waiver.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Houston Wire & Cable Company v. Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 12, 2007

    The parties agree that purchases of the cable itself qualify for the sale-for-resale sales tax exemption. … Fabrication HWC also argues that the evidence establishes that its operations amount to fabrication, which, like processing, is included in the manufacturing exemption.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Houston Wire & Cable Company v. Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 12, 2007

    The parties agree that purchases of the cable itself qualify for the sale-for-resale sales tax exemption. … Fabrication HWC also argues that the evidence establishes that its operations amount to fabrication, which, like processing, is included in the manufacturing exemption.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Darrell Jackson and Rondal Daniels v. CT Corporation Systems D/B/A Albertson's Inc., and Security Officer X, A/K/A MacK McBride, Individually and Employee of Albertson's

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2000

    The record does not clearly demonstrate McBride acted in his public role and contains some evidence that he was merely carrying out his employment duties. We sustain issue number one. … immunity based on the record because he had not proven he carried out his duties in good faith.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Aaron v. Bishop Ronald J. Booker Richard Burns Albert Cortez, Jr. Eric De Los Santos Jovita Lopez Aurelio Martinez Norris McKenzie Tomas Montez Henry D. Moreno Ricardo Pelayo Jesse Prado Oscar Ramirez James Stanesic Lester Vanzura v. the City of Austin

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 21, 2018

    “The TCHRA waives immunity, but only when the plaintiff states a claim for conduct that actually violates the statute.” Id. … The City concedes each plaintiff is a member of a class protected by the TCHRA but argues the disputed personnel decisions do not qualify as adverse employment actions, contends the plaintiffs have not identified any similarly

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 13, 2010

    Because sovereign immunity has not been waived, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. … We believe the regulations governing the creation of mitigation banks clearly allow the Corps to exercise its discretion to approve or deny a mitigation-banking permit.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • David Jaso v. Travis County Juvenile Board

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 4, 1999

    University of Mississippi , the Fifth Circuit emphasized that a fact-finder can infer pretext if it finds that the employee was clearly better qualified (as opposed to merely better or as qualified). … Jaso does not claim to have been clearly better qualified than Medina for the position of chief. The Board argues that this is the only way to establish a pretext for age-discrimination. We disagree.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Schlueter v. Schlueter

    929 S.W.2d 94 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 28, 1996

    The disputed evidence clearly went to the issue of Hudson’s motive and intent. … The supreme court clearly- abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity and is certainly capable, without our assistance, of reviving that doctrine, in whole or in part, if it should ever feel the need.

    Reversed by Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (1998)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • State v. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 13, 2010

    We believe the regulations governing the creation of mitigation banks clearly allow the Corps to exercise its discretion to approve or deny a mitigation-banking permit. … Because sovereign immunity has not been waived, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Travis County Sheriff's Office Senior Certified Peace Officer Dennis Tumlinson v. Carolyn Barnes

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 9, 2015

    Further, a government agent who does not violate clearly established law is entitled to official immunity. … Qualified immunity protects a public official from liability for conduct that "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Osbourn v. State

    59 S.W.3d 809 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 18, 2001

    As the rule itself requires, the proponent of the testimony must establish (1) that the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will aid the trier of fact, and (2) that the expert is qualified to testify on … Clearly, appellant could have anticipated Saval’s testimony, most of which was included in the offense report.

    Cited 46 timesPublished
  • James Marlin Ebert v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2007

    The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his liberty, life, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." Bumguardner v. State , 179 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Crim. … up to enforce those laws and the court system established to interpret those laws.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • James Marlin Ebert v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2007

    Was one Bill Bender constitutionally qualified to be acting as Judge in this matter? 23. … The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his liberty, life, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.” Bumguardner v. State, 179 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Crim.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • John Klotz Stokes, M.D. v. David Delarosa

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 4, 2009

    Meyer’s expert report fails to meet statutory requirements because it does not clearly state a single standard of care and because the opinions set out are “so vague and conclusory that they do not provide a ‘fair summary … Meyer is not qualified to give opinions regarding the standard of care. We review a trial court’s determination that an expert is qualified under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Broders v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Perkins v. Group Life & Health Insurance Co.

    49 S.W.3d 503 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 9, 2001

    Under article 3.50-2 of the Texas Insurance Code, ERS has the authority to contract with “a qualified, experienced firm of group insurance specialists who shall act for the trastee [State Board of Trustees that administers … The Texas Employees Uniform Group Insurance Benefits Act established a plan for the purchase of group life, accident, and health insurance for state employees. Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 3.50-2 (West 1981 & Supp.2001).

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • City of Conroe, Texas City of Magnolia, Texas And City of Splendora, Texas v. the Attorney General of Texas and San Jacinto River Authority

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 22, 2022

    The Cities also asserted governmental immunity as an independent jurisdictional bar. The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction, and the Cities perfected an interlocutory appeal. … The Court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the Cities’ plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. Id. at 680-81.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Coggin v. State

    123 S.W.3d 82 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 9, 2003

    The Sixth Circuit, though, noted that an official loses his immunity where a reasonable person would have known the defendant had a “clearly established” right to engage in the challenged conduct. Id. at 1254 . … The Sixth Circuit held that the arresting officer should have known that the defendant’s speech was constitutionally protected; consequently, the officer did not qualify for immunity. Id. at 1255 .

    Cited 51 timesPublished

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