Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,255 results
1.27s
Travis Central Appraisal District v. Diane Lee Norman
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 19, 2008
TCAD's policy handbook provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n employee who has a complaint concerning disciplinary probation, suspension, termination, demotion, or denial of a promotion of a qualified employee . . . shall … under chapter 451 and a whistleblower claim under chapter 554, the fact that immunity is clearly waived under the whistleblower statute suggests that immunity is also waived under chapter 451.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 15, 2010
ASIM argues that the examination report qualifies as an action of the Commissioner under section 36.201 as a "decision" or "other ruling," and therefore an appeal may be taken from the report under section 36.202. … To establish that a claim is ripe based on an injury that is likely to occur, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is imminent, direct, and immediate, and not merely remote, conjectural, or hypothetical.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 11, 2007
Rather, it is qualified by the requirement that a state opting to participate in Medicaid must fully comply with the federal statutes and regulations governing the program. See Schweiker v. … To qualify for federal assistance, a state must submit and have approved a “plan for medical assistance,” which must establish a scheme for reimbursing health care providers for medical services provided to Medicaid recipients
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 28, 2008
One of the primary concerns was how to reconcile the new rule established by the supreme court in Dubai with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g. , King , 28 S.W.3d at 31 . … There is no dispute that section 21.307 clearly and unambiguously waives the state's sovereign immunity from suit by its express language that "[e]ither party may appeal the commissioner's decision . . . ." Tex. Educ.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 15, 2010
The State argued that without probing the venirepersons with follow-up questions to firmly establish their bias, Martin failed to establish that they were properly excludable for cause. … Here, these factors establish that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying Petrucha as a fingerprint expert.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 20, 2009
A party suing a governmental entity must establish the State’s consent through a statute or express legislative permission. Id. … Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731-32 (Tex. 1981) (court will not entertain evidence of extrinsic agreements when contract is clearly integrated).
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 17, 2005
David’s actions of referring Walters to peer review and restricting her treatment of HIA patients would be justified as legitimate business decisions and protected by the qualified immunity attached to peer review actions … Because HIA conclusively established its affirmative defense of justification, Walters’s seventh issue is overruled. Qualified Privilege In response to all of Walters’s claims, St.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 4, 2003
Nuisance and Attractive Nuisance We will first address the easier question of whether the Shumakes have established a waiver of immunity for their nuisance and attractive nuisance claims. … a waiver of immunity by alleging facts that if proved might establish gross negligence under the duty of care owed to a known trespasser.
Cited 0 timesPublished565 S.W.3d 425 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 16, 2018
Thus, under the plain language of the TMWA, the Ordinance establishes a wage. … The “inability [of a state] to enforce its duly enacted [laws] clearly inflicts irreparable harm on the State.” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 n.17 (2018).
Cited 31 timesPublishedBohannan v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice
942 S.W.2d 113 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 24, 1997
Bohan-nan’s declaratory judgment cause of action is clearly precluded by statute and is therefore frivolous. … by immunity.
Cited 90 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 28, 2008
One of the primary concerns was how to reconcile the new rule established by the supreme court in Dubai with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., King, 28 S.W.3d at 31. … There is no dispute that section 21.307 clearly and unambiguously waives the state’s sovereign immunity from suit by its express language that “[e]ither party may appeal the commissioner’s decision . . . .” Tex. Educ.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 29, 2004
Section 51.212 of the education code establishes the jurisdiction for campus security personnel. … However, Fifth Club did nothing to ensure that the security personnel hired were qualified for employment.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 15, 2010
The State argued that without probing the venirepersons with follow-up questions to firmly establish their bias, Martin failed to establish that they were properly excludable for cause. … Here, these factors establish that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying Petrucha as a fingerprint expert.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 29, 2004
Section 51.212 of the education code establishes the jurisdiction for campus security personnel. … However, Fifth Club did nothing to ensure that the security personnel hired were qualified for employment.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 17, 2012
built wood-treatment plant, trained plaintiff’s employees to operate machinery, licensed plaintiff to use its trademark in connection with treated wood, and supplied toxic chemical plaintiff used to treat wood did not qualify … This would be an absurd result that clearly could not have been intended by the legislature.
Cited 0 timesPublishedBechtel Corp. v. CITGO PRODUCTS PIPELINE CO.
271 S.W.3d 898 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 19, 2008
Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is qualified, and (2) the testimony is relevant and based on a reliable foundation. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d at 499 ; Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556 . … The first difference was that the first sentence of section 9(a) omitted a qualifier found in the statute, "Except as provided in sections 12 and 13 of this Act....” Former art. 9033, § 9(a).
Cited 40 timesPublishedMark Gustafson and CPR Resources, Inc. v. City of Austin and Remedios P. Morris
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 26, 2003
By six issues on appeal, Gustafson argues that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) the City of Austin enjoyed sovereign immunity; (2) Morris enjoyed official immunity; (3) Gustafson’s case was barred because there … Therefore, if Morris and the City of Austin establish the substantial truth of the statement as a matter of law, they are entitled to summary judgment. McIlvain v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDianne Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 3, 2022
When a governmental entity challenges 9 jurisdiction on immunity grounds, the plaintiff’s burden of affirmatively demonstrating jurisdiction includes establishing a waiver … Because the evidence establishes that the Commission has in fact not threatened further disciplinary action against Hensley, she has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the TRFRA waives the Commission’s immunity
Cited 0 timesPublishedLamb County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 23, 2008
She asserts that the enabling language “encompasses a waiver of immunity,” arguing that the legislature empowered TRS to establish benefits plans and develop procedures to administer claims and that “[o]ne procedure for … Only if the plaintiff alleges actions that were criminal, fraudulent, grossly negligent, or “otherwise clearly outside the scope of its delegated authority, then the intermediary may not be entitled to the immunity it
Cited 0 timesPublishedMark Gustafson and CPR Resources, Inc. v. City of Austin and Remedios P. Morris
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 26, 2003
By six issues on appeal, Gustafson argues that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) the City of Austin enjoyed sovereign immunity; (2) Morris enjoyed official immunity; (3) Gustafson's case was barred because there … Therefore, if Morris and the City of Austin establish the substantial truth of the statement as a matter of law, they are entitled to summary judgment. McIlvain v.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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