Case law

Hermenia Jenkins v. Crosby Independent School District and Michael L. Williams in His Official Capacity as State Commissioner of Education

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 24, 2015

Jenkins was certified and qualified to serve as an assistant principal. 19 Tex. Admin. … Petitioner has not proven that hers was a contract of adhesion, which would clearly change the result in this case.

Tom Benson v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 29, 2015

In both established that the wrongful injury respects, HCH is incorrect. … Joseph because they establish DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d immunities from liability 127 (1975); Cates v.

Natin Paul WC 1st and Trinity, LP WC 1st and Trinity, GP, LLC WC 3rd and Congress, LP And WC 3rd and Congress, GP, LLC v. the Roy F. and JoAnn Cole Mitte Foundation

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 8, 2023

without their agreement, a substantive question of arbitrability—i.e., whether the parties have actually agreed to submit a particular dispute to arbitration—‘is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly … They contend that the arbitration clause is limited to disputes “between the Partners” and that Mitte’s derivative claims do not qualify because they belong to the Limited Partnerships.

Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, Office of Public Utility Counsel, and State of Texas Agencies and Institutions of Higher Education

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 27, 2015

policy or merely question whether the Commission’s rules reflect the policy clearly enough. … PUC's "establishing an electric utility's rates."

Dr. Ruthie Harper and PLLG, LLC v. Wellbeing Genomics Pty Ltd.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 5, 2018

Metzker testified that Harper misappropriated Trade Secret No. 1 – based not only on the above-cited evidence (7RR21, 49-52, 57-61, 64-65, and 70- 72), but also his opinions that neither Harper nor DiBella was qualified … Per the standards established by the above-cited cases, there is plenty of evidence to support the jury’s findings that Harper and PLLG misappropriated Wellbeing’s Trade Secret No. 1.

SAFESHRED, INC. v. Martinez

310 S.W.3d 649 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 23, 2010

When reviewing a jury finding for factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. … contention that [plaintiff’s] Sabine Pilot claim is contractual in nature rather than a tort,” the court went on to explain that "Lisanti fails to address ... the fact that Dixon’s petition included a claim for assault,” which qualified

Dennis Davis, Individually and D/B/A Aqua Tech Marine Industries Debbie Desmond, Individually and D/B/A Aqua Tech Marine Industries And Aqua Tech Marine Industries, Inc. v. Steven L. Johnston, Maria Estella Arguinde-Johnston, Stephen H. Gay and Carilynne Yaffe Gay

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 28, 2012

It is true that our reliance on the plain meaning of contractual text must in some instances be qualified when that construction would yield a result that the parties manifestly could not have intended. See Lane v. … This is not enough to establish a negative implied restrictive covenant.

Bernard Morello v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 4, 2015

The groundwater protection standard is established by the TCEQ in accordance with 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 335.158. … Instead, the court clearly describes that the owner of the company failed to submit a complete application, which led to the company operating without a license.

Dennis Davis, Individually and D/B/A Aqua Tech Marine Industries Debbie Desmond, Individually and D/B/A Aqua Tech Marine Industries And Aqua Tech Marine Industries, Inc. v. Steven L. Johnston, Maria Estella Arguinde-Johnston, Stephen H. Gay and Carilynne Yaffe Gay

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 28, 2012

It is true that our reliance on the plain meaning of contractual text must in some instances be qualified when that construction would yield a result that the parties manifestly could not have intended. See Lane v. … This is not enough to establish a negative implied restrictive covenant.

Michael J. DeLitta v. Nancy Schaefer

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 20, 2015

This placement of the house on the lot will clearly comply with restriction 7. … The reported decisions establish that the qualifying “relationship” is one of intended beneficiary under a contract between others. 4 That is to say, the circumstances must justify a conclusion that the contracting parties

Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Everett Brew Houston, Jr., W. Andrew Buchholz, Scott J. Leighty, Jad L. Davis, and Holly Clause v. Tracy D. Strandhagen

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 16, 2015

Whenever the defense is not clearly established on the face of the pleadings, as it is here, it must be pleaded. … The Lermas' intention to relinquish their right to the return of the earnest money, however, is clearly established by their conduct after June 15.

Parker Barber & Beauty Supply, Inc. v. the Wella Corporation, Donald German and Stephen Crawford

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 11, 2006

Finally, the court held that if the judgment clearly disposes of all claims and parties, yet there was not an adequate basis in the record for doing so, then the judgment may be erroneous and reversible on the ground that … On the other hand, specialized customer information that cannot easily be duplicated . . . or a compilation of specific information about individual customers, may be sufficiently valuable and secret to qualify as a trade

Parker Barber & Beauty Supply, Inc. v. the Wella Corporation, Donald German and Stephen Crawford

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 11, 2006

Finally, the court held that if the judgment clearly disposes of all claims and parties, yet there was not an adequate basis in the record for doing so, then the judgment may be erroneous and reversible on the ground that … hand, specialized customer information that cannot easily be duplicated . . . or a compilation of specific information about individual customers, may be sufficiently valuable and secret to qualify

Dalith A. Regost v. Julien Regost

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 20, 2022

In considering factual sufficiency, we consider the entire record and “set aside the finding only if the evidence supporting the finding is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” Gonzales v. … —Fort Worth 2007, no pet.), “[t]o qualify as an outcry, ‘the statement must be more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was going on,’” Hines v.

John Williams v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 23, 2010

When reviewing a jury finding for factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. … contention that [plaintiff’s] Sabine Pilot claim is contractual in nature rather than a tort,” the court went on to explain that “Lisanti fails to address . . . the fact that Dixon’s petition included a claim for assault,” which qualified

Crystal Bingham Hernandez v. Tiffany Polley

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 30, 2016

The Texas Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a sanction is just. … “[C]ase-determinative sanctions may only be imposed in ‘exceptional cases’ where they are ‘clearly justified’ and it is ‘fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance with the rules.’” Id.

Safeshred, Inc. v. Louis Martinez, III

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 23, 2010

When reviewing a jury finding for factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. … contention that [plaintiff's] Sabine Pilot claim is contractual in nature rather than a tort," the court went on to explain that "Lisanti fails to address . . . the fact that Dixon's petition included a claim for assault," which qualified

David Kent Thacker, Jr. v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 8, 2015

Furthermore, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Rockwell v. … Davis as being contrary to the precedent established in Rummel.

Karl B. Bailey v. MidFirst Bank

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 14, 2015

According to WALLY TINGLEY & ASSOCIATES., P.C., “a seller provides buyer non-qualifying interim purchase wrap financing for 1 – 5 years (balloon period), stacking the wrap financing on seller’s prior mortgage.” http://wallytingley.com … Finally, several of the exhibits in MidFirst’s Motion were clearly downloaded from the Travis County Clerk’s website (they have “Unofficial Document” emblazoned across the pages).

Texas Industrial Energy Consumers, Cities Advocating Reasonable Deregulation, and Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Utility Commission of Texas and Southwestern Electric Power Company

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 10, 2018

Code §§ 31.002(6) (defining “electric utility” to include transmission and distribution utilities, but expressly excluding power generation companies and retail electric providers), 32.001 (establishing Commission’s jurisdiction … SWEPCO’s evidence neither qualifies as independent nor constitutes a retrospective analysis under the standard specifically adopted by the Commission.