Case law

Jose Bellnoa and Carolyn Bellnoa v. City of Austin

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 18, 1995

Although the words "under this chapter" do not unequivocally provide that section 101.0215 is subject to section 101.021, neither do the words of section 101.0215 clearly and unambiguously waive sovereign immunity. … Because the statutory language does not clearly and unambiguously waive sovereign immunity, and in view of the stated legislative intent, we hold that section 101.0215 is not an independent waiver of immunity.

John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Official Capacity as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 24, 2015

, and it requires a plaintiff to establish his or her right to declaratory relief in order to establish jurisdiction. … This Court’s prior holdings treat the constitutional provisions as waivers of immunity and require that the plaintiff plead a valid cause of action thereunder in order to establish immunity.

Texas Commission on Human Rights, Texas Workforce Commission, David Powell and Robert Gomez v. Marilou Morrison

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 8, 2011

Sovereign immunity includes two distinct principles: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (citing Texas Dep't of Transp. v. … Garcia , 253 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2008) (agreeing that TCHRA "clearly and unambiguously waive[d] immunity"); see also Tex. Lab.

Texas State University v. Dr. Kathleen Quinn

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 7, 2016

Quinn failed to demonstrate a waiver of TXST’s sovereign immunity under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA” or “Texas Labor Code”) because she did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation … Quinn did not qualify for the job. (CR 202).

Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. City of Eagle Pass/Texas Municipal League Workers' Compensation Joint Insurance Fund And Capital Metro Transportation Authority/Texas Municipal League Workers' Compensation Joint Insurance Fund

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 9, 2000

While it is well established that sovereign immunity protects the federal government from state suits and vice versa, this immunity stems from the basic precept of federalism that the federal and several state governments … Read in its entirety, the Act clearly subjects political subdivisions to administrative penalties.

State Ex Rel. Abbott v. Young

265 S.W.3d 697 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 16, 2008

As the plaintiff attempting to sue the State, Young had the burden of affirmatively establishing that his claim fell within chapter 103’s sovereign-immunity waiver. Id. … Furthermore, by restricting the waiver to a claimant who “has been granted relief on the basis of actual innocence for the crime,” as opposed to a formulation like “is actually innocent ...,” the legislature clearly contemplated

Dianne Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 30, 2025

The supreme court concluded that “Hensley’s notice of the burden she claims to her religious freedom is clearly sufficient under TRFRA.” Id. … The statute establishing the Commission expressly states that the Commission “does not have the power or authority of a court in this state.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 33.002 (a-1).

Landry's Crab Shack, Inc. D/B/A Joe's Crab Shack v. the Board of Regents, Texas State University System And Southwest Texas State University

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 18, 2001

Sovereign immunity consists of two elements—immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405; Bates v. Texas St. Tech. College, 983 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). … The University did not file special exceptions to require Landry’s to replead its claims for equitable relief more clearly or specifically, and we cannot say from the record that Landry’s would be unable to replead those

Muammer David Oksuz v. Harmony Public Schools

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 11, 2026

Harmony filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and, in the alternative, motion for partial traditional summary judgment, arguing that its governmental immunity was not waived because Oksuz had not established a prima … Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2008) (Garcia I) (“[A]ll the courts of appeals that have considered it have concluded that the TCHRA clearly and unambiguously waives immunity, and we agree.”); Tex. Lab.

Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners v. Gene Giggleman, DVM

408 S.W.3d 696 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 22, 2013

Gov’t Code § 552.301(b), such failure did not automatically require it to release the information because the confidentiality requirement imposed by Occupations Code section 807.027(b) would, if established, constitute a … immunity, see City of El Paso v.

Carolyn Barnes, Individually and as Next Friend of William Zimmer Barnes and Charles Austin Lee Bednorz v. Calvin R. Sulak Lt. Wayne Lock Sgt. Ralph Fisher R.C. Nichols And Williamson County Sheriff's Department

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 8, 2002

Appellees contended that the court should stay discovery while considering appellees' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. … The pleas of immunity did not automatically stay discovery. Texas has not yet adopted the federal rule that a plea of qualified immunity automatically stays discovery of an official claiming immunity. State v.

Carolyn Barnes, Individually and as Next Friend of William Zimmer Barnes and Charles Austin Lee Bednorz v. Calvin R. Sulak Lt. Wayne Lock Sgt. Ralph Fisher R.C. Nichols And Williamson County Sheriff's Department

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 8, 2002

Appellees contended that the court should stay discovery while considering appellees= motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. … The pleas of immunity did not automatically stay discovery. Texas has not yet adopted the federal rule that a plea of qualified immunity automatically stays discovery of an official claiming immunity. State v.

S. C. San Antonio, Inc., Doing Business as Southwest General Hospital, by and Through Safeco Properties, Inc., Its Successor in Interest v. Texas Department of Human Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 11, 1995

immunity from suit. … As we note, however, limited review procedures have now been established by rule at 25 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 29.609 (g), (h) (1994). 8.

Janos Farkas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. And Brice Vander Linden & Wernic, P.C. N/K/A Buckley Madole, P.C.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 20, 2015

—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism’d) (an attorney enjoys “qualified immunity,” with respect to non-clients, for action taken in connection with representing a client in adversarial circumstances). … Farkas further claims that qualified immunity is only applicable for attorneys in litigation, and the Brice’s conduct complained of relates to actions outside of litigation.

Landry's Crab Shack, Inc. D/B/A Joe's Crab Shack v. the Board of Regents, Texas State University System And Southwest Texas State University

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 18, 2001

Sovereign immunity consists of two elements--immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Federal Sign , 951 S.W.2d at 405 ; Bates v. Texas St. Tech. College , 983 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex. App.--Waco 1998, pet. denied). … The University did not file special exceptions to require Landry's to replead its claims for equitable relief more clearly or specifically, and we cannot say from the record that Landry's would be unable to replead those

Sandra Pickell v. William H. Brooks, Executive Director, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, in His Individual and Official Capacities

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 23, 1992

not independently establish a cause of action for damages; and (4) no contract existed between Pickell and the Board. … We do not see how Pickell qualifies under the Act as either a police officer or firefighter, but Pickell has not advanced the Act as the basis for her procedural due-process interest. Cf. City of San Antonio v.

Scott v. Presidio I.S.D.

266 S.W.3d 531 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 1, 2008

One of the primary concerns was how to reconcile the new rule established by the supreme court in Dubai with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., King, 28 S.W.3d at 31 . … There is no dispute that section 21.307 clearly and unambiguously waives the state's sovereign immunity from suit by its express language that "[e]ither party may appeal the commissioner's decision...." Tex.

the City of Austin v. Jennifer Frame, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of John William Griffith Greg Griffith Cheryl Burris And Diana Pulido

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 23, 2015

Case law clearly establishes that municipalities, like any other governmental unit, have discretion regarding roadway design and whether or not to install safety features. … establish that the Texas Tort Claims Act has waived immunity for the City.

the United Healthcare Choice Plus Plan for City of Austin Employees and the City of Austin v. Charles Lesniak

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 24, 2015

Further, the legislature has expressly stated that the establishment of a self- funded plan does not waive Appellants’ immunity. See Tex. … This case, in contrast involves a suit against a self-funded plan established by the City for its employees, and the legislature has stated expressly that a municipality does not waive immunity by establishing a self-funded

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. Angela Bonser-Lain Karin Ascott, as Next Friend on Behalf of T. v. H. and A. v. H., Minor Children And Brigid Shea, as Next Friend on Behalf of E. B. U., a Minor Child

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 23, 2014

A party seeking to assert the bar of collateral estoppel must establish that (1) the issue of fact or law sought to be litigated in the second action was fully and fairly litigated in the first action, (2) those issues were … Beal, Texas Administrative Practice & Procedure § 3.1 (2009) (concluding that silence “clearly implied the legislature intended to preclude judicial review of the refusal to adopt the rule”).