Case law

Richard Wallace Pearce and Jesse Ray Blann v. City of Round Rock Round Rock Development Review Board Frank Del Castillo, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Development Review Board Terry Hagood, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Development Review Board

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 11, 2002

The Board’s decision is presumed to be legal, and a party attacking it bears the burden of establishing that the Board clearly abused its discretion. See Pick-n-Pull Auto Dismantlers v. … DISCUSSION The central issue on appeal is whether any of appellants’ seven structures qualified as non-conforming structures at the time the City passed the sign ordinance.

Richard Wallace Pearce and Jesse Ray Blann v. City of Round Rock Round Rock Development Review Board Frank Del Castillo, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Development Review Board Terry Hagood, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Development Review Board

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 11, 2002

The Board's decision is presumed to be legal, and a party attacking it bears the burden of establishing that the Board clearly abused its discretion. See Pick-n-Pull Auto Dismantlers v. … DISCUSSION The central issue on appeal is whether any of appellants' seven structures qualified as non-conforming structures at the time the City passed the sign ordinance.

Vista Medical Center Hospital v. Texas Mutual Insurance Company

416 S.W.3d 11 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 27, 2013

guideline required providers not only to meet the $40,000 threshold, but also to demonstrate, through a case-by-case analysis, that the admission entailed “unusually costly and unusually extensive” services in order to qualify … unless the statute ‘clearly or plainly’ reflects the [L]egislature’s intent to supplant the common-law 23 Our primary objective in statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.

Southwestern Public Service Company/Public Utility Commission of Texas and City of Amarillo v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, City of Amarillo, ASARCO, Inc., and Texas Industrial Energy Consumers/Southwestern Public Service Company

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 29, 1998

At the request of Commission staff, Southwestern ran two modeled scenarios, establishing a benchmark and a change case. 39(c). … It is arguable, therefore, that this fuel reconciliation proceeding was initiated under section 2.051 and that it therefore qualifies as a ratemaking proceeding for that reason alone.

Charles G. Villarreal v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 18, 2015

“Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. … This is clearly more than a mere “modicum” of evidence. While Appellant argues that one must discount Crystal Ann’s testimony as it was inconsistent with her mother, the factfinders clearly disagreed.

Willie Reynolds v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 30, 2000

an assistant district attorney, was board certified in criminal law by the Board of Legal Specialization of the State Bar of Texas, specialized in criminal and juvenile defense cases in her private practice she , and had qualified … interrogatories that shall be presented by the same neutral individual who made the initial inquiries, if possible, and recorded under the same or similar circumstances of the original recording with the time and date of the inquiry clearly

GS Texas Ventures, LLC v. Public Utility Commission of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 15, 2020

She further stated that GSTV had “established that it will hardwire the wireless receiver into the home’s electrical loop.” … error of law, are “not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole,” or are arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly

Heath Lane Stephens v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 22, 1998

App. 1991). (2) Further, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, the presumption obtains that the person who acted and was recognized by the trial court in prosecuting the case was duly authorized and qualified. … Introducing evidence of her pregnancy, clearly the result of some sexual encounter, would contravene the intent of Rule 412 and subject the victim to ridicule, embarrassment, and humiliation.

Lydia H. Grotti, M.D. v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 6, 2005

Grotti must establish that Dr. … Given that the portion of the peer review materials establishing the committee’s decision was admitted, Dr.

Lydia H. Grotti, M.D. v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 6, 2005

Grotti must establish that Dr. … Given that the portion of the peer review materials establishing the committee's decision was admitted, Dr.

Auspro Enterprises, LP v. Texas Department of Transportation

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 19, 2015

the work of the department, and more have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates oth­ specifically, Transportation Code, §391.032, which provides au­ erwise. thority to establish rules … qualify an area as an unzoned commercial or industrial area.

Tracy Lee Bobo, A/K/A Tracy Thorn v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 17, 1998

An offense is a lesser included offense if it is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. … Similar explanations of the law made during jury voir dire have been upheld as proper when the prosecutor was attempting to qualify jurors and to exercise his challenges of jurors for cause and peremptorily. See Hall v.

David Michael Johnson v. Erin Lynn Johnson

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 16, 2005

Clearly, the $40,000 in attorney’s fees assessed against David was for services incurred prior to the filing of the motion for new trial. … On page twenty-three, the decree establishes an encumbrance for owelty partition and states that the court had already “awarded the family homestead of the parties to [David].”

David Michael Johnson v. Erin Lynn Johnson

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 16, 2005

Clearly, the $40,000 in attorney's fees assessed against David was for services incurred prior to the filing of the motion for new trial. … On page twenty-three, the decree establishes an encumbrance for owelty partition and states that the court had already "awarded the family homestead of the parties to [David]."

Tallion Kyle Taylor v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 10, 2021

can be sufficient to establish guilt.” … App. 2010) (observing that constitutional right to “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” is “qualified by requirement that the evidence be relevant and not excluded by an established evidentiary rule”);

Beverly California Corporation and Beverly Enterprises-Texas, Inc. v. Kelcy Robinson

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 16, 1995

We may set aside the judgment "only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Cain v. … Appellants also point out that they recruited and hired qualified people, such as Thomas and Batton, to correct deficiencies found by TDH in 1989 inspections.

Mike Geeslin, Commissioner of Insurance, and Texas Department of Insurance v. State Farm Lloyds

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 22, 2008

Applying these criteria to the provision in question, the court found the section containing the insolvency standard to be "clearly severable." Calfarm , 771 P.2d at 1256 . … Although State Farm Lloyds initiated the appeal, the appeal arose because of TDI's determination that State Farm Lloyds had failed to comply with the statute by filing a rate that did not qualify as "just, reasonable, adequate

Alonzo Moses Botello v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 22, 2008

Applying these criteria to the provision in question, the court found the section containing the insolvency standard to be “clearly severable.” Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1256. … Although State Farm Lloyds initiated the appeal, the appeal arose because of TDI’s determination that State Farm Lloyds had failed to comply with the statute by filing a rate that did not qualify as “just, reasonable, adequate

2800 La Frontera No. 1A, Ltd. 2800 La Frontera No. 2A, Ltd. 941 Hester's Crossing No. 1A, Ltd. 941 Hester's Crossing No. 2A, Ltd. And 941 Hester's Crossing No. 3A, Ltd. v. City of Round Rock, Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 12, 2010

What qualifies as "too far" varies by situation. At least two situations are clear-cut: physical invasions of property and regulations that strip away all economically beneficial uses of land are takings per se. … We will not set aside an ordinance unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Id.

2800 La Frontera No. 1A, Ltd. 2800 La Frontera No. 2A, Ltd. 941 Hester's Crossing No. 1A, Ltd. 941 Hester's Crossing No. 2A, Ltd. And 941 Hester's Crossing No. 3A, Ltd. v. City of Round Rock, Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 12, 2010

What qualifies as “too far” varies by situation. At least two situations are clear-cut: physical invasions of property and regulations that strip away all economically beneficial uses of land are takings per se. … We will not set aside an ordinance unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Id.