Case law

Del Industrial, Inc. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund

973 S.W.2d 743 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 13, 1998

STANDARD OF REVIEW A summary judgment is proper only when a movant establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a. … The employees, therefore, qualify as “persons engaged in work that could make [the Fund] liable” under the policy, entitling the Fund to premiums from Del.

Travis Central Appraisal District, by and Through Marya Crigler, Acting in Her Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of Travis Central Appraisal District v. Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 22, 2022

But in contrast to a Section 42.02(a) appeal, a Section 42.01 appeal is against an appraisal district—a political subdivision of the State with governmental immunity, id. § 6.01(c)—and therefore implicates the mandate that … the administrative hearing process and the exclusive-remedies scheme established by the Property Tax Code.”

In Re Morton

326 S.W.3d 634 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 22, 2010

To qualify for forensic DNA testing, the evidence must have been secured in relation to the offense that is the basis of the challenged conviction and have been in the possession of the State during the trial of the offense … If the bandana contains Christine’s blood, it is sufficient by itself to establish a trail.

DEPT. OF ASSISTIVE & REHAB. SERV. v. Howard

182 S.W.3d 393 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 8, 2005

When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we examine the entire record and set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. … Quoting Howard, the Department maintains that the call was merely an "inquiry" and that, because Howard was only seeking "opinions" regarding the "legality/validity" of the Department's practices, the call does not qualify

Golden Corral Corp. and ZG GC Austin L.L.C. v. Noble Austin Apartments L.L.C. D/B/A Ladera Apartment Homes

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 9, 2021

Until it reached the blocked drain, the water was under the control and direction of a watercourse, and thus, it no longer qualified as surface water. … He testified that a future buyer has the right to ask questions of the seller, that in this case they would uncover “that building 11 has flooded 4 times in 27 months,” that this flooding has “clearly negatively impacted

Tina Leal v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2000

Although it is clearly established that the grounds for terminating a person's parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in the trial court, the correct standard of review an appellate court should apply … Unsanitary conditions can qualify as surroundings that endanger a child. See In re M.C. , 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996). We previously recited evidence of conduct on the part of Ms.

HealthTronics, Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc. and Lisa Laser Products, OHG

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 31, 2012

As a result, the court concluded that "the award was not clearly wrong; the superior court did not abuse its discretion." Id. … In the usual Texas case, the attorney affidavits would be subject to the two-part test that governs the admissibility of expert testimony, i.e., (1) the expert must be qualified; and (2) the testimony must be relevant and

R. G., J. C., and C. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 29, 2023

Standard of review “Proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship implicate rights of constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection.” … The court wrote: The evidence clearly demonstrated a significant bond between [Grandmother] and 21  the children.

Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Everett Brew Houston, Jr., W. Andrew Buchholz, Scott J. Leighty, Jad L. Davis, and Holly Clause v. Tracy D. Strandhagen

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 14, 2015

Whenever the defense is not clearly established on the face of the pleadings, as it is here, it must be pleaded. … This is clearly an erroneous course. See Davenport v.

Joe and Sue Shell v. Austin Rehearsal Complex, Inc.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 13, 1998

We conclude that the summary judgment evidence presented by ARC meets this standard and established that the Addendum was executed before the purchase of the Building by the Shells. … Even considering the evidence to the contrary, the verdict is neither clearly wrong nor manifestly unjust.

Allen Chadwick Burbage v. W. Kirk Burbage and Burbage Funeral Home

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 21, 2011

A statement qualifies for the common-interest privilege only if it is made “for the purpose of protecting the common interest.” Grant v. Stop-N-Go Mkt. of Tex., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 867, 874 (Tex. App. … Clearly, these statements (at a minimum) were not subject to the common- interest privilege. See id.

Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. & F. B. Goldman

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 12, 1992

App. 1990, writ ref'd), the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a car salesman's statement that a Mercedes was the "best engineered car in the world" did not qualify as an actionable misrepresentation of the car's characteristics … The actual damages found by the jury were clearly contract damages.

Texas Water Commission v. Lakeshore Utility Company, Inc.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 18, 1994

Lakeshore contends that this evidence established that it was entitled to have the interest expense included in its rate base. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 13.185 (e) (West 1988). … As we have stated, Lakeshore failed to prove pursuant to the requirements of the Water Code the value of the facilities to qualify as invested capital.

Jonathan Jones v. Laury Carson

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 8, 2023

Further, “[n]ot establishing bias or partiality . . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger . . . . … A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune.”

City of Marshall and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Formerly Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) v. City of Uncertain Caddo Lake Area Chamber of Commerce and Tourism Greater Caddo Lake Association Caddo Lake Institute John T. Echols And Barry L. Bennick

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 16, 2003

to its existing authorization to use water for municipal use.4 1 Cypress Creek flows into Caddo Lake, which has been designated a “Wetland of International Importance” by the Ramsar Bureau, an agency established … desires to sell water outside of its “retail service area.” 9 Appellees argue that, because Marshall sought to sell water outside of its city limits, Marshall cannot qualify

City of Marshall and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Formerly Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) v. City of Uncertain Caddo Lake Area Chamber of Commerce and Tourism Greater Caddo Lake Association Caddo Lake Institute John T. Echols And Barry L. Bennick

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 16, 2003

Cypress Creek flows into Caddo Lake, which has been designated a "Wetland of International Importance" by the Ramsar Bureau, an agency established by the international treaty known as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. … The legislature has clearly and expressly stated that notice and hearing are not required in other portions of the water code. See, e.g. , Tex.

Stephanie Kizima v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 22, 2020

” on its own “to establish guilt.” … Although the charge arguably could have been written more clearly, we cannot agree with Kizima’s suggestion that the charge is incomprehensible.

Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission Charles Smith, Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And Stuart W. Bowen Jr., Inspector General for the Texas Health and Human Services Commission Office of Inspector General

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 30, 2015

Appellant’s request for mandamus 6 relief failed to meet this standard because it cannot establish that HHSC-OIG had a legal duty to perform a nondiscretionary act. … Clearly, the January 2, 2014 letter makes no mention of the alleged “three appeal/hearing requests made in October 2013.”

LMP Austin English Aire, LLC, Derivatively Through Lafayette English Partner, LLC, (Individually and Derivatively) Through Lafayette English Apartments, LP v. Lafayette English Apartments, LP (Nominal Defendant) Lafayette English GP, LLC HVC English, LLC HVC Lafayette, LLC Scott Schaeffer Austin Lafayette Landing Realty LLC And Austin CMA English Aire Realty LLC

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 30, 2022

Next, Appellants cite a recent “holding” that a plaintiff—who controlled a trust that was an 80% limited partner in a limited partnership—qualified as a TUFTA creditor: Cohen qualifies as a creditor for purposes … We review de novo whether the TCPA movant established by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is subject to the TCPA and whether the non-movant presented clear and specific evidence establishing a prima

Texas Health and Human Services Commission Tom Suehs, in His Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of Health and Human Services And Billy Millwee, in His Official Capacity as the Texas Medicaid Director v. Advocates for Patient Access, Inc. John Doe A, by and Through His Next Friend, Laura Garza John Doe B, by and Through His Next Friend, Nayeli Garza And Jane Doe A, by and Through Her Next Friend, Isabel Tijerina

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 26, 2013

Consequently, although clearly contrary to section 380.207’s terms, a practice developed whereby parents and guardians would authorize employees of EPSDT service providers to accompany their children during transportation … a probable right to recovery, and (6) parts (c) and (d) of the modified injunction improperly attempt to control state action, which is precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.