Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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2,255 results

1.15s

  • the Comanche Nation and Jennifer Perry v. Joseph N. Fox and Patricia M. Fox

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 12, 2004

    A final order was issued about a year later establishing a joint managing conservatorship between Perry and the Foxes. … visitation and possession—“effectively” terminated her parental rights, we conclude that a suit seeking to terminate parental rights is substantially different from a modification suit and that this case is clearly not a

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • in Re Catherine Tower LLC

    553 S.W.3d 679 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 20, 2018

    . §§ 6.01–.02 (establishing appraisal district in, and with boundaries coextensive with, each county). 4 See id. §§ 42.01, .21. … observed that the Code’s use of “market value” did not uniformly denote the conventional meaning of the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller: Viewing tax code chapter 23 as a whole, the legislature clearly

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Susan England v. Janice Kolbe, as Guardian of the Estate of Edna Moon

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 30, 2015

    Mary clearly had " adequate time" to conduct discovery. … Governmental immunity from suit deprives CIV.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Dr. Kim Elliot McMorries v. Texas Medical Board

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 16, 2023

    “On cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City of Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 539 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. 2018). … providing separate statute of limitations for “complaints involving an alleged violation of Section 22.011(b)(12), Penal Code”). 6 We therefore do not address whether the particular complaints against McMorries qualify

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Weslaco Federation of Teachers v. Texas Education Agency Commissioner of Education Jim Nelson And Weslaco Independent School District

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 31, 2000

    Thus, teachers' salaries for 1995-96 were not established until August 28, after the District's teachers had become contractually bound to the District for that school year. … The teachers' contracts, however, are clearly limited to one year and state that the teacher "shall be employed on a 183 day basis for school year 1995-96."

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • James McArdle and Chung McArdle v. Eric Stahl

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 15, 2006

    Stahl moved for summary judgment, asserting that the McArdles could not establish any duty on Stahl’s part that would make him liable for Threet’s conduct and that the McArdles could not establish the elements of a premises … Threet’s attack on Terence clearly qualifies as a superseding event under section 442 of the Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442; Pena, 990 S.W.2d at 754-55.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • James McArdle and Chung McArdle v. Eric Stahl

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 15, 2006

    Stahl moved for summary judgment, asserting that the McArdles could not establish any duty on Stahl's part that would make him liable for Threet's conduct and that the McArdles could not establish the elements of a premises … Threet's attack on Terence clearly qualifies as a superseding event under section 442 of the Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442; Pena , 990 S.W.2d at 754-55 .

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Combs v. STP Nuclear Operating Co.

    239 S.W.3d 264 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 1, 2007

    Section 101.053(b)(4) establishes the independently procured insurance exemption. … A law is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Christopher Brian Roberts v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 23, 2015

    Well, I should have known that by doing this act, shooting a gun at somebody is clearly dangerous and can cause them, cause death to them. … White was not qualified as an expert and therefore, his testimony was that of a lay witness. TEX. R. EVID. 701.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Messagephone, Inc. MPI Pass-Through Annuity Collateral Trust And Donovan M. Campbell, M.D. v. Texas Life, Accident, Health & Hospital Service Insurance Guaranty Association

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 26, 1998

    The Nature of the Guaranty Association The Guaranty Act established the Association to protect persons against failure in the performance of contractual obligations under certain forms of group and individual life, accident … Because GICs arose as investment vehicles for employee benefit plans, providing the option to purchase an annuity for an eligible plan participant clearly creates a mortality risk in that context.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State of Texas' Agencies and Institutions of Higher Learning Office of Public Utility Counsel Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC// Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Public Utility Commission of Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor// State of Texas' Agencies and Institutions of Higher Learning Steering Committee

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 6, 2014

    The rates of transmission and distribution utilities, on the other hand, are clearly still regulated, evidenced by the necessity of this ratemaking proceeding. … See Black’s Law Dictionary 597 (9th ed. 2009) (“eligible” defined as “legally qualified for an office, privilege, or status”).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • T. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 26, 2024

    “[A] parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as” endangering conduct. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). … She argues that the Department improperly elicited testimony that the children had not received their immunizations, but we need not consider this evidence in our sufficiency review to conclude that the evidence was sufficient

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Andrew Morris v. Carrie Cecelia Veilleux

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 24, 2021

    evidence for factual sufficiency, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented and will set aside the trial court’s findings only if they are so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence such that they are clearly … During the option period, Morris and Veilleux learned that they did not qualify for the mortgage on their own so Roger Morris, Morris’s father, stepped in to assist Morris and Veilleux to buy the Condominium

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. Exxon Mobil Corporation ExxonMobil Oil Corporation Pennzoil-Quaker State Company and Shell Oil Company

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 2, 2015

    Moreover, the statement did not create a waiver of sovereign immunity. … This raises a question of Sovereign Immunity, since the State has not waived its immunity generally. Each waiver must be in “express and unequivocal terms.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Kristopher Roth v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 15, 1995

    CONSENT TO ENTER One of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. … No waiver of constitutional immunity could be inferred from the singular act of opening the front door. Green v. State , 666 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Josephine Douglas-Peters v. James Nathaniel Peters

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 2, 2006

    establish the child’s primary residence, ordered Peters to pay child support, and divided the property. … It appears that the Qualified Domestic Relations Order attached as appendix A to the divorce decree was never executed, requiring Douglas to bring legal action to receive her share of the stock options.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Robert G. Morris, D.V.M. and Joyce M. Morris v. Kallie Jo Kohls-York, Individually and D/B/A Kallie-Harie Reds and Brenda Behring, Individually and D/B/A South Central Texas Boer Goats

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 5, 2005

    A factual sufficiency challenge requires proof that a finding was “so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” Goodenbour v. … The embryo transfer and implantation services entailed surgical procedures that Robert Morris, as a licensed veterinarian, was solely qualified to provide.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Josephine Douglas-Peters v. James Nathaniel Peters

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 2, 2006

    The divorce decree appointed Douglas and Peters joint managing conservators of their child, gave Douglas the exclusive right to establish the child's primary residence, ordered Peters to pay child support, and divided the … It appears that the Qualified Domestic Relations Order attached as appendix A to the divorce decree was never executed, requiring Douglas to bring legal action to receive her share of the stock options.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Joyce Ludwig v. Encore Medical, L.P. F/K/A Encore Orthopedics, Inc. Encore Medical GP, Inc. And Encore Medical Corporation

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 9, 2006

    Ludwig contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support this finding and contends that evidence in the record conclusively establishes the opposite. … Section 1(e) of Ludwig's severance agreement provides five instances that would qualify as a "good reason."

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Joyce Ludwig v. Encore Medical, L.P. F/K/A Encore Orthopedics, Inc. Encore Medical GP, Inc. And Encore Medical Corporation

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 9, 2006

    February 2002; however, when she did complain the trips were either canceled or postponed.4 Ultimately, the jury found that 3 Section 1(e) of Ludwig’s severance agreement provides five instances that would qualify … Ludwig contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support this finding and contends that evidence in the record conclusively establishes the opposite.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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