Case law

Margaret Torres Wilson and Joe Bob Wilson v. Austin Nursing Center, Inc.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 26, 2002

DISCUSSION Jurisdiction The district court found that the Center=s motion to dismiss qualified as a pending motion for sanctions under Rule 162. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. … These standards are not within the common knowledge of lay-people; therefore, a medical expert is necessary to establish a claim based on the breach of such a standard. Id.

Messagephone, Inc. v. Texas Life, Accident, Health & Hospital Service Insurance Guaranty Ass'n

966 S.W.2d 133 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 26, 1998

The Nature of the Guaranty Association The Guaranty Act established the Association to protect persons against failure in the performance of contractual obligations under certain forms of group and individual life, accident … Because GICs arose as investment vehicles for employee benefit plans, providing the option to purchase an annuity for an eligible plan participant clearly creates a mortality risk in that context.

Medcost, L.L.C. v. Loiseau

166 S.W.3d 421 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 26, 2005

policy and statute’s purpose: (a) It is a state concern that many residents of this state hold insurance policies issued by persons or insurers who are not authorized to do insurance business in this state and who are not qualified … That MedCost’s relationships with the Texas entities were established through third-party entities does not provide it immunity from suit in Texas, where hundreds of thousands of dollars have been lost.

Senna Hills, Ltd. and HBH Development Company, LLC v. Sonterra Energy Corporation

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 15, 2010

STANDARDS OF REVIEW A movant seeking traditional summary judgment on its own cause of action or affirmative defense has the initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by conclusively establishing … The intention to contract or confer a direct benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be denied.

Serreva Page v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 15, 2010

conclusively establishing each element of its cause of action or affirmative defense. … The intention to contract or confer a direct benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be denied.

Bogar v. Esparza

257 S.W.3d 354 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 16, 2008

Karsh, as a radiologist, was not qualified to render opinions on a urologist’s standard of care. … In contrast, section 74.351’s expert report requirement establishes a threshold over which a claimant must proceed to continue a lawsuit; it does not establish a requirement for recovery.

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cody Littlepage

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 23, 2015

For clarity and brevity, the appellee, Cody Littlepage, will maintain references as established by the Texas Department of Public Safety. … Clearly Amaya and Landin are spoken language cases and do not apply to the case at bar. It is clear that Littlepage is unique and distinct.

Evergreen National Indemnity Co v. Tan It All, Inc.

111 S.W.3d 669 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 19, 2003

Consequently, if one party’s interpretation would require the insertion of a qualifying phrase, that interpretation must be rejected as violating the rule that the language of a policy must be given its ordinary meaning. … The judgment was final because it clearly, unequivocally disposed of all claims by TLA, which was the only party to seek affirmative relief. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex.2001); cf. Moritz v.

Dr. Andrew J. Wakefield, MB, BS v. the British Medical Journal Publishing Group, Ltd. Brian Deer And Dr. Fiona Godlee

449 S.W.3d 172 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 19, 2014

Section 27.011 of the anti-SLAPP statute provides that the statute “does not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case or common law or rule … In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s lack of contacts with the forum state defeated jurisdiction and explained that New Hampshire clearly expressed its interest in protecting persons

Thaung Tin v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 28, 2017

Rule 701 provides that “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; and (b) helpful to clearly understanding … It is well established that there is no double-jeopardy violation when the record establishes that each conviction was supported by evidence of a “separate and distinct act.”35 We overrule Tin’s seventh point

Marvin Barth v. Elsie Lucille Barth

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 26, 2001

However, to overcome the community-property presumption, the spouse claiming an item as his separate property must establish that fact by clear and convincing evidence and must trace and clearly identify the property claimed … We will address the remaining part of Marvin's complaint, that Lawson was not qualified to testify as an expert on tracing.

Albert Paul Rios v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 11, 2012

If the parent's imprisonment reflects a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, it qualifies as conduct that endangers the child. Walker v. … In this case, however, the cited facts do not qualify as adjudicative facts that can be judicially noticed under rule 201.

in Re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litigation: Texas Clean Air Act Enforcement Cases

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 3, 2017

The information is directly related and clearly relevant to the claims at issue in this matter. … VWGoA also should remove its objections to the relevance of these requests because the facts concerned are clearly relevant to the litigation.

State of Texas v. A. R. Enochs and Wife, Erlene Patton Enochs

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 15, 1993

The record clearly reveals that no formal discovery was undertaken by the State to identify the witnesses who might be called on behalf of Southland. … The only authority cited by the State is totally consistent with this well-established rule of law. In Brazos River Auth. v. Adkisson , 173 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.

L. T. Des Champ v. Billy R. Featherston

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 26, 1994

Courts liberally construe Election Code provisions not clearly mandatory on their face as directory only. Ramsay v. Wilheim , 52 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1932, writ ref'd). … The Texas Supreme Court has explained the policy underlying time and place provisions: "It is of the essence of a fair election that a time should be fixed and a place appointed where each qualified voter may cast his ballot

Albert Paul Rios v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 11, 2012

If the parent’s imprisonment reflects a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, it qualifies as conduct that endangers the child. Walker v. … In this case, however, the cited facts do not qualify as adjudicative facts that can be judicially noticed under rule 201.

Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, and Nicole Oria, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director// Ellen Jefferson, D.V.M. v. Ellen Jefferson, D.V.M.// Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, and Nicole Oria, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 28, 2015

That is clearly not what the clinic intended. … That is clearly not what the clinic intended.

H. Hal McKinney v. Willard L. Ferguson

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 24, 2004

We will set aside the verdict only if the evidence that supports the jury finding is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). … In a conclusion of law, the district court determined that McKinney does not qualify as a holder in due course, and McKinney does not challenge this determination. 6 Id

L.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 9, 2010

right seat of the car, and Officer Beasley testified that the only two people who could have reached the ice chest were the two passengers in the rear seat. 1 Sorrells argues that $537.21 does not qualify … sufficient to support such a determination because there is no evidence in the record contradicting any of the officers’ testimony, nor is the cumulative force of the officers’ testimony so weak that the verdict seems clearly

Derrick Sorrells v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 9, 2010

In reviewing factual sufficiency, we must weigh all the evidence in a neutral light and set the finding aside only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, or the verdict is against … Sorrells argues that $537.21 does not qualify as a "large amount of cash."