Case law

Jerome Wolf v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 17, 1995

The State thus clearly proved that the alleged offense occurred within the limitation period. … Clearly, the appropriation was within the limitation period.

Joseph Montgomery Reid v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 18, 2002

Even if all three vehicles were present at the time appellant admitted to drinking two beers, however, the facts do not establish that the detention escalated into a custodial interrogation at the time the statements were … As to the last factor of our harm analysis, case law clearly prohibits the admission of the type of evidence that was admitted here—i.e., appellant’s invocation of his constitutional rights.

Joseph Montgomery Reid v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 18, 2002

Even if all three vehicles were present at the time appellant admitted to drinking two beers, however, the facts do not establish that the detention escalated into a custodial interrogation at the time the statements were … As to the last factor of our harm analysis, case law clearly prohibits the admission of the type of evidence that was admitted here-- i.e. , appellant's invocation of his constitutional rights.

Everett and Julie Hicks, Individually and as Next Friends of Katie Hicks, a Minor v. Dr. Bettina A. Vaello

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 15, 1994

sufficient to establish that Dr. … --San Antonio 1975, no writ) in support of her position, the case is clearly distinguishable. Sendjar was not a negligent referral case.

Constance Maxwell v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 23, 2012

she gave at trial or that she is not, in fact, qualified as a "clinical psychologist." … s safety if Maxwell does not take her prescribed medications consistently and that risk had been clearly and consistently communicated to Maxwell while the underlying proceedings were pending.

Ismael Sarinana v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 27, 2014

Under that standard, a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is given wide latitude, and its ruling will only be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable … We need to establish why he was later arrested and charged with assault with bodily injury.”

Robert L. Codner v. Roberto Arellano, D/B/A Road Runner Concrete

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 28, 2001

An expert qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify if the expert's knowledge would help the trier of fact understand the issues. Tex. R. Evid. 702. … Codner has not met his heavy burden of showing that Audino's testimony was essential to his claim and that the district court clearly abused his discretion.

Arthur D. Stone v. Continental Cars, Inc.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 7, 1994

Republic Industries and Continental Cars executed an enforceable contract on April 14, 1987. (2) Under the terms of that contract, Republic Industries agreed to secure a financially qualified and state approved insurance … The letter of September 25 clearly anticipated future dealings between the parties and did not constitute notice of termination.

Sung Wan Jun and Wife, Jung Soon Jun, Individually and as Sole Heirs of the Estate of Ji Hae Jun v. Lloyds and Other Various Insurers

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 9, 2000

Such a person or organization qualifies as an insured only if “the actual operation [was] with the expressed permission of” Aero. … CONCLUSION The summary judgment record conclusively establishes that appellants’ judgment debtor, Miikkulainen, was not an insured under the Lloyds policy.

Lagunas v. State

187 S.W.3d 503 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 3, 2006

First, he argues that D.M.’s statements do not qualify as “excited utterances” so as to be excepted from the hearsay rule. See Tex.R. Evid. 803(2). … He also challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence establishing his identity as the person who committed the offenses.

Central Austin Apartments, LLC UP-32nd Street, LLC And UP-32nd Street Hospitality, LLC// East Avenue Property Owners' Association, Inc. and UP Austin Holdings, LP and UP Austin Land Holdings, LP v. UP Austin Holdings, LP UP Austin Land Holdings, LP And East Avenue Property Owners' Association, Inc.// Central Austin Apartments, LLC UP-32nd Street, LLC And UP-32nd Street Hospitality, LLC

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 9, 2014

In that regard, [t]o qualify as a prevailing party, a . . . plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. … We do not agree that the judgment can be so clearly construed.

Burnet Central Appraisal District v. Millmeyer

287 S.W.3d 753 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 2, 2009

the record, both in support of and against the finding, and set aside a finding for factual insufficiency only if the evidence that supports it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly … Though the property owner may be unable to qualify as an expert witness, she may testify as to what she believes the market value of her property to be. Gulf States Utils. Co., 79 S.W.3d at 566 .

Texas Department of Insurance v. Reconveyance Services, Inc.

240 S.W.3d 418 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 31, 2007

It disputes only whether Reconveyance’s pleadings are sufficient to affirmatively establish the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. … Reconveyance pleads that its “[p]ost closing mortgage release services” are not covered by the “premium” because they “are clearly not title insurance,” “title examination,” or “closing the transaction.” “ ‘[C]losing a transaction

Sung Wan Jun and Wife, Jung Soon Jun, Individually and as Sole Heirs of the Estate of Ji Hae Jun v. Lloyds and Other Various Insurers

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 9, 2000

Such a person or organization qualifies as an insured only if "the actual operation [was] with the expressed permission of" Aero. … Appellants argue that Miikkulainen qualified as an insured under this policy term because he had the "express permission" of Aero to operate the airplane that caused decedent's injuries.

Reymundo Montiel v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 21, 2021

However, Montiel contends that the testimony from Garcia and Paulini was too general to qualify as an outcry. … “[M]eeting the requirements of one part of Rule 902 establishes the documents are self-authenticated.” Id.

Texas Health and Human Services Commission Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services And Commissioner Albert Hawkins, in His Official Capacity Only v. Mary L. Wolfe

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 14, 2010

We then determine whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence … Id. at 694.11 There is no evidence that Serena gave conflicting statements or an 11 Contraband placed in a closed closet qualifies as “secreted.” See, e.g., Moon v. State, 331 S.W.2d 312, 312 (Tex.

Leonard v. Abbott

171 S.W.3d 451 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 17, 2005

available; (2) the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through unreasonable financial barriers; and (3) meaningful remedies must be afforded, ‘so that the legislature may not abrogate the right to assert a well-established … With the knowledge that each of these previous lawsuits has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, that appellees are generally entitled to sovereign immunity, and that the bonds are generally incontestible at this point

Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas Cities of Beaumont, Bridge City, Conroe, Groves, Huntsville, Montgomery, Navasota, Nederland, Orange, Pinehurst, Port Neches, Shenandoah, Silsbee, and Willis And Texas Industrial Energy Consumers

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 8, 2012

the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions” are, among other grounds, “not reasonably supported by substantial evidence,” or are “arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly … The plain meaning of the prepositional phrase “in previous years” then is to qualify or limit “energy efficiency cost recovery revenues.”

Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas Cities of Beaumont, Bridge City, Conroe, Groves, Huntsville, Montgomery, Navasota, Nederland, Orange, Pinehurst, Port Neches, Shenandoah, Silsbee, and Willis And Texas Industrial Energy Consumers

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 8, 2012

The plain meaning of the prepositional phrase "in previous years" then is to qualify or limit "energy efficiency cost recovery revenues ." … the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions" are, among other grounds, "not reasonably supported by substantial evidence," or are "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly

Serena Shaunta Williams v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 14, 2010

We then determine whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence … Contraband placed in a closed closet qualifies as "secreted." See, e.g. , Moon v. State , 331 S.W.2d 312, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959); United States v. Saucedo , 226 F.3d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 2000). 12.