Case law

Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Maurie Levin, Naomi Terr, and Hilary Sheard

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 10, 2015

Under the teachings of Cox, the record conclusively establishes that the identity of the compounding pharmacy and its pharmacist qualify for the physical-safety exception as a matter of law. … Parker Is Not Qualified. An expert witness must be qualified to give an opinion by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. See TEX. R. EVID. 702; Broders v.

State v. Lloyd S. McCarley

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 20, 2007

We set aside a finding for factual 6 insufficiency if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. … Did McCarley establish the requisite intent? The State also argues that the State has sovereign immunity from McCarley’s claim because McCarley failed to establish the requisite intent.

U.S. Concrete, Inc. v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of Texas And Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

578 S.W.3d 559 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 28, 2019

Concrete’s mixer-truck costs and 41% of its truck-operator labor costs on the ground that these costs did not qualify as COGS, (2) the district court erred in concluding that U.S. … The Comptroller, while trying to reach the correct amount for Gulf Copper’s COGS subtraction, “likewise presented the trial court with a flawed view” of what qualified as COGS. Id. at 18.

Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez

81 S.W.3d 452 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 27, 2002

Id. art. 5.06-3 (emphasis added). 6 *459 The question presented is whether Margarita Sanchez qualifies as “any insured named in the policy" as set forth in the statute. … Robles, 740 So.2d 261, 262 (La.Ct.App.1999) (spouse elected lower UM coverage and signed as “named insured”); Oncale, 417 So.2d at 474-75 (policy clearly defined “named insured” as including spouse); Johnson v.

Wylie Cavin Lillian Cavin And Eagle Radiology, PLLC v. Kristin Abbott and William Abbott

545 S.W.3d 47 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 14, 2017

LEXIS 649, at *10 (observing that pleadings alone will often be determinative of legal action’s basis); Sloat, 513 S.W.3d at 503 (“The ultimate question of whether a particular factual basis for a ‘legal action’ qualifies … LEXIS 649, at *11 (“Clearly, suicide prevention and awareness relate to health, safety, and community well-being, all included in the statutory definition of ‘matters of public concern.’” (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Fili Giovanni Chacon v. Cassidy Christine Gribble

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 27, 2019

factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence in the record and will set aside a finding only if the supporting evidence is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, as to make the finding clearly … Father also expressed concern about Mother’s care of J.L.C., explaining that J.L.C. was not current on her immunizations when J.L.C.

Weldon J. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Incorporated

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 6, 1991

City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) ("[T]his Court's decisions . . . enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists."). 2. … First, for its relevant holding, the court in Veytia relied on In re Price's Estate and other cases that were clearly undercut by the 1978 amendments to Rule 166a.

Nathan Bush v. Coleman Powermate, Inc. and Tecumseh Products Company

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 26, 2005

Appellees alleged that these witnesses were not qualified to give opinions as to design defects, dangers associated with refueling a hot generator, or causation. … The party offering the expert's testimony bears the burden to prove that the witness is qualified under Rule 702. Gammill v.

MFG Financial, Inc. v. Paul Jason Hamlin and Tara Natalie Bertalan Hamlin

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 3, 2021

In July 2019, this Court reversed the trial court, ruling that the TCPA applies to the Hamlins’ claims and that the legal defendants proved the defense of attorney immunity. … However, the Hamlins clearly state that they “are not attempting to assert any private causes of action against MFG under the provisions of the Texas Penal Code” and have only “pointed out MFG’s violations of the relevant

Nathan Bush v. Coleman Powermate, Inc. and Tecumseh Products Company

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 26, 2005

Appellees alleged that these witnesses were not qualified to give opinions as to design defects, dangers associated with refueling a hot generator, or causation. … The party offering the expert’s testimony bears the burden to prove that the witness is qualified under Rule 702. Gammill v.

Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read

945 S.W.2d 854 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 19, 1997

First, it was not established that, even if the Boys Club had known of Mullens’s conviction, it would have prohibited him from being a volunteer. … Although no one was injured on that earlier occasion, the supervisor was clearly aware of the pothole and knew that his crew was working near it the day of Ung’s death. Id.

Nathanael Brown v. Jessica Freed and Samuel Freed

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 29, 2023

Because a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to strike an intervention, a significant delay in filing a petition in intervention may also qualify as “sufficient cause” to strike an intervention. … Moreover, constitutional errors are not immune from waiver. See In re J.B., 605 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.)

Bumjin Park and Jaeyoung Park v. Suk Baldwin Properties, LLC Cen-Tex Family Dental, PLLC Bok Suk Baldwin, Individually And Suzanne Baldwin, Individually

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 10, 2018

denied) (concluding that “appellees adduced no evidence to show that any fiduciary duty was breached” and, thus, that “evidence does not clearly and specifically establish all of the essential elements of a prima facie … Code § 27.011(a) (“This chapter does not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions.”). 4

Valerie Thomas Bahar, M.D. and Valerie Thomas Bahar, M.D., P.A. v. Riecke Baumann, Receiver

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 23, 2011

The record clearly indicates that throughout the proceedings below, Baumann never sought sanctions against Bahar, and the court never considered imposing sanctions against Bahar. … In sum, neither the original nor the amended notice of appeal filed in this case qualifies as a timely notice of appeal for Willie and Moore. We therefore lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Brashear v.

Calhoun County I.S.D. v. Lionel R. Meno, Commissioner of Education John Sharp, Comptroller of the State of Texas And Alvarado I.S.D.

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 12, 1995

Legislative intent to immunize the school-finance system from future tax-abatement agreements was reiterated in section 36.008 of the Education Code, which requires the Commissioner of Education to determine the district … This modification would clearly increase the total dollar amount of Calhoun County ISD's existing agreements with Formosa by lengthening the time that Calhoun County ISD's taxable value was reduced, effectively taking millions

Valerie Thomas Bahar, M.D. and Valerie Thomas Bahar, M.D., P.A. v. Riecke Baumann, Receiver

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 23, 2011

The record clearly indicates that throughout the proceedings below, Baumann never sought sanctions against Bahar, and the court never considered imposing sanctions against Bahar. … In sum, neither the original nor the amended notice of appeal filed in this case qualifies as a timely notice of appeal for Willie and Moore. We therefore lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Brashear v.

Bobby Webb v. Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 2, 2005

—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (Association claims examiner determined that injured third-party’s claims “qualified as a covered claim under the Act and recommended that the Association” pay $300,000 towards settlement); Lopez … (not designated for publication) (noting that in 1992, receivers’ duties of administering, evaluating, and paying claims were transferred to Association and stating that legislature clearly intended Association to fulfill

John J. Rogers, Jr. James R. Winton and Burl Richardson v. Texas Board of Architectural Examiners

390 S.W.3d 377 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 3, 2011

Moreover, the textual focus of section 2001.174 is on the effect of a qualifying error in the underlying proceeding; specifically, did the error prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights? … Second, section 2001.175(c) does not limit the district court’s authority to remand under section 2001.174 if there is a qualifying error and rendition is not otherwise mandated.

Bobby Webb v. Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 2, 2005

--Austin 2004, pet. denied) (Association claims examiner determined that injured third-party's claims "qualified as a covered claim under the Act and recommended that the Association" pay $300,000 towards settlement); Lopez … (not designated for publication) (noting that in 1992, receivers' duties of administering, evaluating, and paying claims were transferred to Association and stating that legislature clearly intended Association to fulfill

Constance Maxwell v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 23, 2012

Before a new location could be established, Maxwell’s visitation was temporarily suspended. … opinions she gave at trial or that she is not, in fact, qualified as a “clinical psychologist.”