Case law

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  • Wichita County, Texas v. Allen Hart and Ernie Williams

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 12, 1994

    In the instant cause, appellees filed suit in Travis County, clearly a proper venue under the whistleblower special venue provision. … The Whistleblower Act abrogates sovereign immunity as does the Tort Claims Act, and in addition supersedes the employment-at-will doctrine.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • in Re David Nance, Individually, and as Representative of the Estate of Rozene Nance, Quinton Singleton Michael Lance Crystal Lance Kassie Singleton And Lloyd Singleton

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 12, 2004

    The Nances subsequently brought this original proceeding, contending that the trial court clearly abused its discretion with respect to Ms. Nance's MHMR records. … Nance's family members may not be helpful in disclosing information establishing Ms. Nance's heavy drinking.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ex Parte Ellis

    279 S.W.3d 1 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 17, 2009

    Co., 118 U.S. 394 , 6 S.Ct. 1132 , 30 L.Ed. 118 (1886) (Privileges and Immunities clause extends to corporations). … Ellis and Colyandro also complain that the election code permits corporations to finance the establishment and administration of general-purpose political committees, but it does not define “establishment” or “administration

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas v. Entertainment Publications, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 12, 2009

    In addition, the Comptroller's plea urged that Entertainment's request for declaratory relief under the UDJA is barred by sovereign immunity because she was acting within her discretionary authority in applying section 151.024 … A court, on finding an agency rule invalid, may remand the rule to the agency to allow "reasonable time for the agency to either revise or readopt the rule through the established procedures."

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Allan Eugene Keate v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 16, 2012

    Indeed, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt and may alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. … Here, the record establishes that the statements appellant complains of were non-testimonial.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Allan Eugene Keate v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 16, 2012

    Indeed, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt and may alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. … Here, the record establishes that the statements appellant complains of were non-testimonial.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Margaret Torres Wilson and Joe Bob Wilson v. Austin Nursing Center, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 26, 2002

    DISCUSSION Jurisdiction The district court found that the Center's motion to dismiss qualified as a pending motion for sanctions under Rule 162. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. … The plain language of the statute clearly envisions that to be entitled to dismissal with prejudice one must request that disposition.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Barnes v. State

    165 S.W.3d 75 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 12, 2005

    Over appellant’s objection that Nauert was not qualified to answer this question, she replied, “Not necessarily. … Mason clearly testified to her belief that C.B. would be traumatized if she were required to appear in open court and testify in appellant’s presence.

    Cited 110 timesPublished
  • Maria Gomez, Alicia Naveja and Leonardo Chavez v. State Bar of Texas, James Parsons, III and Karen Johnson

    856 S.W.2d 804 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 9, 1993

    The focus of this provision is clearly on the adjudicative authority of district courts to resolve disputes. … In order to establish standing, the plaintiff must “allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Richard Walton v. Texas Real Estate Commission

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Nov 26, 2024

    The ALJ found that Walton sufficiently established his honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity to be licensed. … The finding and conclusions that the Commission changed concern whether Walton proved himself qualified for a license. A. Crimes can affect licensing decisions.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Lloyd S. McCarley

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 20, 2007

    We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain , 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). … Did McCarley establish the requisite intent? The State also argues that the State has sovereign immunity from McCarley's claim because McCarley failed to establish the requisite intent.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ancira Enterprises, Incorporated and Ancira GMC Trucks and Motor Homes, Inc. v. Frances Fischer and Law Office of Rique D. Bobbitt

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 16, 2005

    We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. … For an entity to qualify as an “employer” subject to liability under the TCHRA, (1) it must fall within the statutory definition of employer; and (2) there must be an employment relationship between the parties.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • TX Far West, Ltd. v. Texas Investments Management, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 15, 2004

    •TX Far West, as a bonafide [sic] purchaser, clearly retained all rights to enforce the Restrictive Covenant and the obligations of [appellee] as TX Far West is asserting in this lawsuit. … Finally, even if we were to accept appellee's argument that Kemp's statements qualify as judicial admissions, they do not constitute conclusive evidence supporting summary judgment.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and Waste Control Specialists

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 4, 2014

    An interest common to members of the general public does not qualify as a personal justiciable interest.” Tex. Water Code § 5.115(a). … Standard of Review Although the TRCA waives sovereign immunity for judicial review of a TCEQ affected-person determination, see Tex.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • David Ontiveros v. the State of Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 27, 2026

    Thus, Ontiveros clearly satisfied the Duren test’s first prong. … Noting that Compton “asks us to hold that his claim is immune from procedural default,” the court declared simply, “We decline to do so.” Id. at 731.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ancira Enterprises, Incorporated and Ancira GMC Trucks and Motor Homes, Inc. v. Frances Fischer and Law Office of Rique D. Bobbitt

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 16, 2005

    For an entity to qualify as an "employer" subject to liability under the TCHRA, (1) it must fall within the statutory definition of employer; and (2) there must be an employment relationship between the parties. … Tackett's testimony establishes only that it is possible that Ancira GMC could have met the TCHRA number-of-employees threshold at the time of trial.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. McCarley

    247 S.W.3d 323 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 21, 2008

    We set aside a finding for factual insufficiency if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). … Did McCarley establish the requisite intent? The State also argues that the State has sovereign immunity from McCarley’s claim because McCarley failed to establish the requisite intent.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. El Paso Electric Company

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 5, 2021

    Further, when findings of fact are filed and unchallenged, “[t]hey are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding.” … Appraisal Dist., 804 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991); see also Southwest Royalties, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 404 (explaining that tax exemptions are narrowly construed and that taxpayer has burden to “clearly show” that exemption

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • S. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 25, 2021

    “[A] parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of conduct.” … “clearly supports a proposition contrary to the main proposition,” see The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 1.2 (c) 12 (Columbia L. Rev.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • TX Far West, Ltd. v. Texas Investments Management, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 15, 2004

    Appellee also asserts that statements by Kemp, TX Far West’s representative, qualify as judicial admissions and therefore prove the validity of the restrictive covenant as a matter of law. … Specifically, Kemp stated in his affidavit: • I . . . clearly and unequivocally came to the conclusion that the Restrictive Covenant had neither been abandoned nor its enforcement waived. . . .

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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