Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,255 results
0.53s
55 S.W.3d 681 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 4, 2001
Although he had- been granted use immunity, Kotaska refused to testify. The State then sought to introduce Kotaska’s earlier testimony from Ludwick’s trial. … to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.”
Cited 66 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 7, 2012
Inc. , 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. 2000) (holding that "a timely filed postjudgment motion that seeks a substantive change in an existing judgment qualifies as a motion to modify under Rule 329b(g), thus extending the trial … In this case, nothing in the record establishes that citation was served on the Secretary of State and forwarded to Kashan.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 7, 2012
Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. 2000) (holding that “a timely filed postjudgment motion that seeks a substantive change in an existing judgment qualifies as a motion to modify under Rule 329b(g), thus extending the trial … In this case, nothing in the record establishes that citation was served on the Secretary of State and forwarded to Kashan.
Cited 0 timesPublishedLinda S. Nowlin v. Lori Keaton
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 4, 2015
Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude that the jury’s finding that Keaton’s failure to pay on July 1 did not amount to a material breach of the lease was clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. … “A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 16, 2005
The prosecutor then qualified his definition by providing two examples of a “serious” offense: driving while intoxicated, which in fact is a class B misdemeanor, see Tex. Pen. … The trial court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous. See id. 6 On appeal, the State argues that the prosecutor intended “serious” to mean “an offense that was worse than a Class C misdemeanor.”
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 14, 2006
Cline argues that article 6181-1, section 4, as it read in 1986, was made part of his sentence and created a protected liberty interest in his earned GCT by its use of "explicitly mandatory language" and establishment of … Although the 1986 statutes used mandatory language in describing the rate at which inmates accrue GCT, depending on their classification, they also clearly provided that credits could be lost and that restoration of lost
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 14, 2006
Cline argues that article 6181-1, section 4, as it read in 1986, was made part of his sentence and created a protected liberty interest in his earned GCT by its use of “explicitly mandatory language” and establishment of … Although the 1986 statutes used mandatory language in describing the rate at which inmates accrue GCT, depending on their classification, they also clearly provided that credits could be lost and that restoration of lost
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 16, 2005
The prosecutor then qualified his definition by providing two examples of a "serious" offense: driving while intoxicated, which in fact is a class B misdemeanor, see Tex. Pen. … The trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous. See id . The judgment of conviction is affirmed. __________________________________________Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Justices B. A.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCynthia J. Lee v. Timothy M. Novak
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 19, 2001
.; (2) Lee had the right to establish A.M.N.' … of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the allegations sought to be established.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 13, 2005
Furthermore, expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger do not establish bias or partiality. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 240. … The threat to counsel was clearly ill-advised and inappropriate.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 13, 2005
Furthermore, expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger do not establish bias or partiality. Francis , 46 S.W.3d at 240 . … "A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration--even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration--remain immune." Id . (quoting Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555-56 ).
Cited 0 timesPublishedCity of Austin v. City of Cedar Park And Wilson Land and Cattle Company
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 14, 1997
The Code also establishes procedures to be followed when an existing municipality's ETJ is reduced or expanded. … In sum, Austin and Cedar Park are, as a practical matter, the only cities that could qualify to use section 42.024. 4.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 8, 2013
But subchapter C of the PIA qualifies the public’s right of access to certain types of “public information.” See id. §§ 552.101–.153. … As for the third, letter ruling 2011-09372, it is clearly distinguishable from the situation here.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAbbott v. Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation
212 S.W.3d 648 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 30, 2006
The Public Information Act Compels Disclosure of the Information Requested The Public Information Act Qualifies Under Section 161.512(a) In support of its assertion that the Public Information Act does not qualify under section … The sixth exception exempts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files 8 the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
Cited 18 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 24, 2007
A party seeking arbitration must establish its right to arbitration under a contract. Weekley Homes, Inc. v. Jennings , 936 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, writ denied) ( Weekley I). … Here, the parties agreed to conditions precedent before arbitration can take place and, by placing those conditions in the contract, the parties clearly intended to make arbitration a dispute resolution mechanism of last
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 12, 2009
In addition, the Comptroller's plea urged that Entertainment's request for declaratory relief under the UDJA is barred by sovereign immunity because she was acting within her discretionary authority in applying section 151.024 … A court, on finding an agency rule invalid, may remand the rule to the agency to allow "reasonable time for the agency to either revise or readopt the rule through the established procedures."
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 24, 2007
A party seeking arbitration must establish its right to arbitration under a contract. Weekley Homes, Inc. v. Jennings, 936 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (Weekley I). … Here, the parties agreed to conditions precedent before arbitration can take place and, by placing those conditions in the contract, the parties clearly intended to make arbitration a dispute resolution mechanism
Cited 0 timesPublished279 S.W.3d 1 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 17, 2009
Co., 118 U.S. 394 , 6 S.Ct. 1132 , 30 L.Ed. 118 (1886) (Privileges and Immunities clause extends to corporations). … Ellis and Colyandro also complain that the election code permits corporations to finance the establishment and administration of general-purpose political committees, but it does not define “establishment” or “administration
Cited 20 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 25, 2010
However, if the person speaking to Kyle was in fact Castle, then what Castle had allegedly said to Kyle would be an admission by a party opponent and would not qualify as hearsay. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2). … App. 1979) (“In admitting the contents of a telephone conversation, the identity of the speaker is sufficiently established if the message reveals that the speaker has knowledge of facts that only the speaker would be
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 12, 2009
In addition, the Comptroller’s plea urged that Entertainment’s request for declaratory relief under the UDJA is barred by sovereign immunity because she was acting within her discretionary authority in applying section … A court, on finding an agency rule invalid, may remand the rule to the agency to allow “reasonable time for the agency to either revise or readopt the rule through the established procedures.”
Cited 0 timesPublished
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