Case law

Sterling Wayne Wyatt v. Capital One Auto Financing

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 29, 2010

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply here, however, because COAF does not qualify as a “debt collector” under the Act. See Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. … CONCLUSION The record conclusively establishes that COAF was assigned Wyatt’s purchase contract.

Rhonda Lane v. Texas Department of Health

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 30, 2003

The district court agreed and the order granting summary judgment clearly and concisely set forth the court's reasoning for its decision. … However, the United States Supreme Court held that a state bears no qui tam liability under the FCA by virtue of sovereign immunity. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v.

Flores v. Employees Retirement System of Texas

74 S.W.3d 532 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 18, 2002

Flores’s disability qualified as an occupational disability. The Board’s reweighing of the evidence was clearly designed to change the effect of Ms. Flores’s preexisting condition on her disability. … The Knee Injury The medical evidence adduced at the hearing also established that Ms.

Rhonda Lane v. Texas Department of Health

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 30, 2003

The district court agreed and the order granting summary judgment clearly and concisely set forth the court’s reasoning for its decision. … However, the United States Supreme Court held that a state bears no qui tam liability under the FCA by virtue of sovereign immunity. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v.

Edwin K. Lang v. Texas Department of Public Safety and Steven C. McCraw, Director of Texas Dept. of Public Safety

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 18, 2014

Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 197-98 (Tex. 2004) (noting that statutes authorizing judicial review of agency orders waive sovereign immunity to that extent). … —Austin 2014, pet. filed) (observing that while this distinction might be relevant where jurisdiction rests solely upon the ultra-vires exception to sovereign immunity, it has less significance where a statute waives immunity

Jack Elwood Hooper v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 24, 2003

The burden rests upon the individual challenging the statute to establish its unconstitutionality. Cotten v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Tex. Crim. … Furthermore, the statute establishes determinate guidelines for law enforcement. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.

Jack Elwood Hooper v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 24, 2003

It is obvious that appellant must have reference to that portion of the statute under which he was convicted, which qualifies a substance analogue as a controlled substance if the analogue is intended for human consumption … Furthermore, the statute establishes determinate guidelines for law enforcement. Grayned , 408 U.S. at 108-09.

Roger Doyle Wood v. State

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 7, 2009

This was clearly the trial court’s understanding of the State’s intent, and this understanding was confirmed by the prosecutor after appellant’s objection was made. … Bodily injury assault 28 is included within the alleged offense because it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission

State of Texas v. Howard Huffstutler

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 9, 1994

However, neither witness was qualified to give an estimate of the fair market value of the property on the date of taking. Thus, the only value amounts in evidence were $310,000 and $450,000. … Clearly, the jury was not convinced either that the highest and best use of the property was retail or that the property was worth the amounts admitted at trial and, thus, substituted its own judgment of the fair market value

Sterling Wayne Wyatt v. Capital One Auto Financing

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 29, 2010

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply here, however, because COAF does not qualify as a "debt collector" under the Act. See Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. … In sum, the record conclusively establishes that COAF was assigned Wyatt's purchase contract and that Wyatt had ample verification of that fact.

Bryan Hicks v. Christina Rodriguez

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 10, 2010

The divorce decree contained a Qualified Domestic Relations Order instructing the LCRA to pay a portion of Brown's benefits directly to Rodriguez. … In a factual-sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all the evidence and set aside a finding "only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Cain v.

Bryan Hicks v. Christina Rodriguez

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 10, 2010

The divorce decree contained a Qualified Domestic Relations Order instructing the LCRA to pay a portion of Brown’s benefits directly to Rodriguez. … In a factual-sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all the evidence and set aside a finding “only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Cain v.

Argonaut Insurance Company and Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 25, 2015

Political subdivisions, including counties and school districts, may establish risk pools or enter into interlocal agreements with other political subdivisions to establish risk pools. … Co., 410 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. 2012) (employers who self fund employee health benefit plans perform service similar to that of insurance companies and “operate much like insurers” but “are clearly not insurance companies

Gutierrez v. State

85 S.W.3d 446 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Oct 3, 2002

By point of error three, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he did not kill with sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. … He is qualified to give an opinion on his character for truthfulness and law-abidingness — or I’m sorry, his pertinent character trait for violence.

Rosemarie Satterfield, as Representative of the Estate of Jerrold Braley v. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., Individually and as Successor to Mundet Cork Corporation

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 29, 2008

Satterfield has not made it clearly apparent that chapter 149 is unnecessary, unreasonable, and unjustified by the facts. See Bellaire, 317 S.W.2d at 45-46. … However, Satterfield has not clearly demonstrated that there is no reasonable basis for the legislative classification concerning the May 13, 1968 merger deadline.

Rosemarie Satterfield, as Representative of the Estate of Jerrold Braley v. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., Individually and as Successor to Mundet Cork Corporation

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 29, 2008

Satterfield has not made it clearly apparent that chapter 149 is unnecessary, unreasonable, and unjustified by the facts. See Bellaire , 317 S.W.2d at 45-46 . … These definitions remain unchanged from the 2003 version in effect when Braley sought partial summary judgment to establish Crown's liability as Mundet's successor. 13.

Mary Louise Serafine v. Alexander Blunt and Ashley Blunt

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 1, 2015

The Act is to “be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully,” but it “does not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case … face were based on Serafine’s exercise of her right to petition because they were “solely about her lawsuit, and not about the 3 The Texas Supreme Court recently noted that an interlocutory appeal is “clearly

Bosque River Coalition v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality

347 S.W.3d 366 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 2, 2011

An interest common to members of the general public does not qualify as a personal justiciable interest. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 5.115 (a) (West 2008). The Commission’s pertinent rules incorporate the same definition. … An interest common to members of the general public does not qualify as a personal justiciable interest.”), .203(a) (2011) (Tex. Comm’n Envtl.

Great American Insurance Company of New York v. Williamson County, Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 24, 2025

This burden includes conclusively establishing when the cause of action accrued. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 833–34 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). … concomitant legal injury, see Etan Indus., 359 S.W.3d at 623, and if the legislature intended by Section 2253.078 that a cause of action could accrue before a surety has committed a wrongful act, that intention would be more clearly

Income Administrator Services, Inc. v. Samuel E. Payne

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Dec 20, 2001

Plaintiff complied with this request because he believed that Defendant, his broker, was more experienced and qualified in real estate transactions. … Rather, we are limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion by either acting arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or misapplying the law to the established