Case law

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  • in Re Thomas Allen Simon

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jun 22, 2016

    Standard of review In criminal cases, “mandamus relief is appropriate only when a relator establishes (1) that he has no adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and (2) that what he seeks to … —Eastland Jan. 22, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Qualified visiting judges possess the same powers as the judge of the court to which the judge is assigned.”); Anuscewski v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. CGG Veritas Services (U.S.), Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 21, 2015

    [and] depth” of the earth’s subsurface, CGG’s seismic images allow petroleum companies “to identify fairly clearly potential places to drill.” (2.RR.94-96). … CGG Qualifies as a “Deemed Owner.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Vehicle Board of the Texas Department of Transportation/Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc.

    21 S.W.3d 744 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2000

    all other qualified Ford heavy duty truck dealers. … Beard is not qualified, in terms of character and capacity, to become the dealer-principal at Metro.”

    Cited 48 timesPublished
  • Johnie Jennings v. Carolyn Bindseil, Dan Bindseil, Jannalyn Welch, Julian Welch, Allen Knodel, Betty Knodel, Dale A. Friesenhahn, Horacio Ayala, Richard Aramendia, Daryl Payne, Melinda Payne, Deanna S. Wilson, Rodney Wilson, D.M. Stuller, William Hall

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 22, 2008

    DISCUSSION Deed Restrictions Covenants restricting the free use of land are not favored by the courts, but will be enforced if they are clearly worded and confined to a lawful purpose. Wilmoth v. … However, when we held that the deed restriction against mobile homes in Dempsey was unambiguous, a jury had already made a factual finding that the structure at issue--a double-wide manufactured home--actually qualified as

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Roger Dale Newby v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 8, 2001

    In the letter, Christopher told appellant that he planned to testify against him at trial in exchange for immunity, but would later recant his testimony on appeal so that appellant’s conviction would be reversed. … A case of beer in a container of the sort used to deliver beer to bars was in the trunk of the car occupied by appellant and the accomplice, although it was never clearly established that beer was taken from

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Johnie Jennings v. Carolyn Bindseil, Dan Bindseil, Jannalyn Welch, Julian Welch, Allen Knodel, Betty Knodel, Dale A. Friesenhahn, Horacio Ayala, Richard Aramendia, Daryl Payne, Melinda Payne, Deanna S. Wilson, Rodney Wilson, D.M. Stuller, William Hall

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 22, 2008

    DISCUSSION Deed Restrictions Covenants restricting the free use of land are not favored by the courts, but will be enforced if they are clearly worded and confined to a lawful purpose. Wilmoth v. … placed on his property constitutes a mobile home or a generic successor as prohibited by the deed restriction.5 As a result, summary judgment is improper because a fact question exists regarding whether Jennings’s home qualifies

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Cynthia J. Lee v. Timothy M. Novak

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 19, 2001

    mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the allegations sought to be established. … The $80,087.94 was properly considered as income to Lee during the marriage along with the interest on the accumulated funds that accrued during marriage, both of which qualify as community property. Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Reliable Consultants, Inc. D/B/A Dreamers v. Delia Jaquez

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 27, 2000

    the finding is so weak as to make the judgment clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. … The evidence firmly establishes that Dreamers' failure to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk was a cause in fact of Jaquez's injuries.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hollis v. State

    219 S.W.3d 446 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 16, 2007

    Rather, "Steelman simply reiterated what previously had been well established: the odor of marijuana emanating from a residence, by itself, is insufficient to establish both the probable cause and statutory authority required … Nevertheless, because the record does not clearly reflect whether the interrogation had stopped or was continuing at the time of this comment and because the State does not advance this argument, we assume for purposes of

    Cited 130 timesPublished
  • Spurlock v. TEX. DEPT. OF PROTECTION

    904 S.W.2d 152 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Sep 13, 1995

    Appellant also points to the cross-examination of Bach, in which he qualified his testimony on direct and testified that appellant's condition rendered her incapable of meeting her children's physical needs, specifically … The weight of appellant's evidence is not such that the judgment is clearly wrong and unjust. 3. Best Interest of the Children In Holley v.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Greg Abbott, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas Kyle Janek, in His Official Capacity as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission Jon Weizenbaum, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of The v. G.G.E., E.M.B., and G.D.E Through Their Next Friend, Geoffrey Courtney And Disability Rights Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 30, 2015

    Further, the trial court heard evidence on Courtney’s qualifications and found he was qualified to adequately represent the interests of the Individual Plaintiffs. … It is true that when a party “files a proceeding that only challenges the validity of an administrative rule, the parties are 14 The UDJA does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity when a plaintiff

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Best & Company v. Texas State Board of Plumbing Examiners

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jul 31, 1996

    It is well established that procedural due process does not protect the mere expectation of a property interest. Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). … "[T]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it." Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 31, 2009

    DISCUSSION On appeal, 7-Eleven urges that the software transferred to third-party franchisees qualified for the sale-for-resale exemption. … According to the State, the “purpose” requirement of section 151.006 is not met because “7-Eleven’s actual use of the Software clearly evidences a purchase for its own use, as opposed to a transfer of Software to a third

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Howard Hamilton v. Pat McClure D/B/A P.J.'s Contents Cleaning & the Beneke Company

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 17, 1993

    Her testimony, however, clearly addressed this issue. She testified that her charges were typical ones by her company. … Hamilton's objection at trial, however, was that McClure could not testify about her expenses because she had not been qualified as an expert.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Gregory Daniels v. Balcones Woods Club, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 2, 2006

    Furthermore, “‘not establishing bias or partiality . . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger. . . . … A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune.’” Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Larry Collins v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 29, 2003

    A variety of factors may be considered in deciding whether a weapon qualifies as a deadly weapon. The nature and severity of the wounds inflicted may be considered. Garcia v. … It is not necessary that serious injury or death actually occur to establish an object as a deadly weapon. See Fugett, 855 S.W.2d at 229.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Larry Collins v. State

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 29, 2003

    A variety of factors may be considered in deciding whether a weapon qualifies as a deadly weapon. The nature and severity of the wounds inflicted may be considered. Garcia v. State , 17 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. App. … It is not necessary that serious injury or death actually occur to establish an object as a deadly weapon. See Fugett , 855 S.W.2d at 229 .

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 31, 2009

    DISCUSSION On appeal, 7-Eleven urges that the software transferred to third-party franchisees qualified for the sale-for-resale exemption. … According to the State, the "purpose" requirement of section 151.006 is not met because "7-Eleven's actual use of the Software clearly evidences a purchase for its own use, as opposed to a transfer of Software to a third

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Moore v. State

    82 S.W.3d 399 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Aug 21, 2002

    Because the State did not establish any of these with respect to Car-dinale’s occupation, it failed to meet its burden under Rule 803(4). … Because the record does not have sufficient information for us to determine that Cardinale has received medical training and can qualify as a member of the medical profession, and because Rule 803(4) clearly requires the

    Overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. State, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1627 (2008)Cited 90 timesPublished
  • Gregory Daniels v. Balcones Woods Club, Inc.

    Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Feb 2, 2006

    Furthermore, "'not establishing bias or partiality . . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger. . . . … A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration--even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration--remain immune.'" Id . (quoting Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555-56 ).

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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