Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Kimball v. Houston Oil Co.

    100 Tex. 336 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 13, 1907

    That the plaintiffs failed to establish by credible testimony that Isam Parmer paid a valuable consideration for the land. “9. … of such statutes has *343 arisen from the strong determination of the courts that frauds should be suppressed; and as the policy of the registration acts has thus, to a great degree, been counteracted, it has been so far qualified

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • RAILROAD COM'N OF TEXAS v. WBD Oil & Gas

    46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 442 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 13, 2003

    The court of appeals wrote: “We can think of no reason why the legislature would have wanted rales adopted [with contested case] procedures to be immune from challenge under APA § 2001.038.” 70 The reason to require that … Id. § 2001.032 ("Each house of the legislature by rule shall establish a process under which the presiding officer of each house refers each proposed state agency rule to the appropriate standing committee for review before

    Cited 68 timesPublished
  • House v. Stone

    64 Tex. 677 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1885

    The statute itself establishes and prescribes the rule of certainty in respect to the identification of the property to be assessed, and requires the assessor to list and assess it in accordance therewith. … The application of the maxim that every man is held to know the law of the land has, of course, a qualified application, according to the nature of the subject and the circumstances of the case. See Moreland v.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Nokia, Inc.

    51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1340 · Texas Supreme Court · Aug 29, 2008

    To the extent that seeking damages, in part, in the form of a headset neither clearly falls within a policy provision, nor is clearly excluded by the text of the policy, the policies are ambiguous. … In fact, each of the complaints quite clearly alleges the opposite, as outlined above.

    Cited 199 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Williams

    41 Tex. 390 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1874

    The depositions, whatever maybe urged as to their not furnishing evidence sufficient as a defense to the action, were clearly admissible as evidence and for what they might legally be worth. … Thompson had not qualified under the will as executor, neither had he accepted the appointment of trustee for his niece.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Puckett v. McDaniel

    96 Tex. 94 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 11, 1902

    Puckett died and his wife qualified under the statute as survivor for the purpose of administering the community estate. … Very clearly the granting clause of the deed conveys to Mrs. E. E. McDaniel all that the grantors had recovered against her and her vendees in suit No. 6585.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Chastain v. Koonce

    29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 79 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 27, 1985

    Thus, we conclude that the purchasers in this suit qualify as consumers and have standing to sue under the DTPA. … A plaintiff failing to establish either of these two requirements does not have standing under the DTPA, but does have common law remedies available for redress. Cameron v.

    Cited 189 timesPublished
  • in Re Silica Products Liability Litigation

    Texas Supreme Court · Jun 19, 2006

    Rule 13.3 establishes a procedure for parties to make a request that related cases filed on or after September 1, 2003, be transferred to a pretrial court. … Thus, Rule 13 clearly creates two distinct mechanisms for transferring cases to an existing MDL pretrial court.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Trevino v. Turcotte

    21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 263 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 15, 1978

    The 1960 will was duly admitted to probate and Edgar Tur-cotte qualified as one of three independent executors of the estate; he served in that capacity until his death on March 18, 1963. … We conclude that the first opinion did not establish “the law of this case” on the issue of whether or not respondents are “persons interested.”

    Cited 109 timesPublished
  • Dobard v. State

    149 Tex. 332 · Texas Supreme Court · Oct 18, 1950

    Supp. 371, sustaining a somewhat similar statute of South Carolina, but that case was subsequently reversed in its pertinent part by the federal Supreme Court, which held the statute to violate the privileges and immunities … Clearly there is a point at which the reduction of the number of boats would reduce the amount of fish taken, because obviously a single boat would not normally take as many as, say, ten boats of the same type operating under

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Fort Worth Improvement District No. 1 v. City of Fort Worth

    106 Tex. 148 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 27, 1913

    As between individual riparian owners it is an established principle that one may make no use of the stream that will result to the injury of the other, and may for his greater convenience or benefit erect no embankment or … by the consent of such person; and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money and no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges or immunities

    Cited 82 timesPublished
  • Odyssey 2020 Academy, Inc. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District

    Texas Supreme Court · Jun 11, 2021

    The taxpayer has the burden to “clearly show” that an exemption applies, and all doubts are resolved against the granting of an exemption. Id. … (holding private leasehold interest in public property did not qualify for exemption as publicly owned property).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.

    108 Tex. 96 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 26, 1916

    The right to have the liability of an employer for an accidental injury to an employee determined by a common law doctrine is not a constitutional immunity, and this Act in changing that rule of liability therefore invades … The association is very clearly only an agency for the proper administration of this law. It has no functions or powers which it may exercise for any other purpose.

    Cited 301 timesPublished
  • Leonard v. Maxwell

    365 S.W.2d 340 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 30, 1963

    Mc-KENNEY, to me well known to be a credible person of lawful age and qualified in all respects to make this affidavit, who, being first duly sworn, on oath says that he is attorney for Violet Maxwell and husband, Charles … A reading of the controverting pleas clearly demonstrates that no one of them alleges these necessary venue facts. Plaintiffs answer first that their reference to Subdivision 9a of Art. 1995 is a sufficient allegation.

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Thomas A. Lalonde, Jr., P.E., Individually and D/B/A Lee Engineering Co., Lee Engineering Co., Stanley Harold Prather and Prather Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Paul Gosnell and Kim Gosnell

    Texas Supreme Court · Jun 14, 2019

    recover benefits, compensation or relief, even though the plaintiff may abandon his cause of action or fail to establish it.”) … Even if the homeowners showed they were prejudiced by the engineers’ delay in seeking dismissal, they cannot establish waiver unless they show that the engineers clearly demonstrated an intent to relinquish their dismissal

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Montgomery v. Rittersbacher

    11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 186 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 24, 1968

    Montgomery, brought this suit to establish his right to accumulated and prospective royalty under an oil, gas and mineral lease. The material facts are undisputed. … The unambiguous entirety clause clearly indicates that it was to apply to all the interests covered by the lease.

    Cited 56 timesPublished
  • Regal Finance Co. v. Tex Star Motors, Inc.

    53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1034 · Texas Supreme Court · Aug 20, 2010

    Qualifying the second sentence as a non-exclusive method of proving commercial reasonableness would have clarified its purpose. … Although the second sentence, in isolation, lacks qualifying language, the preceding sentence and concluding paragraph inform that the dealer standard is not the exclusive means of establishing commercial reasonableness.

    Cited 94 timesPublished
  • Mabee v. McDonald

    107 Tex. 139 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 14, 1915

    "By the `law of the land' is clearly intended the general law, which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. … The effort of the government to compel, by process, such consent by appearance resulted in providing for the circumlocutory proceedings of outlawry, which involved first, a judicial sentence of qualified forfeiture of the

    Reversed on other grounds by McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Chapa v. Garcia

    848 S.W.2d 667 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 7, 1993

    Neither the evidence nor the documents tendered by Remington establish such a right. … Luis Chapa clearly established the relevance of and his need for the documents, by offering evidence demonstrating that the NBAR program had as its goal improvement of the defective fire control on the Model 700 and that

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Nueces County Appraisal District

    904 S.W.2d 621 · Texas Supreme Court · Sep 14, 1995

    Even though we believe taxes due are clearly an obligation to a taxing entity that cannot be forgiven under article III, section 55, we do not believe section 11.433 extends such forgiveness. … Section 11.433 may be said to have some retroactive effect in that it allows an exemption to be established after taxes are assessed.

    Cited 39 timesPublished

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