Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filterstex

1,987 results

2.10s

  • Heirs of Holliman v. Peebles

    1 Tex. 673 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1846

    This examination would have been unnecessary if the action of the ayuntamiento had been clearly within their jurisdiction; but as this has been contested and their powers have not been satisfactorily or fully explained, we … This decision of a most learned court, especially qualified to determine questions growing out of the laws of Spain, is entitled to great weight and authority.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Redman Homes, Inc. v. Ivy

    920 S.W.2d 664 · Texas Supreme Court · May 31, 1996

    Thus, the Macmillan plaintiffs sought to impose a specific construction or safety standard that clearly conflicted with a federal law or regulation pertaining to mobile homes. … A property owner is qualified to testify to the market value of his property. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.1984).

    Cited 126 timesPublished
  • City of Brookside Village v. Comeau

    25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 310 · Texas Supreme Court · May 19, 1982

    conditions require; and their conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. … See 42 U.S.C. § 5403 (d): “Whenever a Federal mobile home construction and safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish

    Cited 174 timesPublished
  • J.G. Griner v. B.C. Thomas, District Judge

    101 Tex. 36 · Texas Supreme Court · Oct 23, 1907

    Admitting that the question is a debatable one, we can not say that the statute in question is so clearly opposed to the Constitution as to justify us in disregarding it. … To the contention that suspension without notice is a deprivation of property without due process, the answer is that such property right in an office as the holder has is qualified by all pre-existing valid laws which provide

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Kadane v. Clark

    135 Tex. 496 · Texas Supreme Court · Oct 2, 1940

    Clearly the outstanding purpose of this Act is for the protection of the public. … The public policy of this State with reference to such sales is clearly expressed in this Act. That the State has power to enact such regulations for the sale of securities is well established. Hall v.

    Cited 60 timesPublished
  • Sadie Weldon v. the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity

    Texas Supreme Court · May 15, 2026

    In the “jurisdiction and venue” section, for example, the Fund alleges that Weldon is a proper party for the Fund’s declaratory judgment claims because Weldon “clearly contends that S.B. 8 is valid (if she did not, she would … whether Weldon can show she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or establish an affirmative defense.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ex Parte Thomas

    141 Tex. 591 · Texas Supreme Court · Oct 27, 1943

    Nothing is better established than the power of the Legislature to enact legislation for the purpose of preventing “fraud and deceit, cheating and imposition.” 16 C. J. S. 555; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. … It does not impose a general restraint on the right to solicit others to join the union, nor does it vest unlimited discretionary power in the Secretary of State to grant or refuse a registration card to any one qualified

    Reversed by Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Schmidt v. Huppmann

    73 Tex. 112 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 26, 1889

    After the death of the wife the husband qualified as independent administrator of the community estate, and filed an inventory and appraisement, in which the community estate was charged with the $2000, the value of the stock … If there be no community estate from which such reimbursement may be made, then we think the husband furnishing from his separate estate the funds to improve the separate land of the wife could not establish his claim for

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Farrar v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ETC.

    243 S.W.2d 688 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 7, 1951

    As a qualified member of the Employees Retirement System and invoking the provisions of Art. 6228c, supra, Mr. … Ill of the Constitution, supra, clearly restricts teacher retirement benefits to teachers, while Sec. 62 of Art. XVI, supra, with equal clarity restricts employee retirement benefits to employees.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. John Summers

    Texas Supreme Court · Apr 3, 2009

    Second, if indeed the text is ambiguous as Justice Hecht claims, we have clearly said that statutes in derogation of common law rights should not be “‘applied to cases not clearly within [their] purview.’” … Two, owners receive significant economic benefits from OPIPs like Entergy’s apart from tort immunity.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Bolton v. Coats

    19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 77 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 26, 1975

    Coats and the other defendants did not negate these allegations in the manner required for summary judgment under Rule 166-A. 2 Although unnecessary under the circumstances, Bolton offered depositions and affidavits which clearly … Thus, it is entirely possible for the Evans well in the Burnett sand to continue to qualify for classification as a gas well while a well drilled on the north 80 acres of the 673 acres might be classified as an oil well.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Evanston Insurance Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc.

    55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1102 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 29, 2012

    Legacy claims “bodily” only modifies “injury” and that Alvarez’s mental anguish qualifies as sickness under the policy. … Here, Legacy maintains that Alvarez’s injuries qualify as sickness or disease under subsection (a) of the definition of personal injury.

    Cited 74 timesPublished
  • Etc Marketing, Ltd. v. Harris County Appraisal District

    60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 838 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 28, 2017

    On one side of the spectrum are cases involving a clearly transitory stop. See, e.g., Champlain Realty Co. v. … The ad valorem tax targets all qualifying personal property; it pays no attention to the property’s intended destination.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Frankland v. Cassaday

    62 Tex. 418 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 17, 1884

    . *421 The general rule as quoted from Wells on Bes Ad judicata and Stare Decisis, it will be noticed, qualifies the universality of its application by the statement that the court of ultimate resort “ will seldom” reconsider … We might even add, if it were appropriate in this relation to do so, that the decision seems to be very clearly right.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Boyles v. Houston Lighting and Power Company

    14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 264 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 3, 1971

    “had a right to inquire of the witnesses as to the names of other expert appraisers who had appraised the property on behalf of the landowners,” upon the principle that it had the right to call as its witness any person qualified … We said: “ * * * There is nothing in this record to establish the relevancy and materiality of the names of the passengers in the car.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Morgan v. Oliver

    98 Tex. 218 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 10, 1904

    Parks, who shall proceed with the county surveyor after being qualified, to lay out and survey such roads to the greatest advantage to the public. The clerk will notify the jurors in the manner prescribed by law.” … The question is, was the road which was laid out in 1901 lawfully established as a. public road?

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Railroad Commission of Texas v. Houston & Texas Central Railway Co.

    90 Tex. 340 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 28, 1897

    In exercising this jurisdiction, courts must be governed by the well-established rule of construction, that an act of the Legislature will not be held unconstitutional unless it is clearly contrary to some provision of that … The language “to correct abuses” is qualified by the phrase “on the different railroads in this State.”

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • United Scaffolding, Inc. v. James Levine

    537 S.W.3d 463 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 30, 2017

    But USI’s argument does not create a dispute over Levine’s assertion of USI’s control; in fact, USI argues quite clearly that it controlled and was responsible for the scaffold. 2 Levine confuses USI’s presence at thé work … The fact that Valero may have employed “competent persons” qualified to inspect scaffolding does not mean that anyone other than USI ever did inspect scaffolding.

    Cited 212 timesPublished
  • Higgins v. Bordages

    88 Tex. 458 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 8, 1895

    Such a tax might be levied under this section of the Constitution, if authorized by law; but the assessment in this •case is clearly not an exercise of the power granted in the language above quoted. … Boyd, cited above, the court said: “The words ‘tax,’ ‘taxes,’ and ‘taxation,’ as used in the Constitution, without some qualifying words, in reference to property, evidently mean ad valorem tax, taxes, and taxation.”

    Cited 74 timesPublished
  • City of Baytown v. Alan Schrock

    Texas Supreme Court · May 13, 2022

    It is clearly true that the Texas Takings Clause is broader than the federal Takings Clause—but how much broader, and under what circumstances? … Rigorous and serious requirements for establishing causation and damages will ensure that worthy claims, but only worthy claims, will both proceed and merit full compensation.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.