Case law

Texas Education Agency v. Leeper

893 S.W.2d 432 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 16, 1995

The case is clearly not moot. … It clearly is not a criminal statute on its face, and defendants do not argue that it is; rather, they argue that it is in effect a defense to prosecution under § 4.25, which clearly is a criminal statute, and that the general

Wesley Rattray, Marco Nunez, Martha Saavedra, Antonio Vindell, Carmen Pashos, Steve Tullos, Cesario Pedraza, Minerva Pedraza, Roger Luly, Nora Gonzalez, and Rosalinda Castillo v. City of Brownsville, Texas

Texas Supreme Court · Mar 10, 2023

Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish jurisdiction, so they subject themselves to some risk by waiting for a plea to the jurisdiction (or other appropriate vehicle) to establish a waiver of immunity or to attempt to negate … clearly relevant exceptions to the waiver rather than doing so from the start.

Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital

52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 680 · Texas Supreme Court · May 1, 2009

We conclude that section 281.056(a) does not, either by itself or in context, clearly and unambiguously waive HCHD’s immunity to suit. … from suit to establish and secure a judgment for the amount of whatever its liability may be.

Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P. v. Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District and Its Board President Jerry McGuairt; Republic Water Company of Texas, LLC; And Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P.

Texas Supreme Court · Mar 13, 2026

And it’s clearly dissatisfied with the District’s refusal to grant it party status. … C The third requirement to establish a waiver of immunity is that Cockrell must have waited to file suit until “all administrative appeals to the district [were] final.” Tex. Water Code § 36.251(c).

City of Houston v. Maria Christina Gomez

Texas Supreme Court · Jun 20, 2025

In addition to asserting that the new affidavit established Simmons’s good faith for purposes of official immunity, the City again argued that there was no fact issue on recklessness, pointing to this Court’s opinion in City … The plaintiff—as nonmovant—can survive the defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction “only by showing that the statute ‘clearly and affirmatively waive[s] immunity’ and by also ‘negating any provisions that create exceptions to

Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, Texas

559 S.W.3d 142 · Texas Supreme Court · Oct 5, 2018

To the contrary, we explained in Tooke that “even if the City were not immune from suit for breach of a contract whose subject lies within its proprietary functions, the Tookes’ contract [did] not qualify” because that … Here, however, all four relevant factors establish that the City was performing a proprietary function when it leased its lakefront property.

Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.

54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1683 · Texas Supreme Court · Aug 26, 2011

Second, there is no need to alter established principles in this area of the law when applying established principles addresses the issue. … We did not address the question of whether the city could waive its own immunity from suit because even if it could, the language in question did not clearly and unambiguously do so.

San Antonio Water System v. Debra Nicholas

58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 720 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 24, 2015

Nicholas also complains she was not interviewed for subsequent positions despite being qualified. … We have consistently held that jurisdictional arguments concerning immunity waiver cannot be waived.

dallas/fort Worth International Airport Board v. Vizant Technologies, Llc

576 S.W.3d 362 · Texas Supreme Court · May 17, 2019

Vizant does not dispute that the Board qualifies as a local governmental entity, 8 but argues that immunity does not apply here because the Board was acting in a proprietary capacity when it entered into the contract. … So even if the contract here stated the essential terms of a legally enforceable promise to make a good-faith effort, chapter 271 does not “clearly and unambiguously” waive the Board’s immunity because any amounts Vizant

University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus

60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 908 · Texas Supreme Court · May 12, 2017

To qualify as a governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act, then, UIW must satisfy subpart D’s two conditions. … Here, UIW clearly derives its status and authority to commission and employ peace officers and operate a police department from laws passed by the Legislature. See Tex. Educ.

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, D/B/A Panda Power Funds Panda Sherman Power Holdings, LLC Panda Sherman Power Intermediate Holdings I, LLC Panda Sherman Power Intermediate Holdings II, LLC Panda Sherman Power, LLC Panda Temple Power Holdings, LLC Panda Temple Power Intermediate Holdings I, LLC Panda Temple Power Intermediate Holdings II, LLC Panda Temple Power, LLC Panda Temple Power II Holdings, LLC Panda Temple Power II Intermediate Holdings I, LLC

Texas Supreme Court · Jun 23, 2023

. at 530. 125 Id. 28  B ERCOT “do[es] not fall neatly into any camp”.126 It is a unique entity serving a role that is not clearly … to derivative immunity

Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda

47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 386 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 2, 2004

Due to the unusual confluence of standards erected by the Legislature for waiver of sovereign immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute, plaintiffs must plead gross negligence to establish subject … With such a long lineage, one wonders why a plea to jurisdiction does not qualify as a “standard” or “established” motion. Perhaps a second mention in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure would suffice.

Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit

369 S.W.3d 845 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 22, 2012

unless the context of the statute indicates no other reasonable construction.” 18 These directives do not establish whether Section 181.004 waives immunity and shed no light at all on what the Legislature intended by its … In short, whether Section 181.004 clearly and unarn- *850 biguously waives a government landowner’s immunity is a difficult question. 22 And it is one we need not answer here because our focus instead is on Section 87.053

Harris County Appraisal District v. Texas Workforce Commission

60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 949 · Texas Supreme Court · May 12, 2017

The Tax Code HCAD argues that the Legislature clearly intended to separate appraisal review boards and their members from appraisal districts. … (applying Butz to give quasi-judicial officers immunity). In Bradley v. State ex rel.

Ltts Charter School, Inc. D/B/A Universal Academy v. C2 Construction, Inc.

Texas Supreme Court · Jun 17, 2011

In this case, Universal Academy is run by a non-profit corporation organized under Texas law and qualifying under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. … And if immunity is never waived, then Section 12.1056 would suggest that open-enrollment charter schools are immune from all tort liability, unique among all governmental entities in the State.

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell

818 S.W.2d 749 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 11, 1991

Moulinage et Retorderie de Cha-vanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973) (work product documents prepared for a prior suit do not lose their qualified immunity from discovery under Rule 26(b)(3) upon termination of that litigation … Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.Md.1974) (qualified immunity of work product documents does not terminate when the lawsuit for which the documents were prepared terminates). But see, e.g., United States v.

General Services Commission v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.

39 S.W.3d 591 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 5, 2001

It has, therefore, unconstitutionally vested the executive and legislative branches with powers clearly reserved to the judicial branch. … CONCLUSION We have consistently deferred to the Legislature with regard to sovereign-immunity waivers. The Legislature has chosen to establish an administrative remedy for breach-of-contract cases against the State.

Zachry Construction Corporation v. Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texas

Texas Supreme Court · Aug 29, 2014

But Section 271.152, as qualified by this “subject to” phrase also does not preclude other defenses or other contractual procedures, or confer immunity or suggest joint enterprise. … Direct damages for breach—“the necessary and usual result of the defendant’s wrongful act”62—certainly qualify.

City of Dallas v. Dallas Consolidated Street Railway Co.

105 Tex. 337 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 19, 1912

At all events it is not a binding enactment until its enactment is completed, and until it is a binding enactment it retains its relationship to the political power, and is immune from the process of judicial authority. … Yre are unwilling to establish the precedent and write it down as the law of this State that the courts in such cases may in this manner predetermine the validity of legislation and assume such control of the • exercise of

Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, Texas

59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 524 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2016

A We start by noting our disagreement with the court of appeals’ interpretation of Tooke as establishing a new default rule of immunity. … In the tort-claims context, this distinction has been clearly established, both by this Court and by legislative recognition. See City of Tyler v.