Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
1,987 results
1.87s
41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 895 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 5, 1998
When I say tread separations, I have to qualify that and say tread and belt separation, and I will explain that later. * * * Q: All right. … To overcome the presumption of openness, General bears the burden of demonstrating all of the following: (a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: (1) this presumption of openness; (2) any
Cited 139 timesPublished55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 501 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 30, 2012
The legislature has apparently sought to avoid such constitutional problems by qualifying affirmatively-declared public rights with an interesting condition precedent. … We do not know that we clearly comprehend the appel- *729 lees’ position that the judgment can be upheld on the theory that the use of the beach by the public has become a part of our tradition and common law and the easement
Cited 75 timesPublishedState v. Public Utility Com'n of Texas
883 S.W.2d 190 · Texas Supreme Court · Oct 6, 1994
The phrase “dedicated to public use” is immediately followed and qualified by the phrase “whether by the utility which is the present owner or by a predecessor.” … The language was not intended to establish a cutoff date after which no costs could be included in the rate base.
Cited 285 timesPublished982 S.W.2d 371 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 10, 1998
BACALA is a non-profit corporation organized under Texas law and qualifying under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. … A party seeking relief must establish that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992).
Cited 10 timesPublishedTurner v. KTRK Television, Inc.
44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 244 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 21, 2000
Further, because of the upcoming election, the story was clearly “hot news.” Cf. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157-59 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). … Contrary to the broadcast’s introductory statement, this would likely not qualify as "one of the biggest attempted insurance swindles in recent Houston history.” .
Disagreed with by New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1140 (2004)Cited 421 timesPublishedTexas Supreme Court · Feb 18, 2015
However, neither Tanner nor Clough rebutted (nor were they qualified to rebut) Ms. … Reed Has Established Chain Of Custody.
Cited 0 timesPublishedState Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy
39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 965 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 12, 1996
We concluded that the disadvantages to assignments of legal malpractice ' claims clearly outweighed the advantages. … To be entitled to a presumption an insured should be required to establish certain basic or foundational facts.
Cited 298 timesPublishedTexas Supreme Court · Jun 24, 2022
Only in 1876 was the phrase “or immunities” added. Does that addition tell us anything new or different about what “due course” itself means? … Or does it simply confirm that, to the extent something qualifies as a “privilege” (a separate inquiry), the state cannot deprive someone of it absent compliance with the long-established understanding of “due course” protections
Cited 0 timesPublished59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 587 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2016
A CT § 3(a). 45 Id. § 3, cmt. 2. 13 Variants of “value,” including “reasonably equivalent value,” are not defined in UFTA, but are clearly … consideration] from a creditor’s viewpoint” and how TUFTA’s market-value inquiry applies. 46 Id. § 3, cmt. 1 (“This section defines ‘value’ as used in various contexts in this Act, frequently with a qualifying
Cited 89 timesPublishedTexas Supreme Court · Apr 19, 2024
JNM and ANCA were clearly Mr. Lozano’s employer under the federal regulations’ definitions. See 49 C.F.R. § 390.5; see also 49 U.S.C. § 31132(2)-(3) (statutory basis for the federal regulations). … Williams, 579 F.3d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing Consumers Cnty., 307 F.3d at 363-64, and 49 C.F.R. § 390.5), could qualify as being “employed by” the employer.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Supreme Court · Mar 28, 2014
Kia also argues that FMVSS 208 clearly governs that risk. … We then concluded that “the mere fact that the tire failed . . . is insufficient to establish a manufacturing defect of some sort.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTexas Supreme Court · Jan 25, 2015
Norman West & Cynthia Ramirez’s testimony: Norman West was given testimonial immunity to testify at trial. (RR vol. 4, pp. 71-72, 91). … When the evidence clearly shows (i.e., there is no doubt) that a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial judge must instruct the jury accordingly. Smith v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedOtis Engineering Corp. v. Clark
27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 100 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1983
Otis contends that, at worst, its conduct amounted to nonfeasance and under established law it owed no duty to the Clarks' respective wives. … Roy's deposition clearly indicates that he at no time attempted to "take charge" of Matheson.
Cited 408 timesPublishedUnion Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske
57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 980 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 3, 2014
But we presume legislators intended to enact legislation fulfilling their clearly stated purpose rather than presuming they made a mistake that both diminishes the result they were seeking to obtain as well as arbitrarily … Prince is a qualified, board-certified pulmonary specialist who served Joseph as his last treating physician; (8) In his report and testimony, Dr.
Cited 87 timesPublished36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 874 · Texas Supreme Court · May 5, 1993
The Court said: Clearly, freedom from severe emotional distress is an interest which the law should serve to protect.... … All manner of symptoms have qualified as physical manifestations.... Such a wide-ranging meaning has attached to "physical manifestation," that the term has lost much of its former significance....
Cited 518 timesPublishedGeneral Chemical Corp. v. De La Lastra
852 S.W.2d 916 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 3, 1993
Such a recovery clearly violates article XVI, § 26. … Section 41.007 caps punitive damages; it does not immunize any award up to the cap from constitutional scrutiny.
Cited 180 timesPublished58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 911 · Texas Supreme Court · May 8, 2015
Several other courts have since expanded on the types of “efforts” that qualify as *674 “significant” under the ■ Howey/Fomum test and those that do not. … First, our decision in this case does not “establish a new principle of law” by “overruling clear past precedent on which .litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
Cited 21 timesPublished552 S.W.2d 90 · Texas Supreme Court · May 18, 1977
The language of § 14.05(b) clearly limits the effect of the Act to a child who is found by the court to require continuous care and personal supervision because of the existence of mental or physical disability prior to reaching … Children must develop their mental or physical disability before eighteen because if they unfortunately develop the handicap at age nineteen, they do not qualify for help.
Cited 29 timesPublishedFredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Co.
881 S.W.2d 279 · Texas Supreme Court · Sep 8, 1994
Rule 74(p) is clearly discretionary — a court of appeals “may” order rebriefing for flagrant violations of the rule. … Such evidence, even if accepted as true, does not establish attachment as a matter of law. 8 .
Cited 939 timesPublishedTexas Supreme Court · Sep 27, 2013
The MSA gives Benjamin the exclusive right to establish the child’s primary residence, and it gives Stephanie periodic access to and possession of the child. 2 Among the … To qualify for appointment “in a dispute relating to the parent-child relationship,” the person must complete additional training “in the fields of family dynamics, child development, and family law.”
Cited 0 timesPublished
Ask Donna