Case law

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  • In Re Alford Chevrolet-Geo

    997 S.W.2d 173 · Texas Supreme Court · Aug 26, 1999

    For example, courts may limit discovery pending resolution of threshold issues like venue, jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and official immunity. See TEX.R. CIV. … Here, Relators failed to show or otherwise explain in their motion to bifurcate *183 that the class and merits issues are clearly separable.

    Cited 203 timesPublished
  • Texas National Guard Armory Board. v. McCraw

    132 Tex. 613 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1939

    Any such officer ap *618 pointed to fill a vacancy shall qualify for office by taking and filing the constitutional oath of office with the Secretary of State.” … Section 30a stipulates that the Legislature may provide by law that the members of such boards as have been, or hereafter may be, established by law may hold their respective offices for a term of six years.

    Cited 167 timesPublished
  • Fieldturf USA, Inc. and Altech, Inc. v. Pleasant Grove Independent School District

    Texas Supreme Court · Mar 4, 2022

    Standard F355, established by ASTM International, is a common 3 According to District personnel, they first noticed issues with field degradation in the spring of 2014. … FieldTurf cross-appealed, arguing that it was entitled to rendition of a take-nothing judgment because (1) the evidence conclusively showed the field did not qualify for warranty coverage; (2) the District’s exclusive remedy

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Angelini v. Hardberger

    39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1084 · Texas Supreme Court · Aug 30, 1996

    Section 28 clearly specifies the circumstances for, and the duration of, such interim appointments. … XVI, § 17 (allowing for holdover in office until successor is qualified).

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • Mid-American Indemnity Insurance Co. v. King

    38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1018 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 7, 1995

    Mid-American presented evidence to the trial court that it had established a trust fund that in early 1993 had a value in excess of $3.5 million. … Provisions which afford the fewest rights clearly apply to unauthorized insurers which have never become eligible to write insurance in this *330 state.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik

    51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1437 · Texas Supreme Court · Sep 26, 2008

    If evidence of gross sales is ever likely to be harmful, the evidence offered here surely must qualify. Further, that evidence must be considered in the context of this case. … Although Reliance did not stipulate that Alvarado was in the course and scope of his employment until shortly before closing arguments, contemporaneous trip records and other discovery disclosures unquestionably established

    Cited 183 timesPublished
  • Olvey v. Jones

    137 Tex. 639 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 26, 1941

    Jones by deed dated February 6, 1908, recorded in Book W, p. 153, and includes any excess, if any.” 1 The mineral deed both before and after reformation clearly shows that the parties did not intend that it should operate … It is the established law in this State that “Conversations between the parties and testimony as to what was said and done by them while a business transaction was being arranged and the transaction was depending are admissible

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton

    980 S.W.2d 425 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1998

    The Commission would reserve the First Amendment's immunities to public speech, and deny those immunities to private, confrontational speech. The Commission's minimalist theory of free speech is flawed. … Even assuming Benton's letter does not qualify as classic political or public speech, it qualifies as moral suasion.

    Cited 137 timesPublished
  • First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett

    860 S.W.2d 74 · Texas Supreme Court · Sep 29, 1993

    The Garretts were never told of this covenant, which clearly prohibited the use for which they intended the property. … The italicized language clearly represents that there were no restrictive covenants in the county deed records.

    Cited 109 timesPublished
  • Railroad Commission v. Metro Bus Lines, Inc.

    191 S.W.2d 10 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 5, 1945

    The decision made in the Shupee case has never been overruled and we have found no decision of this Court that criticizes or undertakes to qualify it. It was discussed in the opinion in Lone Star Gas Co. v. … east of Grand Prairie either in an easterly or westerly direction, and from the defense plants and military and naval establishments eastward the railroad is no factor because it turns north and does not separate the two

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Ellis County State Bank v. Keever

    888 S.W.2d 790 · Texas Supreme Court · Sep 3, 1994

    state why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias. … To make the citizen liable to be mulcted in damages for an honest discharge of duty is to give immunity *800 to crime, and to weaken the restraining power of the criminal law, thereby endangering the security of law-abiding

    Cited 192 timesPublished
  • County of Harris v. Shepperd

    156 Tex. 18 · Texas Supreme Court · May 2, 1956

    Section 1 of the Act reads: “This local law for the maintenance of public highways for Harris County shall not be operative unless or until a majority of the resident property taxpayers who are qualified voters, residing … In our opinion the authority therefor must be derived, if at all, from the taxing power of the state, and, therefore the act is clearly violative of Article 8, Section 3 of our Constitution which provides that taxes must

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • In Re Collins

    52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 813 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 5, 2009

    Alternatively, the re-questor may provide satisfactory assurances that reasonable efforts have been made to obtain a qualified protective order limiting the use of the information to the legal proceeding and providing for … Propriety of the Protective Order In the context of formal discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure, we have established standards for the issuance of protective orders.

    Cited 60 timesPublished
  • United Scaffolding, Inc. v. James Levine

    Texas Supreme Court · Jan 26, 2018

    But USI’s argument does not create a dispute over Levine’s assertion of USI’s control; in fact, USI argues quite clearly that it controlled and was responsible for the scaffold.2 Levine confuses USI’s presence at the work … The fact that Valero may have employed “competent persons” qualified to inspect scaffolding does not mean that anyone other than USI ever did inspect scaffolding.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Regency Field Services LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC

    Texas Supreme Court · May 7, 2021

    As Swift correctly observes, pleadings generally do not qualify as summary-judgment “evidence,” even when they are sworn or verified. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dall.), Inc. v. … But it clearly did allege that it had already suffered legal injuries before it filed its claims on September 24, 2015.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • in Re E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company

    Texas Supreme Court · May 14, 2004

    The log submitted by DuPont combined with Connor = s affidavit clearly make a prima facie case that those documents with only A DuPont Legal @ names associated with them are covered by the attorney-client and/or work product … However, the work product privilege is not necessarily waived by disclosure to a non-employee, as there are numerous other classes of individuals who can qualify.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Patricia Mosley v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission and Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

    Texas Supreme Court · May 3, 2019

    It is well-established that “[t]he failure to give adequate notice violates the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.” Mosser v. Plano Three Venture, 893 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex. App. … To pass constitutional muster, the notice was required to “clearly indicate that if no request for reconsideration is made, the determination is final.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Evanston Insurance Company v. Atofina Petrochemicals, Inc.

    Texas Supreme Court · Feb 15, 2008

    But Evanston counters that ATOFINA fails to qualify as an additional insured under section III.B.6 because the language does not cover an additional insured for its own negligence. … We cite cases addressing both terms because, even if there is a difference, whatever qualifies as “arising out of operations” also qualifies under “with respect to operations,” the broader term. [8] Granite , 832 S.W.2d at

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., Helix Well Ops, Inc., and Helix Offshore International, Inc. v. Kelvin Gold

    Texas Supreme Court · Jun 16, 2017

    Helix maintains that the court’s standard cannot comport with the well-established rule that major overhauls take ships out of navigation. … The deposition testimony of Gold does not call into question any of the objective characteristics of the 534 established above.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co.

    100 Tex. 153 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 7, 1906

    S., 217 ) a rule clearly expressed which is applicable to the facts of this case, we will follow and apply it as we understand it. … That the railroad officials understood what this law means *177 is clearly shown by their returns made in conformity thereto and printed in their brief in this case.

    Reversed on other grounds by Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908)Cited 57 timesPublished

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