Case law

Kind v. Commissioner

54 T.C. 600 · United States Tax Court · Mar 25, 1970

Acting through petitioner, its sole shareholder, the corporation quite clearly intended to, and did, wind up its affairs and distribute its surplus, ceasing all active business on that date. … in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies

Copy Data, Inc. v. Commissioner

91 T.C. 26 · United States Tax Court · Jul 18, 1988

Under petitioner’s method of computing its insurance expense deduction, its lifetime income would clearly have been distorted. … The stipulated table establishes that the deduction reflected actual expenses, even though those expenses were not reflected in the reserve account.

Jaggard v. Commissioner

76 T.C. 222 · United States Tax Court · Feb 12, 1981

To qualify for exempt status under this statute, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare must find that the members of the religious sect or division to which the applicant belongs provide for their dependent members … Admittedly, this mutual aid is a type of insurance but it is clearly not the type of insurance contemplated within the statute’s “private or public insurance” language as that phrase is used in section 1402(h)(1).

Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner

72 T.C. 521 · United States Tax Court · Jun 21, 1979

In order to keep operators qualified for their positions, a continuous retraining program is required by the NRC. Retraining does not qualify personnel for promotions or new positions. … of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.

American Automobile Ass'n v. Commissioner

19 T.C. 1146 · United States Tax Court · Mar 26, 1953

The evidence and record before us clearly establish that the petitioner’s purpose to engage in business was not merely incidental and subordinate to a main purpose but was in fact a principal purpose. … Supp. 310 , nor in establishing and maintaining the integrity of a local commercial market, Crooks v.

Coors Porcelain Co. v. Commissioner

52 T.C. 682 · United States Tax Court · Jul 28, 1969

We conclude on this record that petitioner has failed to establish either of these facts. … Consequently, the expenditures in question do not qualify for treatment as expenses under section 174(a).

Coupe v. Comm'r

52 T.C. 394 · United States Tax Court · Jun 11, 1969

The evidence establishes, however, that in fact Polhemus and Brannely first attempted to have S.P. obtain title to the exchange properties, bnt when that failed, to have title vest solely in themselves. … The evidence presented by petitioners clearly established that these transactions were structured as they were primarily for tax-avoidance purposes.

Blake v. Comm'r

67 T.C. 7 · United States Tax Court · Oct 6, 1976

Clearly he cannot qualify under section 1.1235-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. , which defines "all substantial rights" as: "all rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value at the time the rights to the … A professional inventor clearly can look only to sec. 1235 ; amateur inventors are similarly restricted since Congress clearly stated there was to be "no distinction" between the two. H. Rept.

Brod v. Commissioner

65 T.C. 948 · United States Tax Court · Feb 11, 1976

But when the threat of criminal prosecution is *953 removed, by the grant of immunity "coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination," then testimony may be compelled. See Murphy v. … To the extent the majority opinion is predicated on the supposition of nonexistent facts (i.e., no criminal investigation, no fifth amendment ↩ violation) it is clearly in error.

Azar Nut Co. v. Commissioner

94 T.C. 455 · United States Tax Court · Mar 20, 1990

In his notice of deficiency, respondent determined, inter alia, that since petitioner did not establish “that any amount in excess of that allowed constitutes an ordinary and necessary business expense,” the amount that petitioner … Furthermore, the Supreme Court clearly refused to embrace the sweeping view of those cases according ordinary asset treatment to any property acquired for business purposes as opposed to investment purposes.

Meyers v. Commissioner

21 T.C. 331 · United States Tax Court · Nov 30, 1953

The respondent established that the petitioner received amounts each year, without consideration, as a stockholder of the Corporation. … As part of his proof of insolvency, respondent submitted a statement, prepared by a qualified accountant, showing the extent to which the Corporation was insolvent.

Poole v. Commissioner

46 T.C. 392 · United States Tax Court · Jun 20, 1966

A minimum annual royalty of $2,000 was established for so long as the contract remained in force. The agreement provided that the company would pay Poole one-half of any initial licensing fees it might earn. … denying that preferential tax treatment in the situations which do not qualify.

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner

95 T.C. 323 · United States Tax Court · Sep 18, 1990

in Spain and individuals or legal entities resident, domiciled, or legally established abroad. … A review of First Security Bank will aid in establishing the framework for analysis of this issue.

Adams v. Commissioner

71 T.C. 477 · United States Tax Court · Dec 28, 1978

I would conclude from the record made before me in this case that $300 of the stipend received by petitioner each month qualifies for exclusion from income under section 117(a)(1). … His program is established under rules and regulations of the American Osteopathic Association, clearly stating that emergency situations are the only exceptions considered more important than the advancement of his education

Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner

56 T.C. 925 · United States Tax Court · Aug 5, 1971

with the petitioner that Industrias was a “corporation” for purposes of article IX, and that it therefore cannot be disregarded, we do not agree with the petitioner’s conclusion that this factor alone was sufficient to qualify … However, “To say that we should give a broad and efficacious scope to a treaty does not mean that we must sweep within the Convention what are legally and traditionally recognized to be * * * taxpayers not clearly, within

Vidal Suriel v. Commissioner

141 T.C. No. 16 · United States Tax Court · Dec 4, 2013

The parties stipulate that the MSA escrow fund is a qualified settlement fund under section 1.468B-1, Income Tax Regs. The escrow fund was established with Citibank, N.A., which served as the escrow agent. III. … As discussed supra, the MSA documents clearly show that Vibo obligated itself to make the MSA payments.

Peninsula Steel Products & Equipment Co. v. Commissioner

78 T.C. 1029 · United States Tax Court · Jun 17, 1982

In 1956, petitioner was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of Ferry Steel Products, a manufacturer of steel equipment. … ”; petitioner does not contend that its method qualifies under the regulation’s reference to accruals as of the time "the subject matter of the contract is * * * accepted.”

Downer v. Commissioner

48 T.C. 86 · United States Tax Court · Apr 27, 1967

The failure of the public offering made it 'impossible for Wootten to establish a sales organization. … We think these cases are clearly distinguishable. Peabody Goal Go. and George M.

Southern Dredging Corp. v. Commissioner

54 T.C. 705 · United States Tax Court · Mar 31, 1970

The right to this exemption is sometimes qualified in the application of section 269(a), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: SEO. 269. ACQUISITIONS MADE TO EVADE OR. AVOID INCOME TAX. … [Respondent contends quite ardently that an examination of the record as a whole points quite clearly to the nonbusiness, tax avoidance motives of Richard and Duane Merritt.

Vial v. Commissioner

15 T.C. 403 · United States Tax Court · Oct 5, 1950

States, was established upon the enactment into law of Chilean Law No. 6334, dated April 29, 1939, as amended by Law No. 6640, dated August 5, 1940. … The evidence shows that that reasoning is clearly unsound in so far as it is based upon the alleged fact that Fomento was “a Chilean Government-owned corporation”.