Case law

Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co.

87 Pa. Super. 235 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 26, 1925

“Freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to contract as one chooses. … Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulation”: Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 .

Bethea v. Philadelphia AFL-CIO Hospital Ass'n

2005 Pa. Super. 94 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 15, 2005

Futch because he did not qualify as an expert under the MCARE Act. … "No statute shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1926. 3 .

Nasdaq Omx Phlx, Inc. v. Pennmont Securities

2012 Pa. Super. 145 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 16, 2012

The defendants countered that federal law impliedly preempted the plaintiffs’ state law claims and, alternatively, they were immune from suit based on the doctrine of regulatory immunity. Id. … After separately holding that SROs have absolute immunity from suit, the Señes 7 Court concluded: The comprehensive structure set up by Congress is suggestive both of an intent to create immunity for such duties and of an

Commonwealth v. Smith

436 Pa. Super. 277 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 7, 1994

Cain use immunity 2 for his testimony, but Mr. Cain steadfastly refused to testify. The trial court advised Mr. Cain that his testimony could not be used against him under a grant of use immunity. … In contrast, transactional immunity provides a witness full immunity from prosecution for crimes arising out of any transaction about which the witness was compelled to testify. Commonwealth v.

Jacobs v. Chatwani

2007 Pa. Super. 102 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 13, 2007

Hirsch was not qualified to opine that “Dr. … Rather, the record establishes that Dr.

Azaravich, L. v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC 44 MDA 2023 Reargument Denied 8/12/24 318 A.3d 876

318 A.3d 876 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 5, 2024

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in its application of the immunity provision of the Mental Health Procedures Act 1 (MHPA) to Appellant’s corporate negligence claim. … [There are] three elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of corporate negligence. The plaintiff must establish all of the following: 1.

Coleman v. Duane Morris, LLP

2012 Pa. Super. 281 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 20, 2012

We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise. *837 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. … Thus, this cause of action proceeds along the lines of all established contract claims.

Williams Appeal

210 Pa. Super. 388 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 15, 1967

Wouters, M.D., a qualified neuropsychiatrist, testified that Jones has established a pattern of handling stress by aggression. His diagnosis is that *394 the hoy is a defective delinquent who is potentially dangerous. … A term having a well known legal meaning need not be specifically defined each time it is used in a *399 statute which clearly adopts the term from a prior statute in which the term is clearly defined.

Commonwealth v. Hansell

185 Pa. Super. 443 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 21, 1958

Certainly it was permissible for appellant to have Gentner testify, if qualified, to Lambert’s reputation for truth and veracity at the time. … It was clearly error for the trial judge to hold that Gentner was not so qualified unless he could name specifically the people who also knew Lambert.

Commonwealth v. Wortham

235 Pa. Super. 25 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 24, 1975

Appellant contends that the evidence clearly established that the weapons used by the robbers were small black handguns, and a fourteen-inch pellet gun cannot be classified as a small handgun. … The evidence produced was certainly sufficient to establish that appellant had abused that qualified consent.

Scalice v. Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund

2004 Pa. Super. 248 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 29, 2004

LEXIS 12637 (1992), appellant argues the PEBTF is precluded from being an ERISA qualified plan due to its status as a “governmental” plan as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (32): a governmental plan is “a plan established or … Members will know clearly and concisely the appropriate expectation for their coverage and benefits.

Commonwealth v. Neal

78 Pa. Super. 216 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 3, 1922

The sections of the statute following provided *218 for the establishment of a Bureau of Medical Education and Licensure, charged with the duty to ascertain the character of the instruction and the facilities possessed by … various medical educational institutions chartered under the laws of the Commonwealth, to examine applicants for certificates of licensure to practice medicine and surgery and to issue certificates to those found to be duly qualified

Commonwealth v. Bourgeon

439 Pa. Super. 355 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 20, 1994

Leute’s education and experience with the dynamics of child sexual abuse clearly places him within the range of having “specialized knowledge on the subject” of child sexual abuse and its effects. … Applying the above standards to the evidence presented at trial, we find that Bourgeon’s sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims are clearly meritless. Jarman, supra; Paquette, supra. See Commonwealth v.

Poleri v. Salkind

453 Pa. Super. 159 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 27, 1996

LaFontant that appellants would attempt to establish that Dr. … This overlap is sufficient to qualify Dr. Aragona to offer his opinion regarding the wound care treatment provided by Dr. LaFontant.

Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc. v. Smith

2011 Pa. Super. 30 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 14, 2011

Rule 803(6) requires the proponent of documentary evidence to establish circumstantial trustworthiness. … PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL: We clearly were on the list.

Hernandez, J. v. Independence Constr. Corp.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 18, 2025

In ICC’s first two immunity claims, it contends that it qualifies as a statutory employer under section 302(a) because the work performed by Hernandez was “excavation.” … ICC’s third and fourth immunity claims may be combined into a single issue — whether the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that it did not qualify for immunity under the third category of contracted work

Commonwealth v. Balog

448 Pa. Super. 480 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 13, 1996

To overcome this presumption, the person challenging the constitutionality of a statute shoulders the heavy burden of demonstrating that the statute clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution. … Thus, one may not successfully challenge a statute for vagueness when his conduct clearly falls within the prohibited acts set forth therein. Id.; see also Commonwealth v.

Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien

182 Pa. Super. 584 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 28, 1956

duly qualified physician to determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child, and the results of such tests may be received in evidence but only in cases where definite exclusion of … That case involved a prosecution for fornication and bastardy, clearly a proceeding to establish paternity. We held that a petition for blood grouping tests, presented 38 days after final judgment, came too late.

Young, C. v. S. B. Conrad, Inc.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 25, 2019

Conrad was immune from Mr. … The establishment of jurisdiction is of equal importance as the establishment of a meritorious claim for relief.” Robinson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 582 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1990).

Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc.

211 A.3d 875 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · May 23, 2019

The Commonwealth and the trial court both declined to immunize Mei from prosecution. Next, the corporation asked the trial court to immunize Mei from his testimony being used against him – hence, “use immunity.” … He only sought use immunity (at the time, calling it “limited immunity”) as an afterthought, once the court and the Commonwealth denied his original request to immunize Mei completely.