Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Mistick, Inc. v. Northwestern National Casualty Co.

    2002 Pa. Super. 267 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 14, 2002

    Initially, the Court acknowledged that lead-based paint did qualify as a “pollutant” within the meaning of the policy. … The provision’s additional language, “at any time”, on which Northwestern relies to establish “gradualism,” does not ameliorate this ambiguity.

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • African Methodist Episcopal Union Church

    28 Pa. Super. 193 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 13, 1905

    These cases establish the counsel’s contention that we can only review the regularity of the proceedings as shown by the record and we propose to strictly confine ourselves to the record in this case. … Thus it clearly appears that to make these vital and important amendments to the constitution or charter of the corporation, the affirmative vote of two thirds of the 120 male members of the congregation was required.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • In the Interest of Lilley

    719 A.2d 327 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 25, 1998

    Did the evidence presented at hearing clearly and convincingly establish that Kathleen Lilley’s parental rights to Carl Lilley could and should be terminated under Section 2511(a)(l)(2)(3)(4) or (5) of the Adoption act 23 … Did the evidence presented at hearing clearly and convincingly establish it was in Carl Lilley’s best interest to have his mother’s parental rights to Carl Lilley terminated? (Appellant’s Brief at 3.)

    Cited 220 timesPublished
  • National Casualty Co. v. Kinney

    2014 Pa. Super. 84 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 25, 2014

    To-byhanna required that employees sign up and use qualified carpooling transportation more than fifty percent of the days in a given work month to qualify for funds. … This is not enough to establish employer control. See [ Williams, supra ]....

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Smith

    2016 Pa. Super. 264 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 29, 2016

    The court denied Buterbaugh’s post-sentence motions, and an appeal ensued wherein he argued, inter alia, that the pick-up truck did not qualify as an “instrumentality” for the purposes of the DWE. … Hence, we established that a “device, implement, or instrumentality is an object, whether simple or complex, that is utilized in a fashion to produce death or serious bodily injury, which need not be ___________________

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Bergman v. United Services Automobile Ass'n

    1999 Pa. Super. 300 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 6, 1999

    The trial court must determine whether the necessity for the testimony exists and whether the witness is qualified to testify. Ruzzi v. … F.T.P., Inc., 248 N.J.Super. 468 , 591 A.2d 682 (A.D.1991), affirmed, 127 N.J. 94 , 602 A.2d 733 (1992) (concluding that expert testimony unnecessary to establish standard of care of insurance broker); Shamalon Bird Farm,

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Kyper v. Sheaffer

    42 Pa. Super. 277 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 3, 1910

    The defendants were endeavoring to establish their right to use this lane, because it had been used generally by the public. … The question, therefore, of exclusive and adverse possession thereof *293 necessarily came into the case, and the point, it seems to us, should have been qualified to that extent.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Price, R. v. Catanzariti, A.

    2016 Pa. Super. 76 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 30, 2016

    A29004/15 Whether a witness has been properly qualified as an expert is vested in the discretion of the trial court, Wexler v. … Our supreme court in Wexler found that Section 512 explicitly forbids non-physicians from testifying as expert witnesses against physician-defendants: Although clearly there is some overlap

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Robinson

    2010 Pa. Super. 192 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 20, 2010

    We acknowledge that Section 1926 of the Statutory Construction Act provides in plain terms that: “No statute shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A … of ineligible offenders “logically compels” the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to extend the RRRI statute to include offenders sentenced under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(3)(i) and (ii) provided they otherwise qualified

    Cited 94 timesPublished
  • Com. v. Little, K.

    2021 Pa. Super. 7 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 15, 2021

    The trial court established that Alston indeed would qualify for the death penalty, but then ended the sidebar without explicitly ruling on defense counsel’s proposed re-direct. Id. at pp. 65-66. … We held that counsel apparently opted to agree with the clearly detrimental ruling, resulting in Little’s loss of an arguably meritorious issue that could have afforded him a new trial.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Cunningham v. Byers

    1999 Pa. Super. 146 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 11, 1999

    Cunningham’s vehicle does not constitute a situation which qualifies as a sudden emergency. … Even though the sudden emergency doctrine is a defense to negligence, and the jury clearly rejected Mr.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Hangey, R. v. Husqvarna Professional Products

    247 A.3d 1136 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 8, 2021

    , and that the sale of business generated for the defendant by the Philadelphia-based tour company was “far too small to qualify as ‘general or habitual’” and therefore did not establish sufficient quantity. … The law clearly requires both quality and quantity of contacts, and they are distinct.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Tolano

    995 A.2d 1242 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · May 25, 2010

    The Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence or establish the defendant’s guilt to a mathematical certainty. … The Williams court held that a serial DUI offender subject to mandatory DUI penalties may be sentenced to IP so long as the program is a qualified program and the defendant is a qualified eligible offender. Id.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Dibble v. Penn State Geisinger Clinic, Inc.

    806 A.2d 866 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 7, 2002

    Instant plaintiffs counsel will not agree to limit use of the discovery in this case to the seemingly completed prosecution of this case, but proposes to use it in *869 the attempt to establish liability in other eases. … Some factors that a court may consider in determining whether information qualifies as a trade secret include: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the owner’s business; (2) the extent to which it is known

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Graves

    310 Pa. Super. 184 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 4, 1983

    Wesley, 103 Mich.App. 240 , 303 N.W.2d 194 (1981) and 3) there are no established minimum standards in this field. … These witnesses were qualified to testify as they did and it was for the jury, who had the enhanced comparisons before it, to determine what weight to give to such testimony.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co.

    2010 Pa. Super. 124 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 15, 2010

    Hill-O’Neill was qualified as an expert witness in the field of nursing and gerontological nursing. … Hill— O’Neill, testified clearly and unequivocally that Highland breached the standard of care applicable to nursing homes in vari *988 ous respects.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Adams

    187 Pa. Super. 611 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 14, 1958

    The hypothetical question put to Wisniewski accurately assumed in detail a state of facts clearly established by the testimony including the evidence of two unconnected fires. … Moreover the witness Wisniewski, as a fire marshall of the State Police with three years experience investigating fires, was qualified to give his opinion as an expert as to incendiary origin of the fire.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Abrue

    2010 Pa. Super. 196 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 25, 2010

    Neither the Davis nor Allshouse decision provides any definitive guidance when the statements at issue were not made during an ongoing emergency, but also were not clearly made for the purpose of establishing past events. … Under the Davis/Allshouse “primary purpose” test, Officer Maroney’s statements do not readily qualify as either testimonial or non-testimonial. .

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Baez

    2011 Pa. Super. 109 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · May 23, 2011

    “It is the Commonwealth’s burden to establish whether [a defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. … [H]e clearly and unequivocally indicated after each right was read to him that he understood.

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Kelly v. Kelly

    2005 Pa. Super. 394 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 22, 2005

    It directed appellant that in order to receive the benefits, she must file a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) with the Railroad Retirement Board, but she failed to do so. … are not established in the complaint itself?

    Cited 29 timesPublished

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