Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
325 results
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Olick v. Kearney (In Re Olick)
398 B.R. 532 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 2, 2008
Step 1 To establish a prima facie age discrimination/termination case, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that he was at least forty years old, (2) that he was fired, (3) that he was qualified for the job from which he was fired … Specifically, they contend that summary judgment record establishes that the Debtor: (1) was not qualified for the field agent position; and (2) was not replaced by someone sufficiently younger to create an inference of age
Cited 2 timesPublished135 B.R. 773 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 28, 1992
These cases establish that the issue of whether the creditor actually needed the joinder of the spouse of a principal borrower in a loan transaction is analyzed under applicable state law. … However, the loans in issue clearly involve “extension of credit primarily for business, ... purposes, ...” to which the TILA does not apply. 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (a).
Cited 12 timesPublishedITT Financial Services v. Woods (In Re Woods)
69 B.R. 999 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 19, 1987
The language “shall award fees” in both the EAJA and 11 U.S.C. § 523 (d) provides for the mandatory award of counsel fees to a qualified prevailing *1002 party under the EAJA, Tressler, 748 F.2d at 149 , and under § 528(d … Here, that Section clearly is relevant. 5 . The Archangeli case is clearly a pre-BAFJA case and is inapposite to our analysis herein. 6 .
Cited 22 timesPublishedAmerican Insulator Co. v. Marsh Plastics, Inc. (In Re American Insulator Co.)
60 B.R. 752 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 14, 1986
While this is a nebulous finding, it is nonetheless a finding of fact and, as such, is subject to reversal on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Bankruptcy Rule 8013; Frank v. … Section 547(c)(3) provides that a transfer is “immunized” by § 547(c)(2) from the preference provisions of § 547(b) only if it was “made according to ordinary business terms.”
Cited 8 timesPublishedPennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Griggs (In Re Griggs)
12 B.R. 443 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 7, 1981
Clearly, the D.P.W.’s lien is on the property of the debtors. … Specifically, the debtors must establish the existence of a cooperative federal-state funded program.
Cited 13 timesPublished82 B.R. 373 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 8, 1988
We find that the State Ethics Commission Orders are clearly admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) as public reports. … These factual statements, as to the activities of Mr. *376 Trinsey, contained in Section B of the State Ethics Commissions Orders, clearly qualify as “factual findings” within the context of 803(8)(C). ' Furthermore, this
Cited 6 timesPublishedOlick v. Kearney (In Re Olick)
422 B.R. 507 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 28, 2009
coupled with timing to establish a causal link.” … Feb. 6, 2008). 48 .The Farrell court stated: Although timing and ongoing antagonism have often been the basis for the causal link, our case law clearly has allowed a plaintiff to substantiate a causal connection for purposes
Cited 2 timesPublished440 B.R. 336 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 7, 2006
Saunders qualifies individually as a Chapter 13 debtor because the amount of either Mr. Saunders’ Base Debt or Mrs. … That is clearly incorrect pursuant to Rule 4003(b), which does not provide exceptions from its grant of additional time.
Cited 5 timesPublished522 B.R. 99 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 3, 2014
In this case the record establishes material contacts upon the Debtor at his home. … It was not, but it is clearly implicated.
Cited 1 timesPublishedLyndel Toppin - Adversary Proceeding
United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 8, 2021
therefore diverges from the Williams court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a ministerial act and finds that the Sheriff’s Office’s post-petition actions in enforcing the CCP Court’s wit of possession do not qualify … In order to recover emotional distress damages for willful violation of the automatic stay, a party must (1) have suffered significant emotional distress, (2) clearly establish the significant emotional distress; and (3
Cited 0 timesUnknownUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 31, 2019
immunity. … The Gaming Act clearly goes beyond simply establishing the manner by which the Debtor obtained the License.
Cited 0 timesUnknown90 B.R. 737 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 16, 1988
This limited requirement of disclosure as a condition of invoking the privilege clearly poses some danger to the interests the privilege is designed to protect. … Contrary to the position taken by counsel to Vetri in his initial submission, the trustee has no obligation to seek immunity for Vetri pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 344 and 18 U.S.C. § 6003 as a prerequisite to a motion to compel
Cited 3 timesPublished199 B.R. 882 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 6, 1996
Originally, PACA established a mandatory licencing scheme, under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture, for dealers, brokers, and commission merchants of perishable agricultural commodities, 7 U.S.C. § 499c(a), … Since Bedemeo has failed to establish that it possesses an identifiable interest in the es-crowed monies now in the possession of Midlantic, its motion for relief from the automatic stay and for turnover of that fund is denied
Cited 4 timesPublishedKV Pharmaceutical Co. v. Harland (In Re Harland)
235 B.R. 769 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 1, 1999
A “knowing breach of contract” could also qualify. See id. [emphasis supplied.] … In order to establish a claim of embezzlement, the Debtor must also be shown to have misappropriated the Plaintiffs property. The findings of the State Court are that he clearly did so.
Cited 15 timesPublishedSperazza v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Sperazza)
366 B.R. 397 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 22, 2007
Sperazza writes reasonably well and clearly, and speaks reasonably well and clearly, albeit his speech is hesitant at times. … He is dissatisfied with that arrangement and intends in the future to establish his own residence.
Cited 12 timesPublished65 B.R. 932 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 16, 1986
The Government asserts that, since the Debtor has not undertaken to establish that he meets the criteria of 42 U.S.C. § 294f(g), his debt to the HHS is non:dis-chargeable. … Clearly, Congress, as opposed to some state legislature or other body, has the exclusive power to establish exceptions to the broad discharge otherwise obtainable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a), as it was the creator of this
Cited 18 timesPublishedIn Re Wilbert Winks Farm, Inc.
114 B.R. 95 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 11, 1990
Here, moreover, the advice tendered was sought through the medium of a secretary whose ability to ask the proper questions or properly transmit the response is not established. … it was making a demand against the estate sufficient to qualify it as an informal proof of claim.
Cited 18 timesPublishedFirst Mortgage Co. of PA. v. McCall (In Re McCall)
25 B.R. 199 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 3, 1982
In weighing this conflicting testimony, we accept the appraisal of the debtor’s expert witness as being more reliable in view of the fact that: (1) the debtor’s witness is a certified and qualified appraiser while the mortgagee … Having already accepted the expert witness’s estimation of the fair market value of the property in question, an analysis of the encumbrances against that property clearly indicates that there is equity therein of at least
Cited 9 timesPublishedIn Re Beverage Enterprises, Inc.
225 B.R. 111 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 29, 1998
Next, the Debtor argues that the Union’s claim does not qualify as a § 503(b)(1)(A) administrative expense because WARN Act “back pay” liability is not based on services rendered. … Severance pay in this category is granted priority as an administrative expense only to the extent that it is earned during the period of time the employer is in bankruptcy. *116 It is therefore clearly established by the
Cited 2 timesPublished146 B.R. 138 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 28, 1992
We find that the evidence presented established rather clearly that, under the twenty (20)-factor test and considering the four factors added by the Ras-bury courts, the workers whose classifications were in dispute were … In the instant case, the IRS claim is unsecured and, as such, it does not qualify for the Ron Pair exception.
Cited 20 timesPublished
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