Case law

Kronfeld v. Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, LP

42 Pa. D. & C.5th 353 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Dec 9, 2014

establishment to acquire, maintain, and use such a device on its premises. … The corporate defendant is statutorily immune from liability.

Hurt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

70 Pa. D. & C.4th 142 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Jan 20, 2005

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws’ of the United States. … Alexander asserted that plaintiffs had a constitutionally guaranteed right to be secure in their person as a clearly established *159 constitutional right to liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Weiner v. Fisher

67 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Jun 11, 2004

Furthermore, the fact that the General Assembly omitted the “unless” clause from section 203 shows that the General Assembly had a different intent when drafting section 203 (extending immunity to statutory employer from … Accordingly, legislation will not be declared unconstitutional unless it “clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution.” Snider, 496 Pa. at 166 , 436 A.2d at 596 .

Short v. Pavlides

33 Pa. D. & C.4th 118 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Apr 3, 1996

pursuant to the medical assistance program, and any committee established *122 by one or more state or local professional societies, to gather and review information relating to the care and treatment of patients for the … Nason Hospital, supra, and could potentially allow medical providers to avoid producing documents which could show negligent hiring or supervision of medical professions, which, as stated earlier, would clearly be in violation

Eagle Truck Services LLP v. Wojdalski

35 Pa. D. & C.5th 196 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Dec 19, 2013

the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking … This court concludes that although this defendant has invoked protection from Clause 11, Robb H. is unable to meet its burden to establish immunity.

Gregory v. James D. Morrissey, Inc.

9 Pa. D. & C.3d 664 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Feb 16, 1979

. §481(b), set forth the plaintiffs exclusive remedy and renders it, United, immune from third party actions. … For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant United is not immune from joinder as an additional defendant in this litigation.

Kluska v. City of Philadelphia

4 Pa. D. & C.4th 380 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Nov 3, 1989

The first factor which must be established is that the police had knowledge of the individual’s particular situation. … Waiver of Governmental Immunity “§21-701.

Erace v. Dreger

12 Pa. D. & C.3d 390 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Apr 23, 1979

The complaint, however, clearly alleges negligence in ‘maintaining and/or replacing’ the street lights in question . . . … Broadway Maintenance Corp., defendant’s demurrer should clearly be overruled.

Jones v. City of Philadelphia

68 Pa. D. & C.4th 47 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Jul 30, 2004

their desire to establish their own independent government and constitution. … However, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claim on the merits, holding that the defendants had not violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and granted qualified immunity to the defendants.

Watkins v. Hill

1 Pa. D. & C.4th 59 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Oct 21, 1988

Section 8541 states the general rule regarding governmental immunity: “§8541 Governmental immunity generally — “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of … Clearly the above-stated language applies in the case at bar where it is alleged that plaintiffs injuries resulted from debris on the sidewalk.

Wareham v. Jeffes

46 Pa. D. & C.3d 3 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Sep 9, 1987

Since the issue in Fitzgerald was clearly the agency question only, the case is not on point for our purposes. *28 In Parratt v. … This observation was dictum, but it appears to be a clear statement of the fate of other section 1983 actions that have accrued after sovereign immunity was legislatively re-established and do not fall with *36 in one of

Ali v. Southeast Transportation Transit Authority

19 Pa. D. & C.5th 449 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Dec 14, 2010

Thus, SEPTA “shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity.” Id. § 1711(c)(3). 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 8522 sets forth the nine exceptions to sovereign immunity. … However, the factual circumstances *455 in this case clearly do not rise to this level. Plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence that any of the remaining defendants’ conduct was outrageous or reckless.

McCray v. Lawrence St. Associates

30 Pa. D. & C.5th 534 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · May 30, 2013

If STRE acted outside the scope of the receivership, the order provided no immunity. … The Restatement (Second) Torts §387 establishes a rule for property owners who transfer management control of their property without transferring ownership.

Integrated Project Services v. HMS Interiors Inc.

77 Pa. D. & C.4th 423 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Jun 13, 2005

No inference from words of general import can establish such indemnification.”). … In this case, the subcontract does not contain an express waiver of HMS’ WCA immunity.

Stout v. Morrisville Supply Corp.

61 Pa. D. & C.4th 191 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Sep 14, 2001

Halmstadt’s testimony that he was well qualified to state his opinions. … He certainly was as qualified to testify as defendant’s expert, who arrived at an opposite conclusion.

Cheronis v. Septa

5 Pa. D. & C.4th 112 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Jun 8, 1989

Mary Brown’s injuries were the result of an attack by a third party, clearly not an “act” of a city employee as contemplated by the contract. … The mere fact that the city might have been aware that a particular location was dangerous but did nothing about it is insufficient to establish this “special relationship,” and the city cannot be held *116 liable.

Williams v. SEPTA

4 Pa. D. & C.4th 363 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Jul 12, 1989

The standard for review of a trial court’s grant of motion for a new trial generally is whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or committed an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. … The Tort Claims Act established a cap on the amount of liability and placed thresholds to recovery for pain and suffering with regard to negligence in the operation of motor vehicles.

Jones v. City of Philadelphia

73 Pa. D. & C.4th 246 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · May 19, 2005

Under the Act, defendants City of Philadelphia, Cuorato and Dougherty are immune from liability for any of these claims under the Act. *256 False Light Claim Assuming arguendo, that the defendants are not immune pursuant … Only conduct extreme or clearly outrageous can be a basis of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Id.

Toledo v. Medical Engineering Corp.

50 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Dec 29, 2000

established.” … In this opinion, I am describing what plaintiffs seek to establish.

Lincoln v. Philadelphia Electric Co.

16 Pa. D. & C.4th 275 · Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County · Apr 2, 1993

Plaintiff asserts that these threats were clearly motivated by animosity directed against the plaintiff individually and are not related to his position as a truck driver for PECO. … Plaintiff notes that defendants concede that the individual defendants are not immune if their conduct constitutes “intentional wrong.”