Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

3,447 results

1.27s

  • K. Blackwell v. City of Pittsburgh

    Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 20, 2025

    “Clearly established means that, at the time of 7 Thomas resolved the tension between federal notice pleading and qualified immunity’s “fact-specific inquiry.” … clearly established.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Lancie v. Giles

    132 Pa. Commw. 255 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 23, 1990

    The present standard for determining if qualified immunity applies was first established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), in which case the U.S. … Supreme Court stated that qualified immunity will be found if an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established rights which a reasonable person should have known. Id. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 .

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • Picariello v. Commonwealth

    54 Pa. Commw. 252 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 15, 1980

    However, plaintiff’s complaint clearly contradicts that claim, by alleging that the Secretary acted as a Commonwealth agent. 6 The guidelines established in DuBree v. … Defendant shall file an answer, possibly with new matter addressing the issue of qualified official immunity, if desired.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • P.G.S. v. S. Hendricks

    Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 8, 2025

    qualified immunity. … With respect to qualified immunity, this Court applies that doctrine to state officers when considering federal law violations and will be found if an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established rights which a

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Feldman v. Hoffman

    107 A.3d 821 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 19, 2014

    Hoffman’s duties. 6 The trial court further found that the Letter “was not addressed solely to [Feldman] but to a number of people, and [Feldman] did not clearly establish that [Decedent’s] original note was her property … Hoffman qualifies as a high-ranking public official and it was alleged that he was acting within the scope of his duties, he qualifies for high official immunity. II.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • Ziccardi v. Commonwealth

    109 Pa. Commw. 628 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 8, 1987

    Federal courts have applied only a qualified immunity on behalf of Commonwealth officials in section 1983 claims. … Specifically, under the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Wood, the immunity defense would be unavailable to the secretary if the constitutional rights which he allegedly infringed were clearly established at

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Costopoulos v. Gibboney

    134 Pa. Commw. 263 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 26, 1990

    In Harlow , the United States Supreme Court held that State officials are entitled to qualified immunity in a 1983 action, unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … The appellant maintains that the State Troopers did not have probable cause to arrest him, thus, clearly violating his established constitutional rights.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Hall v. ACME MARKETS, INC.

    110 Pa. Commw. 199 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 9, 1987

    Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540 , 393 A.2d 293 (1978), held that officials are protected by a qualified immunity. … Id. at 545 , 393 A.2d at 295 . 2 Section 1 of the Act of May 18, 1923, P.L. 259. 3 In Witt , this court held that consecutive Secretaries of Banking were protected from suit by the immunity established in *206 DuBree .

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Pine v. Synkonis

    79 Pa. Commw. 479 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 11, 1984

    There was also evidence that damaged or missing guardrail had been left unrepaired for an extended period of time. 3 Qualified immunity Initially we must determine whether the Appellants are protected by the qualified immunity … In DuBree , the Court 4 analyzed prior law governing official immunity and established considerations for determining whether an official should be immune. These can be summarized as follows: 1.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • T. Gardner v. T. Wealand & J. Fustine

    Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 7, 2026

    Federal qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages provided “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of … See R.R. at 284. 11 While he mentions “qualified immunity under federal law” in the heading of the immunity argument section of his brief, see Appellant’s Brief at 22, we note that Appellant bases his immunity

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Fischer v. KASSAB

    32 Pa. Commw. 581 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 5, 1977

    He also “[participates in formulating overall Department objectives and policies and in establishing the short and long-range improvements for the State Highway system.” While this is by no means the limit of Mr. … Burke, Superintendent of the Parole Division of the Board of Probation and Parole, clearly an officer of the Commonwealth as we have defined it.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Reading Area Water Authority

    937 A.2d 1173 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 12, 2007

    Latrobe Municipal Authority, 913 A.2d 988 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), the trial court determined that a per se violation of the Act does not create a dangerous condition of Reading’s facilities, so as to qualify under the exception … Clearly, the dangerous condition, as alleged, originated with the conduct of Reading’s employees.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth

    177 A.3d 1000 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 22, 2017

    Under federal common law, state legislative privilege and state legislative, immunity is “qualified based on the nature of the claim at issue.” Id. at 334 . … Legislative Respondents clearly are not invoking qualified legislative privilege and immunity under federal common law; rather, they are invoking absolute legislative privilege and immunity based on the Speech and Debate

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Travers v. Cameron County School District

    117 Pa. Commw. 606 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 14, 1988

    This was clearly error. Equitable estoppel “does not create a cause of action at law and, unless a plaintiff can first show a cause of action, estoppel will not supply one for him in an action at law.” … These factual allegations and inferences are sufficient, at this point in the litigation where they must be accepted as true, to establish a promise, expected to be relied on, which was relied on by Appellant to his detriment

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation

    805 A.2d 644 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 30, 2002

    DOT’s recall was effected pursuant to Section 1519(c) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1519(c), which authorizes DOT to recall operating privileges when a licensee’s incompetency has been established. … to sovereign immunity).

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Simko v. County of Allegheny

    869 A.2d 571 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 7, 2005

    The Court concluded a contrary holding could expose the Commonwealth to unlimited liability, a result clearly not intended by the legislature in enacting the immunity statute. Id. at 512, n. 9 , 751 A.2d at 1134, n. 9. … ruling, it is unnecessary for us to address the Representatives' other arguments that: a) Gills’ aortic aneurysm rupture was a superseding cause such as would relieve the County of liability, and, b) Corrigan Drive would qualify

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Matarazzo v. Millers Mutual Group, Inc.

    927 A.2d 689 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 2, 2007

    Our court reversed, holding that the allegations and inferences were sufficient to state a cause of action based on promissory estop-pel. 4 Plaintiffs here assert that the holding in Travers establishes that the immunity … Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only where the pleadings are clearly insufficient to establish a right to relief; any doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Matta v. Burton

    721 A.2d 1164 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 23, 1998

    As such, they were not *1167 related to her position as mayor and thus not protected by absolute immunity. … And Burton’s criticism of Matta’s handling of the contract falls within the scope of her duties and authority because the public clearly has a right to be informed of possible mismanagement by Matta of a $13.5 million school

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Joner v. Board of Education

    91 Pa. Commw. 145 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 15, 1985

    Regardless of whether' the Appellant has alleged facts which would have otherwise qualified her claim under an exception to governmental immunity, and we do not now decide whether she has done so, she has not alleged facts … Clearly Vann does not establish such a rule, but establishes only that, under the facts as pleaded in that case, the criminal acts were not a foreseeable use of school property as a matter of law. See Bersani v.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Moody v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

    673 A.2d 14 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 8, 1996

    The question in determining the existence of qualified immunity is whether a reasonable person could have believed the defendant’s action to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed. … Therefore, Appellant, had he raised and preserved the issue of qualified immunity, would not have been entitled to that defense because he did not reasonably rely on existing law.

    Cited 8 timesPublished

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