Case law

Beitman v. Department of Labor & Industry

675 A.2d 1300 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 10, 1996

Employer denied the request on the grounds that Beitman did not qualify as an “employee” within the definition of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, 43 P.S. §§ 1321-22. … This Court, however, is bound by the express and unambiguous language of the statute, and we cannot decide this case based upon our concept of public policy when the General Assembly has clearly established a contrary public

Cahill v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board

137 Pa. Commw. 442 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 31, 1991

In any event, advice of counsel cannot immunize a false stipulation, upon which a compensation agreement is premised, from the consequences set forth in Section 407 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 731. See Reilly v. … It goes without saying that this burden cannot be sustained by submission of a false stipulation in a supplemental agreement which is clearly contrary to the Act.

Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Wayside Bar, Inc.

120 Pa. Commw. 176 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 30, 1988

It was not necessary for the Board to consider whether Hickory qualified as a resort because the expiration of Applicants license created a quota vacancy. … This quota was clearly filled when Hickory was granted its restaurant liquor license, and therefore the LCB did not have discretion to renew Applicants liquor license. *180 Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court

PG Publishing Co. v. County of Washington

162 Pa. Commw. 196 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 24, 1994

By contrast, where, as in this case, the County’s cellular telephone bills clearly do constitute accounts and/or vouchers evidencing a contract and deal with the use of County equipment, discussion of whether the documents … Next, the County cites Barasch in support of its position that WESCA establishes a privacy right in one’s telephone number.

In re the Springdale District Sportsmen's Ass'n

20 Pa. Commw. 479 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 28, 1975

In each of them the region under consideration was clearly a resort area and the main issue was that of necessity for the license. The Board is not pressing that question in the case at bar. … The existence of “opportunities” for recreation such as hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, etc. does not qualify the area as a “resort.”

Lehigh Valley Power Committee v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

128 Pa. Commw. 276 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 7, 1989

Each qualifying facility shall have the option either: (1) To provide energy as the qualifying facility determines such energy to be available for such purchases, in which case the rates for such purchases shall be based … in long term contracts between qualifying facilities and electric utilities.

J.G. v. Department of Public Welfare

795 A.2d 1089 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 10, 2002

“Adjudication” is defined as “[a]ny final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the … By denying J.G.’s appeal on the basis that there is no right of appeal, we conclude that DPW has clearly erred.

Evans v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole

820 A.2d 904 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 25, 2003

been established as voluntary.” … The purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights, but to enforce those rights already established. Id.

Sunrise Energy, LLC v. FirstEnergy Corp. and West Penn Power Company

148 A.3d 894 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 14, 2016

Thus, to preclude utilities, such as merchant generators, from qualifying for net metering, we require load independent of the generation facility. … Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978) (abolishing sovereign immunity in a case that began with a complaint in trespass filed in Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction).

Seifrit v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

100 Pa. Commw. 226 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 2, 1986

That individual, who was qualified as an expert on drug identification, was open to and was in fact subjected to cross-examination with respect to his administration of the test. See Hearing Transcript at 8-9. … A case of constructive possession was thus clearly established.

Commonwealth v. Events International, Inc.

137 Pa. Commw. 271 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 17, 1991

While this rule clearly permits only one set of preliminary objections to any single complaint, it does not address the situation where a party has voluntarily elected to file an amended complaint. … It is established law that solicitation for charitable organizations is fully protected speech. Id.

Community Options, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review

764 A.2d 645 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 21, 2000

They do not, of themselves, establish eligibility for exemption. G.D.L. … Clearly, the fact that a charitable organization is able to prove its entitlement to an exemption as to one of its properties would not necessarily establish its right to exempt status for other properties.

Department of Labor & Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

2 A.3d 1292 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 11, 2010

The Board chose to rely on the only evidence of record that it believed established Claimant’s earnings with presumed accuracy. … As his base year earnings exceeded 1.5 times his highest quarterly wage, Claimant qualified for EUC benefits.

O'Toole v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.

196 A.3d 260 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 16, 2018

However, the Department’s policy changes are clearly internal processes, and there is nothing on the face of the Petition that, even if accepted as true, would establish that the Department violated its policy adoption process … Mandamus is not available to establish legal rights, but is appropriate only to enforce rights that have been established. Stodghill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 150 A.3d 547, 551 (Pa.

Forbes Road CTC v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

999 A.2d 627 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 27, 2010

In addition, Claimant argues that although this Court found use of a qualified NCD acceptable in Armstrong v. … Thus, Employer’s delayed payment was clearly a violation of the Act. Moreover, the WCJ did specifically designate the portion of the Act violated by Employer in paragraph 4 of his Conclusions of Law.

Slippery Rock State College v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission

11 Pa. Commw. 501 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 7, 1974

Nevertheless, complainant testified clearly and affirmatively that she would not say she planned to complete the requirements of the doctorate. … Nevertheless, establishment of such policy is the prerogative of the Board of State College and University Directors, the Board of Trustees of Slippery Rock State College, and its President.

In re Appeal of Irene's Cafe, Inc.

44 Pa. Commw. 20 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 3, 1979

The Board held that this evidence established that he was not a responsible person of good reputation. … As to the statutory provisions concerned, the legislature has clearly given the Board the power to promulgate regulations concerning the management of licensed premises.

Armstrong Communications, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

768 A.2d 1230 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 12, 2001

Moreover, the Commission’s interpretation of Section *1234 251(f)(1)(C) is reasonable, is not clearly erroneous, and therefore should be sustained. … Accordingly, Armstrong was not required to establish a localized need for competition in the service area, and a review of the record establishes that Armstrong is technically and financially fit to provide the sendee.

D.A. Taft and M. Taft, h/w v. S. Kuby

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 18, 2014

a waiver of immunity.” … “[S]ubstances such as ice, snow, or debris on the real estate do not qualify ‘unless those substances are there because of a design or construction defect.’” Nardella v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 34 A.3d 300, 305 (Pa.

Lehighton Area School District v. Carbon County Board of Assessment

708 A.2d 1297 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 26, 1998

That investment clearly supports and improves the operation of the Hospital, and advances its overall mission of delivering health services. … However, our Supreme Court declined to establish a “magical percentage” in HUP, preferring to analyze this issue on a case by case basis.