Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • M.A. Robinson v. Officer Fye

    192 A.3d 1225 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 17, 2018

    The New Matter asserted the defenses of lack of administrative exhaustion, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and qualified immunity. (Defendants’ Answer to Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-51.) … was prejudiced by common pleas’ decision to treat the Motion and the defenses raised therein as an amendment to Defendants’ New Matter, it is first worth noting that “[t]he decision to allow an amendment to a pleading is clearly

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Trenco, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp.

    126 Pa. Commw. 501 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 14, 1989

    However, we believe that appellant has established issues of material fact concerning DOT’s alleged negligent mainte *506 nance of the property adjacent to Route 11 and, therefore, has established a claim within Section 8255 … Clearly, in that scenario, as well as in the facts presently before the Court, the dangerous condition was of the land itself.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Patterson v. Lycoming County

    815 A.2d 659 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 31, 2002

    The Robinsons filed an answer and new matter alleging that at all relevant times they were employees of CYS and therefore immune because the complaint’s allegations do not fall within any of the exceptions to immunity as … R.A.P. 341(c) establishes the exclusive method by which to appeal an order that dismisses fewer than all of the defendants. . 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8564. .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Natt v. Labar

    117 Pa. Commw. 207 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 22, 1988

    We disagree as Labars actions were clearly outside the scope of his employment. … Consequently, the trial court committed no error in finding that Appellants foiled to show that any genuine issues of material fact exist to establish that Appellants’ injuries were caused by the negligence of the local agency

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Burkey v. Borough of Auburn

    100 Pa. Commw. 110 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 25, 1986

    The Court in Davies rejected this argument, stating: Clearly, in order for this section to be applicable to the case before us, there must be an allegation that the vehicle was operated by a school official. … While such allegations, if proven, may certainly establish unreasonable conduct on the part of a police officer toward a driver in Appellant’s condition, they nonetheless do not fall within the narrow exception to the general

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Thomas v. City of Philadelphia

    668 A.2d 292 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 13, 1995

    Initially, we note that summary judgment is only appropriate when, after examining the record, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant clearly establishes its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. … However, Administratrix has failed to establish that any negligence on the part of the City, if proven, falls within one of the exceptions to governmental immunity listed in section 8542(b) and, thus, cannot satisfy the second

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Smolsky v. Pennsylvania General Assembly

    34 A.3d 316 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 2, 2011

    Immunity Additionally, the General Assembly objects on the ground that Smolsky’s claims against the General Assembly are barred by legislative immunity. 7 We agree. … The affirmative defense, however, must be clearly applicable on the face of the complaint. Id. at 975-976 .

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Hill v. PORT AUTH. T. SYS., ALLEG. CTY.

    125 Pa. Commw. 69 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 11, 1989

    Further, it was intended to re-establish limited governmental immunity abrogated by Ayala v. … This Court finds that the Authority consistently maintained that it was not the primary obligor even subsequent to disclosure of information which clearly established Appellant's uninsured status and subsequent to this Court's

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Banfield v. Aichele

    51 A.3d 300 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 29, 2012

    Thus, if a DRE can provide the requisite permanent physical records when specifically requested, it qualifies as an EVS as defined by the Election Code. … Brau enclosed a check in the requisite statutory amount of $450, and provided the statutorily-required signatures of ten qualified electors.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Mistecka v. Commonwealth

    46 Pa. Commw. 267 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 1, 1979

    C.S. §5110, as to which the legislature has granted a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. We conclude that subsection (a)(5) of 42 Pa. … The situations described in these complaints are clearly not created by natural elements.

    Cited 37 timesPublished
  • Reber v. Commonwealth

    101 Pa. Commw. 397 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 21, 1986

    Reber established a cause of action in negligence against the LCB, if we accept the averments as true. To prevail, Mr. … Reber sustained does not clearly appear from the facts. What clearly appears from the facts is that reasonable minds could differ on the question of proximate cause.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Donnelly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

    708 A.2d 145 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 12, 1998

    See Ortiz (holding that routine construction work on a scaffold clearly involves no special danger or peculiar risk); Edwards v. … Exception to Sovereign Immunity Requirement Even if the Donnellys could maintain a cause of action against SEPTA at common law, they would still not prevail because they have failed to establish that any negligence on the

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania State College

    68 Pa. Commw. 287 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 10, 1982

    In any event, that dimension of state sovereign immunity clearly preexisted Section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act. … City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the United States Supreme Court stated that: Where the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at the time §1983 was encated, and where its rationale

    Reversed on other grounds by Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania State College & University Faculties, 504 Pa. 92 (1983)Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Township of Bensalem v. Press

    93 Pa. Commw. 235 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 27, 1985

    It is to be noted that in Pennsylvania, this “waiver” of immunity arose not. from a statute enacted by the legislature, but from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s eradication of a doctrine which it had previously established … S. §704(a). ’ - ■ Appellants do not clearly explain whether they believe Horowitz is entitled to absolute immunity (reserved for high public officials) or a limited immunity which is available to other officials.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • E.P. Schmidt as the Administratrix of the Estate of G.J. Schmidt v. PA DOT; ~ Appeal of: DOT

    Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 11, 2024

    Clearly, the exception to the Commonwealth’s immunity is not coterminous with PennDOT’s rights and responsibilities. … adequately established that the tree was a dangerous condition “of” the Commonwealth realty.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Bendas

    131 Pa. Commw. 488 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 6, 1990

    Thus, the majority holds that an abuse of this authority is tantamount to a breach of duty under the Judicial Code’s highway exception to sovereign immunity. … A dangerous condition of highways under the jurisdiction of a *495 Commonwealth agency created by potholes or sinkholes or other similar conditions created by natural elements, except that the claimant to recover must establish

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Miller v. Commonwealth

    133 Pa. Commw. 327 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 9, 1990

    of juris *331 diction was clearly erroneous, Akron Borough v. … Sovereign immunity, established under Art. 1, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and statutorily instituted by the General Assembly, 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310, has been waived only in those instances enumerated under the provisions

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Thomas v. City of Philadelphia

    133 Pa. Commw. 121 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 11, 1990

    WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY Section 21-701. Police Officers. … However, Middleton is clearly distinguishable from the instant case in that the injured party was in police custody. He had collapsed on a sidewalk, was approached by police officers and was accused of being drunk.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth

    146 Pa. Commw. 114 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 2, 1992

    DER is clearly an “agency of state government” and, under the terms of the act, a “person” who can be sued. 3 *123 DER also makes with some force the argument that immunity must be specifically waived by the legislature. … We certainly recognize this established principle, but such waiver is not confined to the specific words “immunity is waived” and certainly includes words which permit a cause of action against a person, as does Section 601

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Clark v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

    962 A.2d 692 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 8, 2008

    To hold the Commonwealth party liable, the plaintiff also must establish that the cause of action falls under one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity contained in section 8522(b), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b). … The Clarks argue that DOT’s negligent actions clearly are encompassed within this exception to sovereign immunity. In support of this position, the Clarks rely on the testimony of Karl Miller. Mr.

    Cited 4 timesPublished

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