Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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D.N. Hommrich v. Com. of PA, PA PUC
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 12, 2020
“Clearly[,] the legislature 8 would not authorize agencies to adopt binding regulations inconsistent with the applicable enabling statutes.” Slippery Rock, 983 A.2d at 1241. … The PUC established rules for operation for large customer-generators. 52 Pa. Code §75.16(a).
Cited 0 timesPublished844 A.2d 29 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 14, 2004
Here, the Association could certainly have joined in the original action and it clearly had a stake in protecting the reforms it had sought. … of the City, by district.” 3:02: "Only qualified voters domiciled in their respective districts shall be eligible to hold office of Council Member.” 3:03: "Five (5) Council Members shall be elected under this Charter as
Cited 13 timesPublishedCity of Phila. Fire Dep't v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.
144 A.3d 1011 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 12, 2016
fair-skinned Caucasians and states that “[i]ntermittent exposure to UVR [ultraviolet radiation] is the major environmental risk factor for melanoma, especially in combination with endogenous factors (skin types I and II, immune … Also, the testimony must be given by “a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education….” Id. 12 presumption.
Reversed by City of Phila. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 195 A.3d 197 (2018)Cited 22 timesPublished47 Pa. Commw. 43 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 29, 1979
Impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 4. … Only such a new principle of law may qualify for nonretrospective application. (Footnote omitted.) 473 Pa. at 622, 375 A.2d at 1289.
Cited 28 timesPublished124 Pa. Commw. 535 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 31, 1989
In order to qualify for AFDC benefits, applicants must also meet certain standards of financial need, defined *537 by their income and resources. 42 U.S.C. §602 (a). … The federal regulations clearly require the consideration of the son’s income to be available to the needy family.
Cited 1 timesPublishedBellew v. PA. ST. CIV. SERV. COMM.
117 Pa. Commw. 447 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 5, 1988
On her Appeal Request Form, in response to directions that she state specifically the acts of discrimination, Appellant alleged only that she believed that her present classification clearly met the requirements of the next … Section 3(e) of that Directive defines "next lower position" as a position in: (1) the next lower class in the same class series; or (2) a lower level class for which the appointing authority can establish a logical occupational
Cited 0 timesPublished874 A.2d 164 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 12, 2005
Like the MCTLA, the RETSL establishes that all taxes levied on property by a taxing district are considered a first lien on. the property. Section 301 of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 5860.301. … Our scope of review in tax sale cases is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, rendered a decision which lacked supporting evidence or clearly erred as a matter of law. Bell v.
Cited 20 timesPublishedBellosi Et Ux. v. Zhb, Clifton Hb
96 Pa. Commw. 83 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 21, 1986
. *85 Applicant owns and operates a grocery store which qualified as a valid non-conforming use in an R-2 Residential District by virtue of an order of the trial court dated April 25, 1979. 1 Applicant has now applied for … Id., slip op. at 7. *90 We are of the opinion that the record clearly establishes that the proposed expansion is for the purpose of enabling Applicant to take advantáge of his increased business rather than a matter of business
Cited 9 timesPublishedStanton-Negley Drug Co. v. Department of Public Welfare
943 A.2d 377 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 28, 2008
Such opinion, by itself, clearly is insufficient evidence to support Stanton-Negley’s claim. … This list of prohibited activities clearly is directed at “persons” submitting bids in response to a government contract, not the contracting governmental agency.
Cited 11 timesPublishedAndresky v. West Allegheny School District
63 Pa. Commw. 222 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 16, 1981
Clearly, the seven professional employees here have a legitimate claim to continued employment secured by state statute. … The record clearly shows, however, that over a five-year period the School District’s enrollment declined from 3,443 to 3,064 students.
Cited 17 timesPublishedIn Re Nomination Paper of Rogers
914 A.2d 457 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 9, 2007
in order to be a qualified elector. … The existence of a voter identification number, without more, is insufficient to establish rehabilitation. 12 .
Cited 4 timesPublishedBabac v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board
136 Pa. Commw. 621 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 14, 1990
In repealing the “Open Meeting Law” and passing the Sunshine Act, which became effective on January 3, 1987, the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended to establish that the “public has a right to watch and examine the process … This type of telephonic communication clearly cannot replace actual attendance at the Board meeting without specific legislative authorization, nor can it qualify as a “quorum” of members as required under the Sunshine Act
Reversed on other grounds by Babac v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board, 531 Pa. 391 (1992)Cited 7 timesPublishedPittsburgh Action Against Rape v. Department of Public Welfare
120 A.3d 1078 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 14, 2015
Clearly, the legislature considered this potential result when it enacted section 6381 of the CPSL and its accompanying rules of evidence. … Conclusion For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the ALJ’s order qualifies as an appealable collateral order, and further, that the legislature clearly stated that the purpose in the CPSL is to “encourage more complete
Cited 6 timesPublishedCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 23, 2020
Where the statute is ambiguous, the interpretation of the agency charged with its enforcement will be given deference, unless it is clearly erroneous. Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192 (Pa. … By construing that silence as a prohibition on movement out of the Expired Zone into the Active Zone, DCED disregarded established principles of statutory construction and exceeded its authority. See Harmon v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedG. Fox v. SCI Green and Warden of SCI Green, L. Folino
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 22, 2018
Such a construction leads us to conclude that an ear does not qualify as “personal property” for the purposes of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(3). … Fox’s claim clearly stems from a condition which, if true, could be dangerous. Such a dangerous condition, however, is beyond the scope of what the exception provides.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedGuthrie v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
854 A.2d 653 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 21, 2004
Yu did not testify at the hearing but his presence was immaterial if his statements qualify under the exception. But in any event, since Claimant admitted she did not hear *661 what Mr. … In each of these cases, an employee/employer relationship was clearly established by the claimant and the issue addressed was whether the injury occurred during the scope and course of his/her employment. 15 .
Cited 21 timesPublishedWright v. Com., Dept. of Transp.
142 Pa. Commw. 91 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 20, 1991
The Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) dismissed the Township’s motion for summary judgment finding that the Township had a duty to act and that the Township was not provided immunity pursuant to the … A review of ^right’s testimony clearly indicates that she did not see anything. There was nothing for her to rebut and the trial court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm.
Cited 8 timesPublishedGlasgow, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
851 A.2d 1014 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 4, 2004
The Department recognized Glasgow as the apparent lowest qualified bidder following the completion and submission of bids by Glasgow and its competitors. … Clearly, the Department’s rejection of Glasgow for the sole reason of its mistake in operating the computer screen “emasculated” the competitive bidding process that had already proceeded.
Cited 9 timesPublishedJohnson v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
982 A.2d 1253 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 15, 2009
Prebola is not qualified to perform a pulmonary evaluation.” Employer filed a timely answer. … Prebola was not qualified to conduct the IRE because he is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation and is not a pulmonologist.
Cited 17 timesPublishedARIPPA v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
966 A.2d 1204 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 3, 2009
An "alternative energy credit" is a tradable instrument "used to establish, verify and monitor compliance with the act." Section 2 of AEPS, 73 P.S. § 1648.2. … (ii) To submit reports to the commission at such times and in such manner as the commission shall direct. (3) All qualifying alternative energy systems must include a qualifying meter to record the cumulative electric production
Cited 7 timesPublished
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