Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
4,219 results
2.11s
365 Pa. 232 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 26, 1950
Mowry, was named and qualified as executor. … If, as the lower court stated, the parties intended a payment of $27,000 “at the rate of $150.00 per month for a period of 15 years,” that purpose could have been completely and clearly accomplished by omitting the words
Cited 37 timesPublishedYoworsky v. CHARLES STORES CO. INC.
404 Pa. 643 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 17, 1961
After this testimony was given, that portion thereof concerning the x-rays was stricken from the record for failure to call as a witness the roentgenologist, who had taken the x-rays and was the person qualified to read and … We cannot say that the lower court clearly abused its discretion herein. Order affirmed. Mr. Justice Benjamin B.
Cited 2 timesPublishedLancaster School District v. Lancaster County
295 Pa. 112 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 3, 1928
These provisions clearly have reference to acquisition of property by the school district subsequent to the enactment of the statute of 1850. … The condition of reverter in the deed *120 is definite and the words connect the condition with the grant, qualifying and restraining the use of the premises for a definite time and a sole purpose: Cook v.
Declined to follow by People of Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 F.2d 220 (1942)Cited 7 timesPublishedCommonwealth, Aplt v. Williams, T.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 15, 2014
However, Bagley supports neither appellant’s “defense effects” root rule, nor his testimonial immunity extension of the rule. … Supreme Court would adopt a Brady materiality extension L which would immunize a defendant against the effects of his own trial testimony, much less his own false trial testimony.
Cited 0 timesPublished612 Pa. 183 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 19, 2011
Finally, it held that any attempted impeachment of Wiley with an immunity agreement would have been precluded because Wiley never received immunity from the Commonwealth. … It asserts that the stipulation clearly established that the hats had, in fact, been analyzed, but that no DNA evidence could be recovered.
Cited 361 timesPublishedTosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency
460 Pa. 1 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 27, 1975
Courts may not declare a statute unconstitutional “unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271 , 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963). … VIII, and irrevocably grants special privileges and immunities in violation of Pa.Const. art. I, § 17. However, he has abandoned these contentions in his brief and therefore we do not address them.
Cited 101 timesPublishedPhœnix Iron Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Sellers
113 Pa. 563 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 4, 1886
In mandamus, the relator must in all cases establish a specific legal right, as well a.s the want of a specific legal remedy ; Comm’th v. Rossiter, 2 Binn., 362 . … Of course a stockholder is bound by the corporate articles, where the right of inspection of the corporate books and papers is qualified by express stipulation; those who become members are subject to the qualification.
Cited 15 timesPublished516 Pa. 587 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 2, 1987
Stolker’s, was prohibited by virtue of our spousal immunity statute, which makes a wife incompetent to testify against her husband in any civil matter. 3 Since the maintenance of the statute of frauds, as a rule of property … But the record clearly showed that their divorce decree was not final at the time since they both had appealed the decree to the Superior Court and it was pending at the time of trial in this case.
Cited 24 timesPublishedJuker v. Commonwealth ex rel. Fisher
20 Pa. 484 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 13, 1853
They meant rather that the trustees should represent the worshippers belonging to Trinity Church — those who had established themselves there, and had proved by deeds their intention to maintain and support the church, and … A religious corporation is a society; its charter its constitution; and its privileges are dependent on whatever conditions are clearly expressed.
Cited 1 timesPublishedYoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
385 Pa. 520 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 25, 1956
The right of flight in navigable unused air space is now as constitutionally established as the right to walk through the public square. … And if he did not know of the existence of the line, clearly he should not have flown in that area at that height without knowing the terrain.”
Cited 45 timesPublishedWalker v. General Motors Corp.
383 Pa. Super. 400 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 10, 1989
While a police officer may be properly qualified as an expert where the foundation for the presentation of such expertise is laid, Lesher v. … Clearly where evidence is inadmissible directly from its source, it is no less inadmissible indirectly through another.
Cited 6 timesPublishedCommonwealth, Aplt v. Williams, T.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 15, 2014
However, Bagley supports neither appellant’s “defense effects” root rule, nor his testimonial immunity extension of the rule. … Supreme Court would adopt a Brady materiality extension L which would immunize a defendant against the effects of his own trial testimony, much less his own false trial testimony.
Cited 0 timesPublishedPA Enviro Defense Fdn, Aplt. v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 5, 2022
All members of the Court agree that at least some of these activities would qualify as trust activity. … I express no view on which set of activities would qualify as trust purposes and which would not.
Cited 0 timesPublishedLira v. Albert Einstein Medical Center
384 Pa. Super. 503 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 25, 1989
The standard by which an expert witness is qualified is a liberal one. … Here, the evidence failed to establish that the declaration of Dr.
Cited 48 timesPublished252 Pa. 340 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 14, 1916
The charge itself, as a whole, clearly shows that Keller-Pike Company was treated as responsible for any delay caused by its subcontractors. … In our cases, cited by the appellants, the objectionable word is qualified by other words Avhich clearly required a higher degree of proof than in similar cases.
Cited 2 timesPublished442 Pa. 118 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 18, 1971
In Zenner , the Court said, inter alia, 324 Pa. at 437 , 188 Atl. at 126 : “Where a presumption in favor of a plaintiff must be overcome by a defendant if the issue is not to go against the latter, the rule has been established … Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486 , 208 A. 2d 193 (1965), discarding the immunity from liability in tort previously enjoyed by public hospitals.
Cited 24 timesPublishedCom., Dept. of Public Wel. v. Uec, Inc.
483 Pa. 503 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 24, 1979
The grounds generally advanced for this reluctance bear striking similarity to those offered in support of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.; K. C. Davis, Administrative Law § 17.01 (1959). … Clearly the Code provision was not intended to burden the Department of Justice with every conflict arising between an agency of the Commonwealth and one of its citizens.
Cited 64 timesPublished234 Pa. 347 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 2, 1912
The necessity for classification of the counties of the state, with respect to the courts, is clearly recognized in the constitution. … Reeder, J., said (p. 193) : “The act is also clearly constitutional.
Cited 53 timesPublished545 Pa. 420 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 29, 1996
Yet, Pomponi was clearly premised on the Fifth Amendment, and did not reference the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pomponi 447 Pa. at 162 , 284 A.2d at 712 . … The view that the reasoning of D’Elia applies only to cases involving the granting of immunity to witnesses before the Crime Commission was confirmed in this court’s unanimous decision in Commonwealth v.
Declined to follow by Commonwealth v. Rosen, 615 Pa. 305 (2012)Cited 32 timesPublishedAAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance v. Ryan
624 Pa. 93 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 21, 2014
Noting that, once an insured has been fully compensated for her damages, she is not “legally entitled” to recover more, the trial court concluded AAA acted in a manner consistent with the Ryans’ qualified statutory right … Consequently, neither paragraph B nor paragraph D comport with the well-established public policy underlying section 1722 of the MVFRL, as well as sections 1702 and 1731(c).
Cited 28 timesPublished
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