Case law

Minner v. Pittsburgh

363 Pa. 199 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 30, 1949

Page if the plaintiff at the time was qualified ‘for an industrial job around machinery.’ This was entirely irrelevant to the issue. … A careful study of this record nevertheless convinces us that the verdict of $30,855.85 is clearly excessive.

Gallagher v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board

584 Pa. 362 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 28, 2005

World Transportation and Appellant each asserted that it was Appellee’s employer, and therefore, was immune from civil suit in the courts of law under the employer-immunity provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation … Clearly, it was immediately rephrased and it was in no way altering the facts of this case. And to address the issue of a [mistrial] is really, I think, not appropriate at this juncture.

Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry

162 A.3d 384 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 20, 2017

[J-8-2017] - 5 "Haubrich's employment, having terminated one week prior to her request, clearly qualifies as 'presently elapsed' employment and/or 'most recent' employment, thereby, falling within the statute." … terminated one week prior to her request, clearly qualifies as "presently elapsed') (emphasis added).

Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co.

335 Pa. Super. 141 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 9, 1984

The right of privacy is a qualified right to be let alone; but to be actionable, the alleged invasion of that right must be unlawful or unjustifiable. Lynch v. Johnston, 76 Pa.Commw. 8, 463 A.2d 87 (1983). … The form and tone of the article clearly implied that the facts were true.

In re Anonymous No. 42 D.B. 87

5 Pa. D. & C.4th 613 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 27, 1987

cooperation and testimony, respondent’s law practice was severely affected and he found himself in financial difficulties once again. (20) Since the date of his testimony in the federal court criminal matter, respondent has re-established … While the committee clearly views respondent’s conduct during the period 1977 through 1983 as illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and certainly conduct adversely reflecting upon a lawyer’s fitness to practice law, the

Rosenwald v. Barbieri

501 Pa. 563 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 5, 1983

That being so, we find that the Plaintiff has not established a right to representation. … These provisions allow suits against the Commonwealth without the bar of the sovereign immunity in certain enumerated situations, 42 P.C.S.A. § 8522(b).

In Re: Return of Seized Property of Lackawanna Cty

212 A.3d 1 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 17, 2019

As our recent jurisprudence firmly establishes, an investigating grand jury has no authority other than that conferred by the Act. … process for obtaining immunity order and compelling testimony via contempt procedures).

Herring v. H. W. Walker Co.

409 Pa. 126 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 13, 1962

Herring Motor Company, in Somerset, is engaged in the automobile sales and service business, his premises adjoining the establishment of the H. W. … He was well qualified as an expert witness.

Tatrai v. Presbyterian University Hospital

497 Pa. 247 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 29, 1982

The facts here are clearly distinguishable from those presented in Griffin v. Acme Coal Co., 161 Pa.Super.Ct. 28 , 54 A.2d 69 (1947). … This *254 provision, however, is qualified by the requirement that the employee’s presence at the time of the injury was due to the nature of the employer’s business.

Commonwealth v. Loesch

153 Pa. 502 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 20, 1893

The point asserted that the uncontradicted evidence established certain facts, viz.: that the defendant was a member of the Germania Turnverein ; that this society was organized in good faith and for certain lawful purposes … This instruction is clearly right.

Bailey v. Zoning Board of Adjustment

569 Pa. 147 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 17, 2002

Applying its Minor Modification Policy, the Planning Commission reviewed the changes and determined that they did not qualify as minor modifications. … As demonstrated in the instant case, proposed changes may qualify as minor modifications under the five criteria established by the Planning Commission even though they increase or decrease the number of structures, transform

Curran's Estate

310 Pa. 434 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 6, 1933

Had testator intended to endow a mission school, this appellant would clearly satisfy the requirements of the will. … The Presbyterian background (which testator clearly desired) is more apparent than real.

A.M.D. v. A.L.R, Aplts.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 18, 2023

[J-27-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 10 Court considered the cost of litigation in an immunity claim, but also recognized that the “interests sovereign immunity protects are not entirely pecuniary.” 34 Here, the parents … The claim here is not akin to the claims of privilege or immunity that have justified collateral order appeals.

Commonwealth, Office of Administration v. Orage

511 Pa. 528 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 25, 1986

In establishing such standards, the Executive Board “may ... [establish different standards for different kinds, grades and classes of similar work or service.” 71 P.S. § 249(a)(2). … This is evident upon comparison of the instant provision with other provisions of the Civil Service Act which clearly create enforceable rights in employees.

Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers v. School District

506 Pa. 196 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 20, 1984

The school districts are clearly within their delegated authority in entering employment contracts with their teachers. See 24 P.S. §§ 2-211, 11-1106, 11-1121. … PSERS, in assessing the increased contributions was merely following the law as established by Act 31.

In re Goldwyn Distributing Corp.

265 Pa. 335 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 21, 1919

We think that it clearly appears in the opinion of the court that the effect of the introduction of this evidence was to raise a false issue and lead the mind away from the one issue which was, as we have stated, did the … Whatever may have been the decline, if any, in the public observance of established moral standards, we are not yet prepared to accept any such conclusion.

Raymond v. Middleton & Co.

29 Pa. 529 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 1, 1858

Although the object of the statute is not to restrict the negotiability of the instrument, but to enlarge it, this is done only for the special purpose of enabling the bank which discounts the note, to do it with immunity … The endorsement of a negotiable note, however, is both a qualified guaranty of payment, and a transfer of title.

Commonwealth v. O'Hayer

345 Pa. Super. 73 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 23, 1985

operate a clinical laboratory; 2) whether the person who conducted the blood test met the requirements of the Department of Health; and 3) whether the testing equipment was approved by the Department of Health. 1 It is clearly … (b) If any individual has been determined, under the program established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to be qualified to perform the duties and functions of any health care specialty, no person or provider

Warwick Board of School Directors v. Theros

494 Pa. 108 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 13, 1981

That case is clearly distinguishable. … It is only when a board has clearly established that the reduction conforms with the mandates of Section 1106 of the Code and the Constitutional provisions herein referred to, and that the suspension is made in accordance

Triffin v. Interstate Printing Co., Inc.

357 Pa. Super. 240 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 29, 1986

We find that rather than establishing the Bank’s duty to pay the funds in Interstate’s accounts only to Interstate, Georgia-Pacific supports precisely the opposite conclusion. … Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the accounts are not immune from attachment in execution because of the Bankruptcy Court’s order.