Case law

Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

454 Pa. 32 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 19, 1973

Appellants make three contentions: the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania is judicially, and not constitutionally established; Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania constitutes a waiver of … In light of our holding that Article I, Section 11 establishes sovereign immunity, appellants' contention that that section tvaives such immunity is obviously without merit. Order affirmed.

John Doe v. Franklin Co. Sheriff's Office, Aplt.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 22, 2017

Further, “absent statutory classification, the parameters establishing ‘high public official’ status would be delineated by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis, rather than establishing a bright-line rule.” … First, appellees’ argument that the doctrine of immunity generally has been completely abolished was clearly and unquestionably rejected by this Court and the General Assembly.

Winig, J., Aplt. v. Office of DA of Phila.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 19, 2025

Title I, Section 2310 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes further establishes that only the General Assembly can waive “the immunity,” i.e., sovereign or official immunity. … The only affirmative defense clearly and expressly barred under Section 5725 is found in subsection (b), which clearly and expressly waives the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity for those entitled to assert it.

Winig, J., Aplt. v. Office of DA of Phila.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 19, 2025

Therefore, as the Majority acknowledges, prosecutors “qualify as ‘person[s]’ under the Wiretap Act, both as individuals as well as employees of Philadelphia, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania[] … First, the current codification of high prosecutorial immunity was not in effect when the Wiretap Act was passed. Second, the legislature clearly intended to waive all forms of sovereign immunity existing at the time.

Williams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.

337 Pa. 17 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 29, 1939

The Superior Court, however, found that defendant had not established the defeasible immunity, holding that such a defence was an affirmative one consisting of several elements, one of which (probable cause) defendant had … In view of the established law as outlined above, an analysis of the facts of the instant case clearly shows that there was no defeasible immunity involved here.

Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Hunte, L.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 17, 2025

Brobson cogently explains, nothing in the statute “forecloses a situation where either law enforcement obtains a warrant before directing emergency room personnel to withdraw a person’s blood or the Commonwealth later establishes … Through Section 3755(b) our General Assembly has clearly expressed its intent that medical personnel complying with requests from law enforcement to draw blood from suspected intoxicated drivers should enjoy immunity from

Ferri v. Rossetti

483 Pa. 327 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 24, 1979

Pachtman, supra 4 Appellant here is urging in essence that assigned defense counsel’s immunity should not be absolute but rather qualified. … Pachtman, supra, did not unequivocally rule out the possibility of the functioned approach with regard to the prosecutor’s immunity under section 1983 actions, it did *332 clearly indicate that the immunity was an absolute

In Re: Amendments to Rule 1905 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 1, 2023

There is hereby established the Investment Advisory Board (‘‘Board’’), which shall consist of [eight] nine voting members. … (f) Immunity.

In Re Investigating Grand Jury

527 Pa. 432 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 25, 1991

Clearly, the Commonwealth hoped to do so by the grant of immunity to Employee B. It is premature, however, on the strength of this record. … If the Commonwealth is able to establish to the court’s satisfaction that the grant of immunity is necessary,- then the immunity order shall be issued. *445 The petition for immunity described the December 8, 1988 statement

Commonwealth v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp.

432 Pa. 584 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 27, 1968

It is clearly not a corporation, 3 and Public Utility Code §1102(16) defines “person” as “individuals, partnerships, or associations other than corporations. . . .” … Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 407 Pa. 609, 617-18, 620 , 182 A. 2d 199, 204-05 (1962), to give the Turnpike Commission the same basic sovereign immunity protection as that enjoyed by the Commonwealth itself.

Riccobene Appeal

439 Pa. 404 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 13, 1970

By its terms, the Pennsylvania Immunity Act is clearly a grant of “transactional” immunity identical to—and indeed broader than—that upheld in Brown and Ullmann, supra. … Even though appellant is not Constitutionally entitled to immunity from civil liability, we believe that Pennsylvania’s aforesaid Act clearly grants immunity from civil liability. C.

Dume v. Elkcom Co., Inc.

368 Pa. Super. 280 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 23, 1987

Here, Judge Hoffman rejected Westinghouse’s assertion of immunity: We hold that Westinghouse is not a statutory employer because it has failed to establish that it was, in fact, obligated by contract to perform the activity … The trial court correctly deduced that appellee construction company fell squarely within the five requirements enunciated in McDonald to qualify as appellant’s statutory employer.

Wunderly, K., Aplt v. Saint Luke's Hosp.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 23, 2025

Luke’s conduct in this case qualifies as treatment, St. Luke’s may not be held liable under the Immunity Provision of the MHPA absent willful misconduct or gross negligence. … Luke’s actions in this case qualify as treatment under the MHPA. Because Appellant failed to demonstrate gross negligence or willful indifference, St. Luke’s is immune from suit.

Pennsylvania State University v. Derry Township School District

557 Pa. 91 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 22, 1999

The immunity from tax extends to property owned by agencies of the Commonwealth. Id. In Pennsylvania State University v. … Inasmuch as HMC does not qualify for tax-free status as property owned by an agency of the Commonwealth, a remand to the court of common pleas is necessary for a determination of whether HMC qualifies for exemption on an

Kiker v. Philadelphia

346 Pa. 624 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 28, 1943

Although plaintiff’s salary was at that time immune from this levy, when the immunity was removed by Public Act No. 819, which receded to Philadelphia jurisdiction to impose taxes on League Island, the ordinance became applicable … As is clearly shown by the Act of February 2, 1854 6 (incorporating the City) and the statutes granting consent to its purchase and ceding jurisdiction over League Island, as well as the Federal government’s Certificate of

Farago v. Sacred Heart General Hospital

365 Pa. Super. 1 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 23, 1987

Farago claims that she was raped; however, this has never been established. … Additionally, as a collateral matter to this issue of immunity, appellants argue that the lack of restraint upon Mrs. Farago was not a treatment decision which could be accorded immunity.

Mullin v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP.

582 Pa. 127 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 29, 2005

Although there are factual disputes underlying this matter, our plenary review involves the purely legal question of whether PennDOT, in this instance, qualifies for Commonwealth agency protection under sovereign immunity … However, in order for the Commonwealth to be found liable, a party must also establish that the cause of action falls under one of nine specifically enumerated exceptions to immunity. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b).

Commonwealth v. Marshall

523 Pa. 556 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 22, 1989

Appellant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because his case was decided by a death qualified jury. This argument has consistently been rejected, as it must be now. Commonwealth v. … In effect, Appellant argues that the grant of immunity provided the motive for the Marshalls’ testimony.

In Re: Pennsylvania Continuing Judicial Education

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 9, 2016

Continuing Judicial Education Board of Judges (a) Establishment. The Supreme Court hereby establishes the Continuing Judicial Education Board of Judges. (b) Purpose. … (h) Immunity.

Commonwealth v. Baker

352 Pa. Super. 260 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 14, 1986

Sweitzer, 261 Pa.Super. 183, 191 , 395 A.2d 1376, 1380-81 (1978), this court explained that ... a PCHA petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for postconviction relief____ In particular, the burden of establishing … This statement of reasons clearly demonstrates that the court considered factors specified in the sentencing code.