Case law

Commonwealth v. Vogel

501 Pa. 314 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 27, 1983

Justice Pomeroy also clearly indicates that his joinder in the order of reversal was as a result of his concern for the proper effect to be given to the “presumption of sanity.” Commonwealth v. … It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction. U.S. v.

Short v. Allegheny Trust Co.

330 Pa. 55 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 24, 1938

Such cross-examination “may embrace any matter germane to the direct examination, qualifying or destroying it, or tending to develop facts which have been improperly suppressed or ignored by the plaintiff”: Conley v. … Integrity Trust Co., 317 Pa. 513, 517 . *62 Plaintiff’s final contention is that the charge was inadequate and did not clearly present the issues to the jury.

London v. Kingsley

368 Pa. 109 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 27, 1951

Justice Bell, Plaintiffs, heirs of Isaac London, brought an action of ejectment to establish their title to 132 acres of coal lands in Lackawanna County. Defendant is the heir of Burr Kenyon. … The bill was dismissed because a bill for an account cannot be maintained by one who claims to be a tenant in common but who is out of possession and has not established his title at law.

St. Elizabeth's Child Care Center v. Deparment of Public Welfare

600 Pa. 131 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 19, 2009

Elizabeth’s, as a private child day care provider, qualifies as a children’s institution subject to DPW’s supervisory power. … DPW’s interpretation of its enabling statute is not clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Michaux

360 Pa. Super. 452 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 12, 1987

His testimony was clearly sufficient to establish his qualifications as an expert dog handler. … We hold, therefore, that the training and reliability of the dog in question were satisfactorily established.

Bloom v. Selfon

366 Pa. Super. 283 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 11, 1988

Should my said husband fail to qualify or cease to act as such, then I appoint the said Stanley Selfon to act in this capacity. … The provision clearly disqualifies the ex-husband from receiving the estate.

Commonwealth v. Jones

590 Pa. 202 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 29, 2006

The instructions clearly permitted the jury to reach these conclusions, but nothing in the language used demanded or in any other way required the jury to make this finding. … There is no clearly defined limit as to the time sequence required for a statement to qualify as an excited utterance; instead, a fact-specific inquiry is made for each case to determine whether the utterance and the event

Commonwealth v. Marinelli

570 Pa. 622 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 25, 2002

Mihalakis should not have been qualified as an expert; rather, he posits that Dr. … Marinelli’s case in 1995, was that if the Commonwealth establishes an aggravating factor and the defense fails to establish mitigating factors, that the actual sentencing instruction says the sentence shall be death?

Haldeman v. Hillegass, Chm.

335 Pa. 375 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 10, 1939

This was clearly stated in Retirement Board v. McGovern et al., 316 Pa. 161 , at page 172, and McBride v. Allegheny County Retirement Board et al., 330 Pa. 402 , at page 405 (note). … To summarize, appellant clearly fulfills all of the requirements that have been invoked.

Southard v. Temple University Hospital

566 Pa. 335 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 26, 2001

Furthermore, summary-judgment may be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. … The Superior Court reasoned that the FDA’s Class III classification constitutes a conclusion by the FDA that the screws have at least unknown characteristics, which are clearly “risks”.

Commonwealth v. Groff

378 Pa. Super. 353 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 20, 1988

We note that the Commonwealth would clearly prevail if appellant had been convicted of repeatedly abusing the victim during the summer of 1985. … The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that the statute of limitations applies to any criminal offense and [to] the civil suits and things of that sort.

Commonwealth v. Raymond

412 Pa. 194 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 9, 1963

All of the ingredients of murder in the first degree were established beyond a reasonable doubt. … If any prejudicial facts or inferences were brought to light, it was clearly accomplished only in defense counsel’s vigorous cross-examination.

In Re Fiori

543 Pa. 592 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 2, 1996

In that context, the standard refers to that quantum of evidence necessary for a party to establish a point. … As we hold that no legal proceedings are necessary in cases such as Fiori's, then clearly there would be no need for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

Commonwealth v. Carsia

512 Pa. 509 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 20, 1986

Article 4, section 4.1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in part here pertinent, as follows: An Attorney General shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the Commonwealth ...; he shall be the chief law officer … In our view, the use of the language “as may be imposed” clearly shows an extension of power to the legislature to statutorily define and regulate the powers and duties of the Attorney General.

Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Township

600 Pa. 231 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 19, 2009

but, *239 they argue, an ordinance, such as the one under review, that specifically targets the oil and gas industry, incorporates by reference the provisions of the Act, and “overlap[s] the Act at nearly every turn,” is clearly … Here, the concept of a "feature of” oil and gas well operations is statutorily limited only by the qualifier, “regulated by this Act.” 58 P.S. § 601.602.

Hreha v. Benscoter

381 Pa. Super. 556 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 24, 1989

That an expert may, at some point during his testimony, qualify his assertion does not necessarily render his opinion inadmissibly speculative. Woods v. … The evidence, therefore, was clearly hearsay. A business record, of course, is recognized as an exception to the hearsay exclusion.

In Re Estate of Pitone

489 Pa. 60 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 20, 1980

Clearly, the legislature did not intend by this legislation that under no circumstances would a personal representative ever have a duty to invest estate funds. … To require a new executor to qualify and administer the estate might cause additional delay and expense.

Gillins v. UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REVIEW

534 Pa. 590 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 12, 1993

Clearly, the Postal Service did not provide the requisite evidence to meet its burden of proof that claimant is unemployed through fault of his own. … Gibbs was discharged for a violation of Pennsylvania Power’s rule prohibiting arrests for off-the-job drug activity, which arguably qualified as conduct not connected with work.

Cragin's Estate

274 Pa. 1 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 20, 1922

Generally speaking, a delivery is complete when a deed is acknowledged before a proper officer as being signed, sealed and delivered without an act, expression or writing indicating an intention to qualify this formal act … But this acknowledgment, with the physical possession of the deed in the grantee, does not conclusively establish an intention to deliver; the prima facie case, — or the presumption arising from recording, or signing, sealing

Commonwealth v. Williams

383 Pa. Super. 458 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 14, 1989

According to this interpretation, the words "for the use and benefit of the prisoners or inmates" were not intended by the legislature to establish an element of the offense. … It is noteworthy that the language does not qualify the language "brings into" with intent to transfer to an inmate.