Case law

Cagey, J., Aplt. v. PennDOT

179 A.3d 458 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 21, 2018

On appeal, the Cageys argue that Dean is inapplicable to the facts of this case because Dean establishes only that the Commonwealth's failure to install a guardrail does not give rise to a waiver of sovereign immunity under … Lewis, 523 Pa. 30 , 565 A.2d 122 , 126 (1988), the Cageys contend that the General Assembly clearly intended PennDOT to be liable in the case at bar. Cageys' Brief at 16-17.

Simmons v. St. Clair Memorial Hospital

332 Pa. Super. 444 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 17, 1984

Clair Hospital should be granted immunity for ordinary negligence. We will address appellant’s contentions seriatim. I. … The immunity issue in this case is potentially moot and we decline to consider that issue at this time. Id.

Commonwealth v. Brady

470 Pa. 420 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 28, 1977

Thus, reference to the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 to interpret the previously enacted Immunity Act would clearly be improper. … The order to testify shall not be given except upon the order of court after a hearing in which the attorney general has established a need for the grant of immunity, as hereinafter provided.

Shaler Area School District v. Salakas

494 Pa. 630 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 2, 1981

. 11 In his brief, appellant argues that his property rights have been affected in that the unsatisfactory rating: (1) threatens his right to continued employment in his current tenured position; 12 (2) divests him of a qualifying … The entry of a peremptory judgment in this instance was clearly erroneous, since the ultimate question of whether any of appellant’s personal or property rights were affected involves factual as well as legal issues.

Walsh v. City of Philadelphia

526 Pa. 227 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 9, 1991

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that he is presently “unable to do or perform a bodily act which he was able to do or perform prior to the injury.” … Plaintiff has established sufficient facts to merit an award for pain and suffering under the statute.

Balentine v. Aplt. v. Chester Water Auth

191 A.3d 799 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 21, 2018

Judge Friedman maintained that the majority erred by distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary movement of a vehicle because "the statute does not qualify the word 'operation.' " Id. at 77 . … Balentine has pled facts sufficient to establish a prima facie cause of action in negligence based on acts that constitute the operation of a vehicle.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

507 Pa. 27 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 21, 1985

The evidence in this case established that on July 1, 1980 at approximately 2:30 a.m. a young woman was raped by two men. The rape occurred in a house on North 29th Street in Philadelphia. … The Superior Court concluded that the testimony sought to be immunized was not shown to be clearly exculpatory or essential, thus, the denial of immunity was sustainable.

Overstreet v. Borough of Yeadon

327 Pa. Super. 291 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 13, 1984

The criminal charges were dismissed after a preliminary hearing on the ground that a prima facie case had not been established, and a petition for rearrest was rejected by the Deputy Administrator for District Justices, the … As the facts alleged clearly would support a determination of willful misconduct on the part of the individual appellees, the preliminary objections of the individual appellees should not have been sustained on the ground

Scientific Games International, Inc. v. Commonwealth

620 Pa. 175 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 25, 2013

Summary The Procurement Code establishes administrative processes to address disputes arising in the procurement setting. … The Legislature obviously was entitled to rely on this clearly-expressed understanding when it subsequently devised the Procurement Code and its internal immunity reaffirmation.

Boettger v. Miklich

534 Pa. 581 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 10, 1993

In subsection (b) of § 5725 it clearly states that officers of the Commonwealth will not be protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in civil actions brought against them for violations of the provisions of this Act … That defense is defined as follows: “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

Bendas v. Township of White Deer

531 Pa. 180 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 17, 1992

Thus, in Mindala , three Justices, including this author, clearly were of the opinion that the question of what constitutes a dangerous condition constituted a fact question. … Nothing in this Opinion is intended to preclude a court from entering judgment in those cases where the facts establish as a matter of law that a dangerous condition did not exist. See generally Thompson Coal Co. v.

Carney v. Lowe

336 Pa. 289 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 25, 1939

In short, the Schmid case ruled that under Article III, section 7, of the Constitution, which forbids the granting of any special or exclusive privilege or immunity, a statute was constitutional if it granted to war vetterans … a preferential right to appointment provided they had qualified for the position under uniform eligibility rules, but was unconstitutional if it permitted veterans to qualify under less rigorous standards than those prescribed

Commonwealth v. Smith

502 Pa. 600 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 3, 1983

Evidence of a crime other than the one charged is clearly relevant and admissible for establishing a common plan, scheme or design. See, Commonwealth v. Galloway, supra; Commonwealth v. … The same rationale was clearly applicable here. 7 .

Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc.

579 Pa. 404 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 16, 2004

Id. 9 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8332). *413 The landscape regarding the criteria for establishing local agency immunity changed while the matter sub judice was pending on appeal. … Whether Cranberry Ambulance will qualify for local agency immunity pursuant to Sphere Drake cannot be not known at this stage of the proceedings; however, it is clear that the Commonwealth Court erred by failing to apply

Brown v. Travelers Insurance

434 Pa. 507 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 28, 1969

Appellant counters by arguing that this definition applies only to Article IV of the Act, that the employer’s immunity from liability is established in Article III and that, therefore, the general definition of “employer” … Instead, we are convinced that the legislature intended that the *514 broader definition which clearly applies in §319 should also apply in §303 establishing the employer’s immunity.

Commonwealth v. Maguigan

511 Pa. 112 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 30, 1986

This is prohibited and clearly does not serve as the basis of an acceptable attorney-client relationship. … Polak, 438 Pa. 67 , 263 A.2d 354 (1970), cited by Judge Spaeth, is clearly inapposite.

Jones v. Holes

334 Pa. 538 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 8, 1939

Fewer teachers were required in them, and new teachers were needed in the commercial department, but appellant could not qualify. … To avoid this risk, they must forever continue only those *542 courses in which their preseut staff is qualified. What we said in Ehret v.

Thompson v. Nason Hospital

527 Pa. 330 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 20, 1991

Not surprisingly, the by-product of eliminating hospital immunity has been the filing of malpractice actions against hospitals. … Initially, suits against hospitals qualifying as charities failed because such hospitals were not liable vicariously or otherwise. Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 574 , 122 A.2d 209 (1956); and Yorston v.

KOTWASINSKI v. RASNER

436 Pa. 32 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 11, 1969

Bradstreet, supra, p. 169 ); (4) the burden to establish immunity from liability is upon the party who asserts such immunity (Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, supra, p. 436 ).” … The import of the clause is therefore clearly different in the two situations. 2 Interpreting this rather imprecise statement on behalf of appellants in the way most favorable to them, it would appear to mean that Lanard

City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth

468 Pa. 174 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 6, 1976

There is no indication in that Act that the Legislature intended the Bureau of Correction to be immune from local zoning regulations. 7 Although the Act gives general au *184 thorization for the establishment of such centers … Other courts have found immunity from local zoning regulations when the public entity seeking the immunity is acting in a “governmental” rather than a “proprietary” capacity.