Case law

Charter Oak Fire Insurance v. Interstate Mechanical, Inc.

958 F. Supp. 2d 1188 · District Court, D. Oregon · Jul 23, 2013

Thus, Glacier concedes that it has chosen not to clearly assert a bad faith claim in order to pursue what it has viewed as a stronger argument, that this Court is the wrong forum. 2 Therefore, Glacier has attempted to have … The more modern rule strikes this court as the better one, but it is by no means established in this jurisdiction.

Morrow v. Trellix

District Court, D. Oregon · Sep 19, 2024

Morrow has continued to try to obtain information from Mcafee, and the email in question has been viewed 520 times, and therefore, is clearly important. … Morrow does not allege a special relationship, status, or standard of conduct that establishes defendants owed her a duty.

Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n

851 F. Supp. 1476 · District Court, D. Oregon · May 3, 1994

A credible link must be established between the reasoning and the con­clusion. … An expert may be “qualified” to render an opinion, but the methodology may be suspect.

McNall v. CREDIT BUREAU OF JOSEPHINE COUNTY

689 F. Supp. 2d 1265 · District Court, D. Oregon · Feb 5, 2010

The court also found that the collection agency was not a judgment creditor indicating that a debt had been judicially established as was the case in Hasbun, 323 F.3d at 803 . Pintos, 565 F.3d at 1113-14 . … The fact that plaintiff Karyl McNall signed the computer screen and not plaintiff Michael McNall is of no moment; both plaintiffs clearly initiated the transaction with RVMC and participated in seeking treatment for their

Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. National Marine Fisheries Service

647 F. Supp. 2d 1221 · District Court, D. Oregon · Aug 12, 2009

The Corps’ EA establishes that the required balancing of benefits and detriments occurred. … “Clearly, there can be a significant impact on a species even if its existence is not jeopardized.” Id.

Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc.

6 F. Supp. 3d 1141 · District Court, D. Oregon · May 15, 2014

Genesis Healthcare Corporation the Third Circuit stated without analysis: To qualify for relief under the FLSA, a party plaintiff must “commence” his cause of action before the statute of limitations applying to his individual … Plaintiffs have not established they brought this action in a dual capacity.

Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland

428 F. Supp. 908 · District Court, D. Oregon · Mar 7, 1977

The plaintiffs clearly have standing to sue under NEPA. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 1975). … The registrants have not established that dioxin and 2,4,5-T do not accumulate in body tissues.

Axelsen v. Hillsboro Union High School District No. 3

898 F. Supp. 719 · District Court, D. Oregon · Jul 17, 1995

The District is a “fair dismissal district,” O.R.S. 342.815(4), and plaintiff qualifies as a “teacher” under the fair dismissal statutes. See O.R.S. 342.120(9) and 342.815(1). … The District argues that this interpretation means that any teacher who works 135 days in his or her third year automatically attains permanent status, a result clearly not intended by the legislature.

Minton v. Klamath Co. Jail

District Court, D. Oregon · Feb 8, 2021

Cahill told Minton that she was not qualified to answer that question, and suggested Minton send a kyte to a sergeant regarding this request. (Id.) … Applicable Law Section 1983 provides a private right of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc.

857 F. Supp. 2d 1114 · District Court, D. Oregon · Apr 24, 2012

A district judge may reconsider a magistrate’s order where it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(a); Henry v. … Plaintiffs claim that Mensing overturns the law established in Foster v.

Nemeth v. Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC)

District Court, D. Oregon · Sep 30, 2025

Plaintiff, however, does not clearly allege that Banks was in disciplinary segregation at the time of his death. … Plaintiff needs to more clearly allege when and how Banks was deprived of the amenities to adequately allege this claim.

International Longshore & Warehouse Union & Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. ICTSI Oregon, Inc.

15 F. Supp. 3d 1075 · District Court, D. Oregon · Mar 24, 2014

Specifically, the courts analyzed whether the conduct at issue was directly and extensively regulated by labor law and was clearly acceptable under labor law. … 8(b)(3) (which establishes that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer), or section 8(e) (which establishes that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor

Maney v. Brown

District Court, D. Oregon · Sep 28, 2021

“A motion to strike should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Menchu v. Multnomah Cnty. … Specifically, Defendants argue that the Court should strike paragraphs 46-49, 86-93, and 110(e) of the FAC as immaterial based on the Court’s prior ruling that discretionary immunity precludes Plaintiffs from pursuing

Opal Labs Inc. v. Sprinklr, Inc.

District Court, D. Oregon · Sep 2, 2020

Any interpretation of the Integration Agreement that would give it effect before April 11, 2016, would clearly contradict its effective date provisions. See Frank v. … The contracts at issue in the cases that Defendant relies on in support of its argument that the Integration Agreement retroactively revoked and replaced the NDA and Teaming Agreement did not include the same qualifying

Metro v. Exxon Mobil Corporation

District Court, D. Oregon · Jun 25, 2024

Finally, respondents' argument that Local Rule 3-4(c) establishes that a petition for pre-suit discovery initiates a civil action is simply incorrect. … Nov. 8, 2016), establishes that the petition is removable because it plainly mirrors proceedings pending in federal court. Again, the Court disagrees.

Feskens v. Astrue

804 F. Supp. 2d 1105 · District Court, D. Oregon · Apr 8, 2011

STANDARDS The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish disability. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.2005). … The ALJ did not clearly set out the weight he gave to Dr. Moreno’s opinion. Tr. 436-37. The ALJ emphasized Dr. Moreno’s statement that Plaintiffs physi *1121 cal RFC was “essentially normal” and noted it contradicts Dr.

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley

6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 · District Court, D. Oregon · Jun 1, 1998

Thus, a species is threatened if it is likely to qualify for endangered status within the foreseeable future. Any interested person may petition to list a species as threatened or endangered. 16 USC § 1533 (b)(3)(A). … Diaz-Soltero “[t]he Administrative Record points clearly to the need to list ... the Oregon Coast ESU[ ] as threatened.” Id.

Lynx Franchising Intellectual Property, LLC v. Superior Fence and Construction, Inc.

District Court, D. Oregon · Nov 25, 2025

State Univ., 755 F.Supp.3d at 582 (holding that defendant’s affirmative defense “qualifies as a proceeding under § 1065” because it “is adverse to [Plaintiff]’s claim of ownership of [its] mark”); Gutier v. … Under Miller, a district court is bound to follow the reasoning of a precedential case “unless it had been ‘effectively overrule[d]’ or was ‘clearly irreconcilable’ with a case from the relevant court of last resort” United

Loveall

District Court, D. Oregon · Aug 19, 2026

If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must “establish that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to support a prima facie case.” … Failure to give statutorily required notice, for instance, does not qualify as protected conduct under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 4–5.

Miller v. Mallery

410 F. Supp. 1283 · District Court, D. Oregon · Mar 5, 1976

Clearly, “the man-caused risk is higher than lightning right now,” (Wilson Depo. p. 38) as shown by statistics from 1960 to 1973 in the Bull Run. … The defendants have responded with statements of policy and purpose, not with evidence that establishes a protective practice. 11 *1297 VII.