Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • State v. Vincent

    556 P.3d 1046 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 5, 2024

    Evans acknowledged that he “d[id]n’t know what’s going on in their head,” but believed that “they had known that they had been in the wrong, clearly, and were trying to get away from witnesses and/or police.” … That suspicion arises from a general concern about the veracity of a witness who has admitted to committing a crime and a specific concern that an accom- plice might be induced by promises of leniency or immunity to testify

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Dept. of Human Services v. N. H.

    322 Or. App. 507 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 26, 2022

    S qualified for developmentally disabled services. In October 2020, S participated in a “best interest” evaluation with Dr. Bennett. … Accordingly, we are persuaded that the benefits to S of ending the legal relation- ship with mother clearly outweigh any risk of harm posed to S by a termination.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • State v. Nix

    251 Or. App. 449 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 1, 2012

    That interest might, if viewed in isolation, suffice to qualify the public as the victim of a violation of ORS 167.325. … Deputy Hemphill stated that the bill was necessary because the existing law had “vague and archaic language,” had “no enforceable prohibition against abandonment,” and had “a lack of clearly defined standards for animal care

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Oregon State Bar v. Smith

    149 Or. App. 171 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 9, 1997

    Thus, although the “practice of law” circa 1937 clearly included appearing in court and drafting court *180 documents, it was unsettled whether that concept encompassed engaging in out-of-court negotiations on a “client’s … , accredited and licensed by a board or commission established by statute may engage in those professions and occupations.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Portland Police Ass'n v. City of Portland

    275 Or. App. 700 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 30, 2015

    Specifically, the city’s thesis is that the legislature has established, in ORS 181.789(2), a clearly defined public policy that deference be given to a police chiefs plausible interpretation and application of a police department … We disagree with the city that ORS 181.789(2) establishes a clearly defined public policy requiring deference to the police chiefs decision on whether an officer’s conduct comports with the bureau’s use-of-force policies.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. State Office for Services to Children & Families v. Hammons

    169 Or. App. 589 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 6, 2000

    taken within the 90-day time frame established by ORS 419A.200(4)(c). … Clearly, appellate counsel’s inadequate performance did not affect the outcome of the trial, it affected the appellate court’s ability to review de novo the order of the trial court. ORS 419A.200(5).

    Declined to follow by Miller v. Baldwin, 176 Or. App. 500 (2001)Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Pam's Carpet Service, Inc. v. Employment Division

    61 Or. App. 96 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 22, 1982

    We said: “* * * while the foregoing may not qualify as ‘risk capital’ in the sense that it does not amount to a business that could be sold beyond the value of the equipment used, it is commensurate in ‘quantity and quality … Their testimony did not address whether any other firms had in fact offered similar arrangements during the audit period, which is clearly relevant to economic dependency.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Marks v. LCDC

    327 Or. App. 708 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 7, 2023

    As noted above, petitioner contends that “LCDC erred in determining the IGAs do not qualify as land use decisions under the signif- icant impact test.” … And, as petitioner also notes, even if Metro has the authority to add part of Stafford to the UGB without a concept plan, “Metro clearly stated it will not do so and agreed to the 5-Party IGA to convince the Cities of this

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber

    188 Or. App. 526 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 9, 2003

    Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair judicial immunity if otherwise applicable. “(11) Reporting requirement. … The dissent disagrees, because it believes that section 7 does not confer a qualifying constitutional right on persons in need of drug treatment.

    Reversed by Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or. 496 (2006)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Milne v. Milne Construction Co.

    207 Or. App. 382 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 23, 2006

    Office in Portland,” considering that there were various company office locations and at least some were not intended to qualify. … To clearly present the facts, we refer by proper name to Bortolin and to MCC.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Milne v. City of Canby

    195 Or. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 1, 2004

    While not finding it necessary to address all of the parties’ arguments, the court nonetheless recognized that the ‘unneeded but committed’ policy could serve to allow an amendment of an existing UGB. “ ‘If an area does not qualify … The court clearly believed that the exception for ‘unneeded but committed’ lands was a valid method of amending a UGB, without regard to the Goal 14 ‘need’ factors.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • State v. Sell

    9 Or. App. 299 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 21, 1972

    The qualifying phrase ‘in any significant Avay’ is used at one point in the opinion, although it is omitted in later statements of the test. … However, it clearly does not suggest that when he consented to the search the defendant was a “focal suspect,” which in State v.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • At&T Communications of Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene

    177 Or. App. 379 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 31, 2001

    But it is generally required that the legislature’s preemptive intentions be clearly stated. … In that case, the county imposed a business income tax on pari-mutuel racing establishments.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Holbrook v. Precision Helicopters, Inc.

    162 Or. App. 538 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 15, 1999

    Defendant misunderstands the requirements for establishing a business record. … if kept in the course of a *544 regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the * * * report, * * * all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Stewart v. Salem School District 24J

    65 Or. App. 188 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 12, 1983

    “Fasold: Under our laws, it is permissible for a school district to establish that kindergarten which would include 5-year olds. … If the legislature intended that the district provide educational services to handicapped children under regular school age, it should have said so clearly. 6 Petitioner asserts that, in any event, 20 USC § 1400 et seq and

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Premier Technology v. OR. STATE LOTTERY

    136 Or. App. 124 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 23, 1995

    Plaintiffs right to sue defendant is found in ORS 30.320. 1 That statute provides a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity and a statutory remedy for breaches of contracts by state agencies made within the scope of their … In paragraph 3.1, the agreement clearly establishes a condition precedent regarding the requirement of a performance bond.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Department of Human Services v. J. G.

    260 Or. App. 500 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jan 2, 2014

    The Supreme Court has explained that “where state courts entertain a federally created cause of action, the federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice,” and “any state law, however clearly within a State … Therefore, we turn to ICWA’s definition of a foster care placement to determine whether the guardianship in this case qualifies.

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Singh v. McLaughlin

    255 Or. App. 340 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 21, 2013

    Because a lawyer cannot commit a crime on behalf of a client or to further the lawyer’s own *352 self-interest, that conduct, too, would fall outside the scope of the attorney-client relationship for purposes of immunity. … See Reynolds, 341 Or at 351 (“[T]he rule [concerning qualified privilege] protects lawyers only for actions of the kind that permissibly may be taken by lawyers in the course of representing their clients.”

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Powers

    232 Or. App. 214 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 25, 2009

    The defendant had argued to the trial court that his skateboard did not qualify because vehicles are something that one drives, and one does not drive a skateboard. … The parties clearly put before the trial court the meaning of ORS 144.120(1)(a) (1989).

    Reversed on other grounds by State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. 592 (2011)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • State v. Chavez-Meza

    301 Or. App. 373 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 18, 2019

    It is well established that confessions are presumed to be involuntary. Id. (citing Powell, 352 Or at 225-26; State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 137, 806 P2d 92 (1991)). … Those statements also did not suggest that, if defendant confessed, he might receive immunity or leniency.

    Cited 11 timesPublished

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