Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersorctapp

1,397 results

0.83s

  • Yes on 24-367 Committee v. Deaton

    276 Or. App. 347 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 3, 2016

    Brown introduced SJR 52, which would have established a new statewide property tax.’ «<*** [¿y|t a time when the people were clearly saying they wanted LOWER PROPERTY TAXES, [Brown] introduced legislation to add a new, state-wide … That document, which is in the record, clearly itemizes the two different existing fire district assessments.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Bates v. Oregon Health Authority

    335 Or. App. 464 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 16, 2024

    Robertson Framework We begin with the framework for evaluating Article I, section 8, claims, as established in Robertson. … Contrary to defen- dants’ assertion that that passage demonstrates that “the regulation of packaging is not the regulation of expression,” we interpret the passage as referring to the clearly non- expressive elements of packaging

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Daley v. Daley

    280 Or. App. 448 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 31, 2016

    As explained below, on review to determine “whether any evidence establishes the requisites for the issuance of the FAPA restraining order by the trial court,” Patton v. … In other words, she contends that “the evidence clearly demonstrates that subsection (b) of ‘abuse’ was proven.”

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Dept. of Human Services v. J. A. G.

    328 Or. App. 739 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 25, 2023

    Although the statute does not impose a “requirement of absolute need,” to qualify as a “needed” treatment, the treatment “must be connected more than tenuously to the jurisdictional bases” the treatment is Cite as 328 Or … Although we are mindful of the press of court business, we encourage courts, when issuing orders under ORS 419B.387, to clearly explain why, based on the evidence, the ordered treatment is needed by a parent to

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Hornbuckle v. Harris

    69 Or. App. 272 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 25, 1984

    Based on the foregoing facts as established by the pleadings, there is no 1983 violation. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 US 516 , 102 S Ct 781 , 70 L Ed 2d 738 (1982); Mullane v. … Even though plaintiffs’ homes qualified for homestead exemptions under former ORS 23.240(1), plaintiffs lost those exemptions because they failed to file homestead exemption claims. See former ORS 23.270 and 23.450(3).

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Mason v. Mountain River Estates, Inc.

    73 Or. App. 334 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 17, 1985

    The county established a three-stage approval process for PUDs. … Moreover, the county’s recent interpretation is clearly contrary to the language and intent of the PUD ordinance.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Matter of Marriage of Red Fox

    23 Or. App. 393 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 24, 1975

    by a French court because in the course of the proceeding leading up to the entry of that de *400 cree a party had been permitted to testify “not under oath” and without cross-examination and because documentary evidence clearly … Miller, 70 Ariz 380, 222 P2d 624 (1950). ⑦ That an Indian tribe has the authority to regulate the domestic relations of its members — including the power to grant a divorce — has been well established. United States v.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Nichols v. Clackamas County

    146 Or. App. 25 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 9, 1997

    here that Brentmar does not permit LCDC to adopt any rules that amplify the statutory descriptions of uses in ORS 215.213(1) and ORS 215.283(1), even in ways *33 that are fully consistent with the statutes and that would clearly … Affirmed. 1 No argument is made that the parcel qualifies for a dwelling under any other regulatory standard. 2 Only Washington County and Lane County adopted such provisions while the option for doing so existed. 3 We note

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. v. City of Eugene

    211 Or. App. 573 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 28, 2007

    In February 2003, the city manager issued Administrative Order 58-02-29-F (the 2003 order), adopting the reduced rate and ratifying the other rates established in the 2002 order. … State of Oregon, 161 Or App 32, 38 , 983 P2d 1044 , rev den, 329 Or 447 (1999) (“[T]he legislative power includes the authority to write a seemingly absurd law, so long as the intent to do that is stated clearly.”).

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Pulley v. Herndon

    324 Or. App. 568 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 15, 2023

    Mother asks this court to exercise de novo review, asserting that this qualifies as an “exceptional case” for purposes of ORAP 5.40(8)(c). … [She] testified that [grandmother] and [T] were clearly bonded and the relationship benefitted [T] psychologically. “3.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Hudjohn v. S&G MACHINERY CO.

    200 Or. App. 340 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 22, 2005

    Extensive motions practice ensued, much of which pertained to S&G’s invocation of immunity from civil liability by virtue of the “workers’ compensation exclusivity” statute, ORS 656.018(l)(a) 2 Ultimately, plaintiff filed … Second, Butler’s opinion as to causation, even as so qualified, was explicitly stated in terms of possibility (“may be”) and not probability.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • State v. Bowman

    60 Or. App. 184 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 10, 1982

    This statute does not give much help in defining the minimum requisites of a private school, but it clearly states that the “parent or private teacher” exemption is not a private school. 3 The statute is not vague. … Establishment of a knowing or intentional violation satisfies the lesser culpable mental state of criminal negligence. ORS 161.115(3).

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Jacobson

    164 Or. App. 37 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 3, 1999

    “Claimant agreed to a training program with a goal of cost estimator under the good faith belief that this would qualify him for a job in the electrical field. … The record tends to establish the opposite since there were concerns about late payment of wages and the allegation that Shari might be using illegal practices.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • McInnis v. Lind

    198 Or. App. 139 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 2, 2005

    Plaintiff asserts that the compromise letter “clearly sets out that the [original option] remains in effect.” We disagree. … Even if we were to agree that this conduct was unequivocally referable to the alleged oral agreement, none of the alleged facts establish equitable grounds for enforcement.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Roach v. Hockey

    53 Or. App. 710 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 31, 1981

    He argues that the failure to give this additional qualifying instruction amounted to telling the jury that a physician is not liable for an inappropriate judgment if he acts in good faith. … The trial court clearly instructed the jury to disregard the release and its terms if it found that it did not apply to the present defendants.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Marquam Farms Corp. v. Multnomah County

    147 Or. App. 368 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 16, 1997

    had somehow established a nonconforming use to operate and expand a 50-dog kennel. … To the extent that the county has interpreted the section in the manner that petitioners assert, the interpretation cannot survive even under the less than stringent “clearly wrong” test that inheres in Clark.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • SAIF Corp. v. Traner

    270 Or. App. 67 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 25, 2015

    The board observed that, under ORS 656.267(1), claimant was required to “clearly request formal written acceptance of a new [or] omitted medical condition ***.” … Those precedents establish that a claimant initiates a claim for a new or omitted medical condition under ORS 656.267(1) when clearly requesting formal written acceptance of that condition, even if the requested condition

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • LandWatch Lane County v. Lane County

    346 Or. App. 290 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 31, 2025

    The planning director therefore concluded that, even though the properties were initially lawfully created in 1983, they were unlawfully adjusted and therefore were not lawfully estab- lished, meaning they did not qualify … As explained, however, the hearings official did not find that that the 1999 property line adjustment was a land use deci- sion or otherwise immune from collateral attack—instead she found that by following the

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Klein Campaigns, Inc.

    168 Or. App. 259 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 7, 2000

    With respect to the Lloyd Center, the court clearly concluded that there had been an invitation to the public to use its common areas as public property. … This court held that the defendant had established that the premises were of the sort subject to the right established in Whiffen , and the Supreme Court affirmed.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • GAC v. State Ex Rel. Juv. Dept.

    219 Or. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 26, 2008

    Mother also testified that "I don't think I'm qualified any more to help [V] with all the psychological issues that she has." … See, e.g., ORS 30.936 (defining claim for physical injury, for immunity purposes, with reference to ORS 161.015).

    Cited 1 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.